The PSYCHOLOGY of EXPERIENCING

Fyodor Vasilyuk

Progress Publishers

The
PSYCHOLOGY
# of EXPERIENCING

Fyodor Vasilyuk, Cand. Sc. (Psychol.), works at a psychological clinic.
In his *The Psychology of Experiencing* he provides an analysis of human psychological states arising from various stress situations and offers a theory to explain them.
He also examines different ways of coping with psychological frustrations, conflicts and personality crises.
This book is intended both for specialists and the lay reader interested in psychology.

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Fyodor Vasilyuk

An Analysis of How Critical Situations Are Dealt With

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FOREWORD

In classical psychology the phenomenal world of consciousness, the world of subjective human experience, was viewed as internal by its very nature, and as having no connection with external objective reality. And along with this, action was seen as mechanical execution of commands, and movement as contraction of muscles and extension of tendons. Thus classical psychology did not allow action even to approach the threshold of the psychologist's study. The subsequent history of psychological science is full of ingenious attempts to overcome this dichotomy between human consciousness and human existence in the everyday world, and to lead psychology out of the self-enclosed phenomenal world of consciousness. A decisive step towards bridging the gap between the internal and the external was achieved by L. S. Vygotsky, A. V. Zaporozhets, A. N. Leontiev, A. R. Luria, S. L. Rubinstein, and their pupils and successors, who laid the foundations for construction of a psychological *theory of activity*. According to this theory, the emergence of a mediated structure of psychological processes in the human being is the result of the social activity of that being. Mental processes are born of activity, and become functional organs of activity. The theory was originally developed on the basis of material concerning cognitive processes—perception, attention, memory, thought. Within the framework of this theory these processes are seen as particular forms of perceptive, mnemonic and mental actions, which pass through a long period of development. The data accumulated make it evident that something in consciousness has existential characteristics (susceptible of being objectively analysed), characteristics which have their source in human object-orientated action; and the action has in turn its own biodynamic, sensory fabric. Here we have the content of the principle of *unity of consciousness and activity*. The analysis made by A. N. Leontiev of the classical psychology of consciousness has demonstrated the total lack of future for investigations of individual consciousness viewed in isolation from its connections, firstly with the individual's existence and secondly with social consciousness.

At the same time, within the theory of activity there has been a certain gap between its treatment of cognitive processes and its treatment of consciousness. One cannot progress from cognitive processes to consciousness, bypassing an activity-related treatment of human emotions and experiences. Of course adherents of the psychological theory of activity have turned their attention to the sphere of the emotions and to the world of subjective experiences. Here one may mention first of all the name of L. S. Vygotsky, who towards the end of his life undertook a major theoretical study of Spinoza's teaching on the passions. He wrote of how the world of inner consciousness is generalised and perceived in a system of meanings—the human being emerges from "the slavery of affects" and acquires inner freedom. S. L. Rubinstein advanced the thesis that emotions are born of action, and that every action therefore contains at least some seeds of emotionality. A. V. Zaporozhets initiated investigations into the genesis of emotions in children, and saw these as functional organs of the individual, as specific forms of action. More than forty years ago A. N. Leontiev and A. R. Luria were stating the necessity of viewing complex human experiences as a product of historical development. In other words, during the time over which the psychological theory of activity has been elaborated, definite methodological theses have been advanced as to how an activity theory of human emotions and experiences might be constructed. The logic of development of the activity theory itself points in that direction. And this is the task which the author of this volume, F. Y. Vasilyuk, himself a direct disciple of A. N. Leontiev, has taken upon himself.

Does this mean that we have here a book about the emotions? No, it does not. To view the book in that way would be to disguise new psychological content in old, familiar clothing. The problem of experiencing, as posed in this book, does not fit into the traditional range of questions relating to emotional processes. The activity theory in fact calls for thematic demarcations quite other than those we have inherited from classical psychology.

The author has taken as his object of study the processes whereby a human being copes with critical situations in life. F. Y. Vasilyuk poses the problem broadly and boldly. One may summarise the basic thrust of his intention thus: to investigate from the psychologist's standpoint just *what* a person does when there is nothing to be done, when he is in a situation that renders impossible the realisation of his needs, attitudes, values etc... In order to fix this subject-matter within a theoretical framework, the author introduces a new category into the conceptual apparatus of the activity theory—the category of experiencing. In this book experiencing is not seen as a reflected gleam, in the subject's consciousness, of one or another state—not as a particular form of contemplation, but as a particular form of activity, directed towards the restoration of mental equilibrium, of the lost meaningfulness of existence; directed, in a word, towards "the production of meaning".

The main aim of the study is to establish the regularities followed by the processes of experiencing. To do this, F. Y. Vasilyuk employs the method of categorical typology. This method is one of various possible practical realisations of Karl Marx's "ascent from the abstract to the concrete", and it is this method which is responsible for the success of this work's typological analysis of experiencing. Four principles are isolated to which the processes of experiencing are subordinated. These are the principles of pleasure, of reality, of value, and of creativity. It should be stressed that we are speaking here of the establishment (one might almost say, the discovery) of *a system of psychological regularities,* not of the mere addition of two new principles of experiencing, value and creativity, to those which have long been familiar to us. The latter principles, pleasure and reality, are subjected to critical re-appraisal within the framework of the new system; they are in effect re-discovered, since their inner psychological structure is here elucidated for the first time. No less important is the fact that fitting these principles into an integrated system of regularities indicates their true place in the human psyche and thereby demonstrates the philosophical and methodological limitations of psychoanalytical theory, which absolutises the principles of pleasure and reality and in consequence reduces the higher, spiritual phenomena of mental life to the same level as its lower ones.

The book presents a convincing demonstration of how the processes of experiencing are mediated by distinct patterns or "constructs" in social consciousness, while stressing that these patterns are not of natural origin, as C. G. Jung, for one, considered, but are historico-cultural formations.

Of very great importance and value to the psychological theory of activity as a whole (not only to the theory of experiencing) is the transition effected in this work from a schema of a single activity to a schema of the life-world. The idea of such a transition is not new, but this is the first time it has been carried through in deed rather than by declared intent only. Within this ontology of the life-world the idea of experiencing is built up as of a person's "working-over" of himself within the world, and of the world within the self, when crises occur. The concept of the life-world is important for the purpose of doing away with the lingering remains—very tenacious of life in psychological circles—of the classical gnoseological approach which saw subject and object as existentially separate and opposed to one another and as meeting only on the perceptual plane. The concept of the life-world establishes the fact that nowhere, except in our own theoretical constructs, do we find a person before or outside of the world in which he lives, and that to consider him in abstraction from that world is a theoretical fallacy, one which has in its time brought psychology into a state of crisis, the consequences of which are felt to this day.

The psychological theory of activity has a high potential for practical uses. Its conceptual schemata are being used with success, in child and educational psychology, in work psychology and ergonomics, in social and clinical psychology. F. Y. Vasilyuk's book is purely theoretical. But its basic thrust is towards the practical provision of help to the person overtaken by a crisis in life.

F. Y. Vasilyuk's study makes a real contribution to the development of the activity theory and extends the field of practical application of that theory by bringing within it what has become known as "life psychology". Let us recall the words of L. S. Vygotsky: "Not only does life need psychology and practise it everywhere in other guises; within psychology itself we must expect contact with life to have a stimulating effect".

Prof. V. P. Zinchenko

What does a human being do when there is nothing to be done? A misfortune has occurred, the situation cannot be put right, it is hopeless, the whole of life is bereft of meaning, it seems as though nothing and no one can be of any help... But time passes, and we see the same person cheerful once more and full of hopes. How has he managed to emerge from the crisis, to pass from grief to happiness? These questions, or, to be more precise, the amazement evoked by this strength of the human spirit, provided the starting-point of the present study.

The main aim of this book is to attempt the construction of a theory of the psychological processes whereby a human being copes with critical situations in life. These processes are best denoted, in Russian, by the word *perezhivaniye*. It is a very comprehensive word: in colloquial speech the verb *perezhivat'* can mean "to be alarmed, worried, upset"; "to suffer mental torment"; "to undergo some trial and survive it, having overcome the difficulties and troubles involved"; "to experience a state or feeling and then outlive or vanquish it";—and many other things. Out of all these meanings, scientific usage takes only one—here *perezhivaniye* means the direct sensation or experience by the subject of mental states and processes. We propose to use this term to denote also a particular activity, a particular internal work, by means of which a person overcomes and conquers a crisis, restores lost spiritual equilibrium, resurrects the lost meaning of existence.

But what term should be chosen for the English translation? The area of psychological reality which is our concern is no *terra incognita* for Western psychology. It is described and explained in, for the most part, the theories of defensive and coping processes. Within these theories a vast number of important facts, profound hypotheses, well-founded conceptual constructions has been amassed. And yet we are obliged to reject the terms "psychological defence" and "coping behaviour", firstly because the categories they represent delimit only some partial aspects of the integral problem seen here, thus none of them can aspire to the role of general category; and secondly because the terms "defence" and "coping" have too many associations with psychoanalysis and behaviourism, whereas this study has been conducted along lines proper to a quite different school of psychology, that of Vygotsky, Leontiev and Luria, a school which in many ways stands opposed to psychoanalysis and behaviourism, but which in our opinion is potentially capable of assimilating all that is true in the concepts of the above-mentioned schools, and of making a major contribution towards creating a psychological theory of the processes through which critical situations are dealt with. For those reasons, then we need a new, fresh term. We have decided to use the term *experiencing* to denote the subject-matter of our study.

But this term is already bespoken in English-speaking psychology. We may refer the reader to, for instance, E. T. Gendlin's interesting book *Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning* (Glencoe Free Press, New York, 1962; No. 96 in bibliography to this volume). Gendlin's object of study is the subjective (the book is sub-titled "A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the Subjective"). The "molecule" of the subjective is meaning. As a molecule of water is made up of atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, so meaning is formed from experiencing and symbolism (of various kinds). Experiencing as a "chemically pure element" is "...partly unformed stream of feeling that we have every moment" (96, p. 3). Gendlin brings in a direct phenomenological criterion by which his concept may be verified, in the shape of an appeal to the personal experience of each of us: "Experiencing is simply feeling as it concretely exists for us inwardly, and as it accompanies every lived aspect of what we are and mean and perceive" (*ibid.*, p. 15). Gendlin repeatedly reminds us that his concept is not merely a logical construct, that it is backed up by subjective reality "...to which you can every moment attend inwardly, it you wish" (*ibid.*, p. 3).

The process of experiencing is involved in perception and in personality changes. These are two principal functions of experiencing. Personality changes in the patient during psychotherapy take place not because the person treated forms exact concepts of his or her problems, but because he or she succeeds in feeling them through, "by facing them" or "by working through them". "Facing" and "working through" are imprecise colloquial terms for this vital function of experiencing in psychotherapeutic change. One of the functions of experiencing, then, is that it carries on a processing of problems, and brings about personality changes.

Now let us try to compare Gendlin's concept of experiencing with the meaning we propose to give the term in these pages. For Gendlin, in defining his concept of experiencing it is its ontological status that is of primary importance (his indication of the phenomenological "body" of the process), while its functions are of secondary interest (specifically, its function in dealing with personal problems). The process of direct feeling, regardless of what functions it may be performing, can, according to Gendlin, be called "experiencing". But for us, in defining the concept "experiencing" it is its function in coping, in achieving control, which is of primary importance, while its ontological status is secondary. We shall be denoting as "experiencing" any process which brings about resolution of a critical life-situation, irrespective of how that process is directly felt by the individual. Not that we consider this process of direct feeling to be unimportant, it is simply that we are commencing our investigation of "experiencing" not from that phenomenological angle, but from the point of view of function, seeing experiencing as, first and foremost, a special kind of inner working towards the solution of a critical situation, only later on shall we be posing the question of the phenomenological forms in which the process takes place. From this standpoint even some external act, one single instance of behaviour, can be "experiencing" or a fragment of experiencing, if it performs the function of enabling a person to cope psychologically with a crisis.

While we are aware of all the difficulties of terminology and style that will ensue, we are nonetheless standing by our choice of the term "experiencing", principally because here we have a task that psychology must face up to—the construction of an integrated theory of experiencing which will satisfactorily bring together the phenomenological and the functional aspects of this process. S. Freud, J.-P. Sartre, C. Rogers and E. Gendlin have made great strides towards construction of such a theory, but we are as yet far from reaching the goal. It is in the hope that this study may serve as one small brick in the structure of a future theory that the author has decided to retain the term "experiencing" to denote the subject-matter of his work.

Soviet psychology long ago ceased to be a purely academic discipline but it still has great undischarged responsibilities in practical matters. In various areas of the life of society such a responsibility is being actively met, the figure of the psychologist is becoming more and more familiar in the modern factory, in medical establishments, in the world of education and in that of law. But the need for the psychologist's help exists not only in the wider social setting but in personal and family life also, and that need is not, so far, being met satisfactorily. Conversely psychology itself, particularly the part of it sometimes called "interests" psychology—that studying human motives, emotions and personality—cannot productively develop any further within the four walls of the laboratory, taking no active part in real life.

Under the pressure of these mutual interests a new (and long-awaited) era in the development of Soviet practical psychology is now opening up: before our very eyes a whole new sector of psychological service to the public is being born—family counselling; suicide prevention service with its network of "socio-psychological assistance centres" and in-patient facilities for crisis management; psychological counselling within higher educational establishments, etc. (8, 9, 40 et al.).

It is still not altogether clear what organisational forms such psychological services will take as they become an independent branch of practice, but whatever the forms may be, the very fact that such work is being done obliges the discipline of general psychology to work out basic theoretical principles which will underpin this practical work.

These guiding principles must take account of the professional position to be occupied by the psychologist who does practical work with individual patients. Whereas his psychologist colleagues working in the fields of education, medicine or law have operated and have been seen as consultants and assistants to the teacher, the doctor or the lawyer—as ancillary workers serving specialists—once a psychologist starts to work in the kind of service mentioned above, he becomes the responsible practitioner directly serving the individual who has come to him for help. And if formerly the psychologist saw his patient through the prism of the questions posed by other specialists (making a more precise diagnosis, deciding on degree of legal responsibility, etc.), or through the prism of a psychologist's own *theoretical* questions, now he is, in the capacity of *responsible and independent practitioner,* for the first time coming face to face professionally with—not "a patient", "a student", "a suspect", "an operative", "an experimental subject" etc.—but with a human being, in all the fulness, actuality and tension of that being's real-life problems. Of course, this does not mean that the professional psychologist has to act "as one human being to another", so to speak; the main point here is to separate off, out of all the everyday problems involved, the strictly psychological aspect, and by so doing to delineate the zone of competence of the psychologist.

Delimitation of that zone is determined by the fact that the psychologist's professional activity does not coincide, directionally, with the pragmatic or ethical targeting shown by the patient, with the latter's emotional-volitional attitudes; the psychologist cannot borrow his professional goals from the array of actual goals and wishes presented by the patient, and consequently the psychologist's operations, and reactions to events in the patient's life, cannot be automatically determined by what the patient wants.

This of course does not mean that the psychologist has to kill off within himself all capacity for sympathy and empathy, to foreswear forever any right to react to a "cry for help" (260) not as a specialist but simply as a human being, i.e., with moral support. What responses to another's misfortune come under this head? On the emotional plane—to attempt to console, to offer sympathy; on the intellectual plane—to advise; on the behavioural—to give practical assistance. But all these actions come within a dimension of life where professional duty is irrelevant, just as no professional duty can prescribe that a doctor should, or should not, give his own blood to a patient.

What a psychologist really must do, if he or she wishes to be useful as a specialist to a fellow-human, is to learn—while keeping the capacity for sympathy which is after all the soil of feeling and motive that nourishes practical action—how to subordinate immediate moral reactions arising from sympathy to a specific programme of psychological treatment, just as a surgeon does in performing an operation, or as a teacher does when applying educational techniques which may not always be pleasant for the pupil.

Why, though, is it so essential to be able to subordinate immediate moral reactions to a professional, psychologist's, attitude? Because, first of all, consolation and pity are not quite what a patient requires (and often quite the opposite of what is required) if the crisis is to be weathered. And secondly, because advice on what to do in daily life—which many patients are very eager to have—is mostly quite useless or may even be harmful to them, because it panders to their unconscious desire to rid themselves of responsibility for their own lives. In any case a psychologist is not a specialist in giving practical advice, the training he has had is far from being equivalent to the acquisition of wisdom, and the fact of holding a diploma confers no moral right to lay down the law to another person on how to behave in this or that situation. Furthermore, before consulting a psychologist a patient has usually considered all the possible ways out of the situation troubling him and found them unsatisfactory. There is no reason to think that a psychologist, discussing a real-life situation with a patient in terms of everyday life, is going to find a way out that the patient has not noticed. The very fact of such a discussion taking place tends to maintain unrealistic hopes in the patient's mind that the psychologist can solve his life-problems for him, and the almost inevitable failure of the advice given saps the psychologist's authority and lessens the chances of treatment being ultimately successful, not to mention the fact that the patient often takes a morbid satisfaction in having "won the game" against the psychologist, as described by E. Berne (35) in *Games People Play*, under the heading "Why Don't You.... Yes, But...". And thirdly, to take the last-mentioned possible moral reaction to another's misfortune—offering practical assistance—this cannot be any part of the professional psychologist's resources simply because a psychologist cannot, with the best will in the world, improve a patient's material or social circumstances, alter his or her looks for the better, or bring back a lost loved one, i.e., cannot exert any influence on the existential side of the problem.

All these points are very important if a sober view of the possibilities and tasks of psychological treatment are to be formed in the minds of patients (and of psychologists). But the principal reason why the psychologist must operate beyond the bounds of immediate moral reaction when seeking means of treatment which are strictly psychological—the principal reason is simply this: only the person concerned can *experience* the events, circumstances and changes in life which have produced a crisis. No one else can do it for him just as even the most skilful teacher cannot *understand for* a pupil the material presented.

But the process of experiencing can to some extent be controlled—one can stimulate it, organise it, direct it, ensure favourable conditions for it; with the aim that the process should, ideally, lead to the strengthening and improvement of the patient's personality or, at the very least, that personality changes should not take a pathological or socially unacceptable direction (alcoholism, neurotic or psychotic states, suicide, crime, etc.). Thus experiencing is the main object upon which the efforts of the practical psychologist are focussed, when attempting to help an individual in a life-crisis. That being the case, it is quite natural that *the process of experiencing* should become the central *object of general psychological investigation* within the study of crisis management, if we are to build a firm theoretical foundation for psychological practice.

Let me repeat that the term "experiencing" is used here not in the sense most familiar in psychological literature—that of a direct, usually emotional form of presentation to the subject of the contents of his consciousness—but to denote *a special inner activity or inner work* by means of which an individual succeeds in withstanding various (usually painful) events and situations in life, succeeds in regaining the mental equilibrium which has been temporarily lost—succeeds, in short, in coping with a crisis. Why is it necessary to bring in this term at all? Because we are proposing to make our analysis on the basis of one particular concept of psychology—A. N. Leontiev's activity theory (12; 138a; 142), which is a major off-shoot of the work of L. S. Vygotsky, and there is no appropriate category or term available within this body of work.

Although many studies made within the framework of this theory do touch upon the problem concerning us—the psychological conquest of critical situations (15; 16; 17; 45; 138a; 140; 142; 176; 179; 224; 230; 244 et al.)—as yet no attempt has been made to pose this problem as such. The reason why activity theory has so far touched only in passing on this area of mental reality is to be found in the fact that this school of thought has paid most attention to the study of object-orientated practical activity and mental reflection, while the need for experiencing arises in precisely those situations which cannot be resolved by practical activity, however perfect their mental reflection. When misfortune comes upon a person, neither practical action nor perception of the situation can help to cope with it. That person must go through with the labour of experiencing. Experiencing is not practical activity, nor cognitive activity, but this does not mean that it is not activity at all, and therefore "of its very nature" falls outside the general picture given us by the activity theory; on the contrary, experiencing fills out that picture, since it represents a particular type of active process[1] alongside external-practical and cognitive activities, the most characteristic feature of processes of this type being their product. The product of the labour of experiencing is always something *internal* and *subjective*—mental equilibrium, consciousness of meaning, tranquillity, a new sense of values, etc.—in contrast to the *external* product of practical activity and the internal but *objective* (not in the sense of being always veracious in content, but in that of being formally related to the external) product of cognitive activity (knowledge, image).

In the problem of experiencing, then, the activity theory discovers a new dimension. And this determined the main aim of this investigation: taking activity as the general line of approach, to work out a system of theoretical representations of the processes whereby people overcome crises in their lives, and thus to advance the frontiers of the activity theory in general psychology, establishing the psychology of experiencing within that theory as a separate sector for theoretical studies and for the development of practical techniques.

Clearly such an aim could not be realised empirically, by accumulating more facts, of which there is already an abundance. An aim of this nature presupposes use of a theoretical method. The method we have employed is Karl Marx's "ascent from the abstract to the concrete" (1; 2; 62; 114; 217). As regards technical method, theoretical progression has been organised via the technique of categorical-typological analysis; the principles and technical devices of this analysis have been borrowed from the published work and the lectures etc. of O. I. Genisaretsky (97; 98).[1] The aim thus formulated, and the method chosen to achieve it, as well as the prevailing state of the science determined the order in which the questions to be dealt with in our study should be approached.

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[1] Emotional processes are not mentioned in this series, but not because experiencing replaces them—that is not the case. They cannot figure as a rightful unit in the series because they are not processes of activity. Consider: the questions proper to activity: "How?", "By what means?" etc. can be posed on the practical plane, on the cognitive plane, and on the plane of experiencing (one of the playwright Ostrovsky's characters tells a story thus—"this spring a pawnbroker hanged himself—they'd robbed him of twenty thousand. No wonder he strung himself up. How would you live through* that? How, eh?")—but on the emotional plane those questions are meaningless; one cannot conceive of asking how or by what means one should feel joy, pain or longing (*feel* them when they already exist, that is not evoke such feelings within oneself).

* "Perezhivat'/perezhit' " = experience (lit. "live through"). See Foreword to the English Edition.—*Trans.*

First, it was essential to place the problem of experiencing within the context of the psychological theory of activity, to introduce the category "experiencing" into that context in a systematic way. "Introducing" is perhaps not the most exact expression to apply to this operation, for the category "experiencing" is not something we took up ready-made from outside the activity theory, from some other theory; what we have tried to do is rather to take the extra-scientific, intuitively comprehended idea of experiencing and "facet" it, using as tools the concepts and categories of the activity theory. This "facetting" was rather like the process of recollection, when we cannot precisely recall something, but gradually narrow down the field of search by defining what that "something" relates to, and what it is not.

Only when the idea of the subject concerning us had been crystallised within the "maternal body" of general psychological theory, and a foothold thus obtained, could we then proceed to a review of the concepts of that subject current in psychological literature, without the risk of drowning in the superabundance of material available, of becoming bogged down in detail and losing sight of the main point. This review is made almost totally without regard to chronological order, it is structured in terms of system. The reader will therefore find in the first chapter not a gallery, where independent theoretical positions are displayed to view, but something more like a building site where separate elements or whole pre-assembled units for a future structure are being prepared, and the outlines of that future structure can here and there be anticipated.

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[1] O. I. Genisaretsky is a Soviet philosopher and psychologist specialising in systems studies, psychotechnology and experimental design.

The author would like to take this opportunity of expressing his gratitude to O. I. Genisaretsky for the unusual generosity with which he has made available his knowledge and his skill in methodology.

The aim of the second, constructive chapter is to take the basic abstractions, the points of departure, of the psychological theory of activity and—guided by the general idea of experiencing on the one hand and the data of our analytical review on the other—to deploy those abstractions in the direction of the empirical area which concerns us, with the object of transforming empirical facts into knowledge of a kind that will reveal the regularities of processes, not their general characteristics only.

Identification of those regularities does not of course complete the "ascent to the concrete". In our third and concluding chapter we pose the question of the cultural and historical determination of experiencing, our intention being that the consideration of this question should provide a bridge leading from the general regularities of the process—i.e., from experiencing in general, from the experiencing of some abstract individual—to the experiencing of a real person living among people at a particular historical period. This chapter contains our hypothesis on the experiencing process being mediated by specific structures of social consciousness; it also offers a detailed analysis of an actual instance of experiencing—one taken from a work of fiction. This analysis is intended not so much to prove our hypothesis (it is clearly insufficient for such a purpose) as to provide an illustration of it and of a number of the theses stated in earlier sections.

The author must here honour, with heartfelt appreciation, the gracious memory of the late A. N. Leontiev, under whose guidance this study was commenced; sincere thanks are also due to Professor V. P. Zinchenko, without whose sympathy and support this book would never have appeared, and to N. A. Alexeyev, L. M. Khairullayev and I. A. Pitlyar for the help they have provided.

Chapter I.

MODERN IDEAS ON EXPERIENCING

1. THE CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCING

Experiencing as Contemplation and Experiencing as Activity

When we worry whether a close friend will "come through" the experience of losing a loved one, we are not doubting his or her ability to suffer, to feel pain (i.e., the capacity "to experience" in the traditional psychologists' sense of the word), we are worrying about something quite different—how he or she will succeed in overcoming the suffering, in standing the test, in emerging from the crisis and regaining mental equilibrium—in short, in coping with the situation psychologically. We are speaking of an active, result-producing internal process which actually transforms the psychological situation, of experiencing as an activity.

The traditional psychological concept of experiencing has little in common with that of experiencing as an activity. This traditional meaning is determined by the category of the mental phenomenon. Any mental phenomenon is characterised outwardly as belonging to one "modality" or another (feeling, will, imagination, memory, thought, etc.), and as regards its inner structure by, firstly, the presence of what Franz Brentano called "immanent reality" (46) known to modern psychology as the real content of a mental phenomenon (200) and secondly by the fact that it is directly experienced by the subject, is presented to him. It is the latter aspect of the mental phenomenon which is defined in the concept of "experiencing" as traditionally employed. Experiencing, then, is understood in psychology as the direct, internal, subjective presentation of a mental phenomenon, as distinct from its content and "modality". From this point of view it makes theoretical sense to speak, as is occasionally done, of "thought experience", "sight experience" etc. (32; 242), clumsy as such expressions may sound.[1]

To elucidate the concept more precisely, one must consider experiencing in relation to consciousness. Both structural components of a mental phenomenon—real content and experiencing—are presented to consciousness, but they are presented in different ways, under quite different régimes of observation. Where the forms of apprehension are active—thought, memory—the real content apprehended appears as a passive object upon which mental activity is directed. That is, real content is presented to us *in apprehension,* which is a special act of observation in which the Observed is the object and the Observer is the subject. But in the case of experiencing these relations are reversed. Every one of us can bear witness that experiencing takes place spontaneously, without requiring any particular effort on our part, that it is presented to us directly, of itself (compare Descartes' "we apprehend it of itself"). To say of experiencing that "it is presented of itself" is a way of underlining the fact that it comes of its own force, that it is not reached by any effort or act of apprehension or reflection, in other words the Observed here is active and is therefore the logical subject, while the Observer, on the contrary, only feels or suffers the effect of what is presented, is passive, and therefore appears logically as the object.

To bring out even more sharply the specific characteristics of experiencing as a particular régime of functioning of consciousness, one should name two other possible combinations. When consciousness functions as an active Observer, seizing upon its own activity, i.e., when both the Observer and the Observed are of an active, subjective nature, then we are dealing with reflection. And finally, the last possible case—when both the Observer and the Observed are objects, and that being so, observation as such disappears—gives the logical structure of the concept of the unconscious. From this standpoint, one begins to understand physicalist ideas of the unconscious as being the site of silent interaction between things and psychological forces (260).

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[1] In this, its most generalised definition, experiencing coincides with Descartes' "cogitatio": "Under this word (cogitatio) I subsume," explained Descartes, "all that takes place within us in such a way that we apprehend it of itself; therefore not only understanding, wishing, imagining, but feeling also, is the same thing as thinking" (66, p. 7).

The outcome of this train of argument is a categorical typology which shows us the place of experiencing among the other functional régimes of consciousness.

Typology of Functional Regimes of Consciousness



We cannot pause here for a detailed consideration of this typology; to do so would lead us too far away from our main theme, and in any case our principal object is already achieved—we have formulated a system of appositions and oppositions which indicates the basic sense of the traditional psychological concept of experiencing.

Within this general idea, the variant of the concept most frequently found in modern psychology is that which limits experiencing to the sphere of the subjectively valid. Here experiencing is understood as being in opposition to objective knowledge: experiencing is a special, subjective, partial reflection, and a reflection, moreover, not of the surrounding real world *per se,* but of the world in its relation to the subject, as regards the possibilities it offers for satisfaction of the subject's immediate motives and needs. What it is important for us to stress, in this understanding of the matter, is not the distinction between experiencing and objective knowledge, but that which unites the two: experiencing is here seen as a *reflection* of the objective world. What is meant here is experiencing as contemplation, not experiencing as activity, which is the concern of our investigation.

In Soviet psychological literature on experiencing a special place belongs to the work of F. V. Bassin (28; 30), whose name is associated, in Soviet psychology of the 1970s, with questions of "meaningful experiences" (Bassin's own term) and the attempt to represent these as "the most promising subject-matter for psychology" (30, p. 107). In his work the concept of experiencing received what one might perhaps call a good shake-up, resulting in its bounds becoming blurred (but widened, too!) by the bringing together of this concept with a large and heterogeneous mass of phenomena and concepts (including A. Adler's "inferiority complex"; B. Zeigarnik's "incompleted action effect"; psychological defence mechanisms; A. N. Leontiev's "shift of motive towards goal" [27; 30], and so on); this enabled Bassin to advance a number of promising hypotheses, reaching beyond the bounds of the traditional concept of experiencing—we shall return later to one of these. The most important aspect of Bassin's work, in our opinion, is his movement—discernible, though not clearly formulated—towards an "economic" view of experiencing, that is towards glimpsing, beneath the surface of the phenomenally felt stream of experiencing, the *work* wrought by it, work which produces real, meaningful changes in a human being's consciousness, of import to that being's life. If this conceptual transition could be carried through, strictly and systematically, we should have a single theory of experiencing, uniting experiencing-contemplation and experiencing-activity in one representation.

Neither Bassin nor anyone else has so far succeeded in doing this at the level of an integrated theory; investigations of experiencing-contemplation, made mostly in terms of study of the emotions, and investigations of experiencing-activity made within the bounds of theories of psychological defence, compensation, coping behaviour and substitution, have for the most part proceeded along parallel lines, never coming together. Yet the history of psychology can show examples of successful combination of these two categories in clinical analyses of specific cases of experiencing (e.g., in Sigmund Freud's analysis [85] of "the work of mourning"; Erich Lindemann's—of "the work of grief" [152]; in Jean-Paul Sartre's interpretation of emotion as "magical action" [205]) and this gives reason to hope that sooner or later a unifying theory of experiencing will be constructed.

Introducing the Concept "Experiencing" into the Categorical Framework of the Activity Theory

But construction of such a unifying theory is still in the future. We face a humbler task by far: to develop our ideas of experiencing-as-activity starting from the theses of the psychological theory of activity. This concept of experiencing-as-activity does not, then, claim to replace or to subsume the traditional concept "experiencing".* It is introduced not instead of but alongside it, as an independent, free-standing concept.

In Western psychology the problem of experiencing is being actively studied within the framework of investigations into processes of psychological defence, compensation, coping behaviour. An immense mass of facts has been described, sophisticated techniques have been developed for their study, much methodological experience of working with individuals in crisis situations has been accumulated. In recent years this field has attracted close attention from Soviet psychologists and psychiatrists also. The psychological theory of activity, though, has stood somewhat aside from this complex of problems.

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* From here on, we shall use "experiencing" as meaning experiencing-as-activity, noting with an asterisk all cases where the word is used in its traditional meaning.

Yet if this theory lays claim to be valid for psychology in general, it cannot just calmly contemplate the existence of vast deposits of psychological facts (known to other systems of psychology), and of large areas of practical psychological work, and make no attempt to assimilate to itself these facts and the intellectual and technical expertise associated with them.

It cannot of course be asserted that the activity school of psychology has totally failed to notice this area of psychological reality. Quite frequently the course of an investigation has brought many authors with this general approach face to face with the problem of experiencing. In the works of these authors we find analyses of particular cases of experiencing (let us recall, for instance, A. N. Leontiev's description of the psychological solution found by the revolutionaries imprisoned in Schlüsselburg fortress, which enabled them to cope with the necessity of performing senseless forced labour[1]); likewise the work done to develop ideas on those psychological situations and states which produce experiencing processes (among them "disintegration of consciousness" [142], personality development crises [256], state of mental tension [176; 177; 179], and conflict within an individual's system of meanings [225; 230]). Some authors also arrive at the idea of experiencing via study of particular mental functions (we may name here V. K. Viliunas and his view of "the emotional way of solving a situation" [244, pp. 128-30] and the attempt to explain perceptive phenomena such as "perceptive defence", etc. through the concept of personal meaning [225]); other researchers have arrived at the same point while studying the general mechanisms of the mind's functioning (e.g., while looking from an activity standpoint at the phenomenon of attitude [15]). Further, we find within the activity theory itself a number of general concepts which can be directly utilised to develop our ideas on experiencing. Worthy of special note, among these, is the concept of "internal work" or "the work of consciousness" (256, p. 139; 138a, pp. 206, 222).

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[1] They took to viewing the "penal stint" set them by the prison authorities—moving earth from one place to another quite pointlessly—as a means of keeping up the physical and moral strength they would need later to carry on the fight against autocracy. Senseless, burdensome labour, when experienced in this way, became meaningful and acceptable (140).

All these ideas and representations, valuable in themselves, are however desultory and incidental so far as our problem is concerned, inasmuch as they were put forward occasionally, so to speak, in the course of addressing quite different theoretical tasks, and they cannot of course suffice to provide a theoretical foundation for such an important subject as experiencing.[1] If such a foundation is to be systematically sound, not a mere mechanical transplantation of concepts from other systems into different theoretical soil, if it is to be achieved thanks to organic growth of the activity theory itself, then a new category must be introduced into that theory, upon which an in-depth treatment of the problem can be based. We are putting forward experiencing as the category that can perform this function.

But what does it mean—to introduce a new category into an already established conceptual system? Firstly, it means demonstrating that there is a state or quality of an object to be studied through the system concerned, for which it finds itself unequipped, i.e., one must demonstrate that the system needs a new category; and secondly, one must relate the new category to the other basic categories of the system.

One need only take one of the classical situations, in terms of the theories of psychological defence and coping behaviour, say, the death of a loved one, to find that the activity theory can comparatively easily answer some questions—why does this situation evoke a psychological crisis? and how does this manifest itself phenomenologically?—but that it does not even pose the main question of how a person comes through the crisis.

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[1] A. N. Leontiev had every justification for remarking, in a discussion of themes which Soviet psychology might usefully address, that questions of conflict experience and psychological compensation had been wrongfully ignored prior to the time of writing (141).

Of course it is not that the system is in principle incapable of operating here: it is simply a fact of its historical development that until now its main interests have been in another plane—that of object-orientated practical activity and its mental reflection. These are the categories which have determined the nature of the basic questions with which investigators have approached psychological analysis of reality. But in this real world, in life, situations exist where the main problem cannot be solved either by practical activity, even the best-equipped, or by even the most highly accurate reflection of that problem in the mind. If a person is threatened by danger he can try to save himself by running away, but as R. Peters writes, "if a man is overcome by grief because his wife is dead, what can be done of a specific sort to remedy *that* situation?" (181, p. 192). Such action does not exist, because there is no objective transformation of existing reality which would resolve the situation, and there is correspondingly no possibility of establishing a goal which both has internal meaning and is externally adequate to the situation (i.e., realisable). Objective action, then, is powerless. But so is reflection, either rational (obviously) or emotional. Indeed emotion, insofar as it is a particular form in which a certain phenomenon is reflected in the mind[1], can only express the subjective meaning of the situation, offering the subject the possibility of bringing it within rational recognition; the meaning is tacitly supposed to have existed before and independently of such expression and such recognition. To put it another way: emotion only *states* the relation between "what is and what must be", but cannot change it. That is the view offered by the activity theory. Nor can psychological crisis situations be resolved by the process, developing from a basis of emotion, of "solving the problem of meaning"[1], since this continues on another level, as it were, the reflection begun by emotion.

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[1] And in the activity theory emotion is viewed as being this and only this. Although there is disagreement among authors studying the emotions as to their functions, the point that emotion is reflection, maybe a special sort of reflection with a special object (not external reality, but the relation of that reality to the needs of the subject) and a special form (that of direct experiencing* or so-called "emotional coloration")—but reflection nonetheless, and nothing but reflection—on this one thing they are unanimous (43, p. 157; 244; 255, p. 64; 138a, p. 198).

So our "test" situation has proved insoluble either by the processes of practical-objective activity or by the processes of its reflection in the mind. However far we pursue these processes we shall never reach a point where a person can by their means cope with an irreversible disaster, regain the lost meaning of life, or "recover spiritually" as M. Sholokhov expresses it. The most that a person can do by their help is to realise very deeply and exactly what has taken place in his life, what that event means for him, i.e., become conscious of what a psychologist calls the "personal meaning" of the event, which the person actually in the given situation may well feel to be lack of meaning, nonsense.[2] The real problem facing him, its crisis point, lies not in recognising the meaning of the situation, not in elucidating a hidden but existent meaning, but in creating a meaning, in bringing meaning into existence or constructing it.

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[1] "The problem of meaning" is a term used by the activity theory. A. N. Leontiev explains it by the following example: "A day filled with many actions, successfully carried out by a person who in the course of their execution felt them to be adequate, can nonetheless leave that person with an unpleasant, sometimes even oppressive, emotional "aftertaste". Against the background of ongoing life with its current tasks "aftertaste" is not clearly distinguishable. But the moment comes when the person looks back at himself and in thought goes over the events of the day, and then the emotional signal gathers strength and indicates unambiguously which of those events is responsible for the unpleasant feeling. And it may turn out that it is the *success* achieved by a friend, but prepared by himself, in reaching a common goal—a goal which was, he had thought, the only object his actions held in view. Now it is apparent that this was not so, that the main driving force for him had been personal success and advancement. This realisation brings him face to face with 'the problem of meaning', the task of recognising his own motives or more precisely their real internal relationship to one another" (140, p. 27).

[2] Here we must make a small digression into the realm of ideas about meaning. This concept is not altogether monosemantic in A. N. Leontiev's conceptual usage. For our purposes it is important to distinguish three uses, which may be indicated by the following three antitheses: 1) meaning-signification; 2) meaning-emotion; 3) presence of meaning (meaningfulness)—absence of

Processes of this kind are that very dimension of psychological reality for which the activity theory provides no appropriate category. Advancing the claim of experiencing to take this place, and thus passing on to the second, "positive" phase of its introduction, one does however require to dispose of any claims to this role made on behalf of the concept of meaning-formation. The latter, as current in activity-theory usage, is frequently employed to refer to the process whereby any personal meaning comes into being (and not to the arisal of meaningfulness), i.e., without reference to the isolation of special meaning-forming motives. But even this is not the main point: formation of meaning is here considered as *a function of motive* (127; 128; 138a), but when we speak of "bringing meaning into existence" what we have in mind is a special *activity on the part of the individual.*[1]

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meaning (meaninglessness). The first of these is derived from the fundamental opposition of *knowledge* and *attitude* (138a; 200): as signification is a unit of objective knowledge of reality, so meaning is a unit of subjective (partial) attitude to it. This first usage of the concept "meaning" is an abstraction from the actual forms of its existence in consciousness. The second antithesis, meaning-emotion, in fact distinguishes between two basic forms of its existence in consciousness. Emotion is the immediate, direct expression of a person's attitude to one or another event or situation, while meaning is mediated by significations and knowledge in general, by the person's cognition of himself and his life: meaning is emotion plus thought, emotion enlightened by thought. The third antithesis, meaningfulness-meaninglessness, has quite a different origin. Its source is in the concept of the "meaning-forming motive". Only when a subject's activity, and the course of events in general, is proceeding in a direction tending towards realisation of his meaning-forming motives, will the situation have meaning (be meaningful). If things are proceeding otherwise the situation becomes meaningless.

[1] The activity theory already has, incidentally, one example to show an approach to formation of meaning as to an activity; this example deals with experimental material concerning pseudoscopic sight (189; 190).

The specifics of this activity are determined by the peculiarities of the situations which put the individual under the necessity of experiencing. We shall refer to these as *critical* situations. If one had to use one word only to define the nature of such situations one would have to say that they are situations of *impossibility*. Impossibility of what? Impossibility of living, of realising the *internal necessities* of life.

The struggle against that impossibility, the struggle to realise internal necessities—that is experiencing. Experiencing is the repair of a "disruption" of life, a work of restoration, proceeding as it were at right angles to the line of actualisation of life. If the psychological theory of activity studies, figuratively speaking, the way in which a human being travels life's road, then the theory of experiencing studies the way in which he or she falls and rises again to continue the journey. The fact that the processes of experiencing are counterposed to actualisation of life, i.e., to activity, does not mean that they are mystical processes taking place outside life; in their psychological constitution they are processes of life and activity like any others, but in their psychological meaning and purpose they are processes acting upon life itself, to ensure the psychological possibility of actualising life. This is the most abstract formulation of experiencing on the existential plane, abstracted, that is, from consciousness.

That which on the level of existence appears as the *possibility* of actualising the needs of life, the possibility of life-assertion, appears on the level of consciousness, or more precisely the level of one of its layers, and that the lowest, "existential consciousness",[1] as the *meaningfulness*

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[1] The idea of such a layer's existence has been fairly well developed in philosophic literature, as in, for instance, the concept of "pre-reflective consciousness". The idea has been employed, in various guises, in the construction of psychological theories too. It is not unknown to activity theory also; it is present though unrecognised in its concept of motive, and quite clearly employed by the group of authors who have tried to make the concept of "meaning formations" the keystone of their theoretical development of the activity approach (16, pp. 113-14; 17; 260, p. 279).

of life. This is the general name (derived from description at the phenomenological level) used for a number of actual psychological states directly recognised in consciousness in the shape of corresponding experiences,* varying from pleasure to a sense of "existence being justified", this last being, as A. N. Leontiev puts it, "the whole meaning and the happiness of life" (138a, p. 221). "Impossibility" also has its own positive phenomenology where the general heading is meaninglessness, and the actual states—despair, hopelessness, unrealisability, inevitability, etc.

Since life can have *internal necessities* of various kinds, it is natural to suppose that the realisability of each of these has, corresponding to it, its own type of "possibility" states, and their unrealisability, a corresponding range of "impossibility" states. The precise nature of these types of necessities and of these states cannot be determined in advance—their determination is one of the main goals pursued in this investigation. One can only say that in a situation of impossibility (meaninglessness) a person is faced with a "problem of meaning" in one form or another—not as this is spoken of by A. N. Leontiev in his activity-theory writings, where the task is to clothe in significations a meaning which is objectively present in the individual's life but not yet clear to his consciousness[1]—here the problem is of arriving at meaningfulness, of seeking out sources of meaning, of "exploiting" these, of actively extracting meaning from them, etc.—in short, of *producing* meaning.

It is this general idea of *producing meaning* which enables us to speak of experiencing as of a *productive* process, as of a special kind of *work.* Although one may suppose in advance that the idea of production is applicable, to a varying extent and in varying forms, to different types of experiencing, it is for us a central idea in terms of ontology, gnoseology, and methodology. Ontology, because the idea of experiencing as a productive act is an expression of the general idea of man as a being called upon, and able to be free and creative—creative, moreover, not only in respect of the external world, but in respect of his own self also.[1] Productivity and, ultimately, creativity, is (as we shall later see) an integral part of experiencing in its higher, more fully developed forms. The idea of productivity is important gnoseologically because the higher developmental forms of an object studied are, as Karl Marx's well-known thesis stated, the key to understanding its lower forms. And lastly, productivity is an important idea with respect to methodology because in it, as nowhere else, we find concentrated the very essence of the activity approach to psychology, since that approach takes as its methodological model, its guiding principle, Marx's conception of production and its inherent "superiority" to consumption (138a, pp. 192-93).

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[1] It is only fair to state that A. N. Leontiev was very well aware that the "problem of meaning" is for the person concerned a "problem of inter-relationship of motives" (138a, p. 206), and that it is not solved by conscious recognition of these, but requires a special *work of transformation* of one's own motives ("a special inner labour is requisite to solve such a problem and perhaps to root out from oneself what has been discovered" [*ibid.*]); still, we are only treated to a glimpse as the curtain's edge is raised, as it were, on that wonderful (there is no other word for it) area of the mind where motives do not rule man, but he himself becomes the master—more, the creator—of his motives.

If on the existential level experiencing is the renewal of the possibility of actualising life's internal necessities, and on the level of consciousness it is the establishment of meaningfulness, then when it comes to the inter-relationship of consciousness and existence the work of experiencing is towards achieving correspondence of meaning between consciousness and existence—*providing meaning for the latter,* and inducing the former to *accept a meaning* for existence.

As regards the relationship between the concept of experiencing and the concept of activity, the assertion that the need for experiencing arises in situations which cannot be directly resolved by object-orientated activity, however perfectly this may be reflected (as we have already said), must not be taken to mean that the category "activity" is altogether inapplicable to experiencing, that the latter is therefore either an auxiliary functional mechanism within activity and reflection, or "by nature" falls outside the activity theory's picture of psychological reality. In fact experiencing fills out that picture, representing, along with external practical activity and cognitive activity, a special type of activity processes, characterised first and foremost by their product—meaning (meaningfulness). Experiencing is, precisely, activity, i.e., an independent process relating the individual to the world and resolving his actual life-problems; it is not a special mental "function" of the same order as memory, perception, thinking, imagination, or the emotions. These "functions", and external object-orientated actions, are all switched in to perform the work of experiencing, just as they are involved in performing any human activity. But the meaning of both the intra-psychic and the behavioural processes which take part in experiencing can only be elucidated if we start off from the general purpose and direction of experiencing, from the integrated work it does in transforming a psychological world, a work which is the only thing capable of resolving a situation of impossibility in which external activity is powerless.

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[1] "The freedom of the Ego (I) is in the living creation of its own empirical content; the free Ego recognises itself to be the *creative* substance of its states, not merely their *gnoseological subject,* i.e., it recognises itself as the active causator, not only the abstract subject, of all its predicates" (76, p. 217).

Coming to the question of the bearers or agents of experiencing, let us first consider external behaviour. External actions perform the work of experiencing not directly, by producing objective results, but by changing the consciousness of the individual, his psychological world in general. This behaviour is sometimes of a ritual or symbolic character, and in such a case operates by linking up the individual consciousness with special symbolic structures that organise its movement, and that have been developed within the given culture, concentrating within themselves the long human acquaintance with experiencing typical events and circumstances in life.

The part played in the work of experiencing by intra-psychic processes can be well brought out if we paraphrase a "theatrical" metaphor of Sigmund Freud's: in the productions of experiencing the whole theatre company of mental functions is usually brought on stage, but for each different play a different function performs the leading part, taking upon itself the lion's share of the work of experiencing, i.e., of the work required to resolve an insoluble situation. The "stars" are often emotional processes (distaste for "sour grapes" can solve the contradiction between the desire to taste them and the impossibility of doing so [173]); but to offset the ingrained association or even equation of the words "emotion" and "experiencing", still widely current in psychological literature, it must be especially stressed that emotion has no sole right to the starring role in the actualisation of experiencing. The main part may be played by perception (in the various phenomena of "perceptive defence" [49; 103; 223; 224 et al.]), and by thinking (in cases of "rationalisation" of urges, the so-called "intellectual processing" [207] of traumatic events), and by attention ("defensive switching of attention to matters irrelevant to the traumatic event"[1] [197, p. 349]), and by other mental "functions". Only it must be stressed that in carrying on the work of experiencing, mental processes operate in a specific capacity—that of processes of consciousness (but not necessarily conscious processes).[2]

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[1] V. Y. Rozhnov and M. Y. Burno (197) take as illustration the passage in *War and Peace* where Tolstoy describes Pierre Bezukhov's reaction to the death of Platon Karataev: when he heard the shot which meant Karataev had been killed, "at that same moment he remembered that he had not finished his calculation, started before the convoy marshal made his round, of how many days' marches there still were before Smolensk. And he started reckoning". ..."only now did Pierre realise the full power of human attachment to life and the saving power of switching one's attention, implanted in a human being like the safety-valve in steam engines which lets off steam as soon as pressure rises above a certain level."

[2] What is meant by considering a process "as a mental process" and "as a process of consciousness"? Since we cannot here go into the whole question systematically, let us give an example only. One and the same fact—say the fact of forgetting something—can be understood (and in classical psychology was never understood in any other way) as a purely natural event, the

Experiencing as an activity, then, is realised through both external and internal actions. This thesis is of exceptional importance in its methodological implications and in those relating to general world outlook. Traditional psychology in its idealist forms confined experiencing to the narrow world of individual subjectivity, while its vulgar-materialist trends took experiencing to be an epiphenomenon, thus putting it outside the scope of scientific investigation. Only a materialist psychology, based on the Marxist teaching of man's active and social nature, is capable of releasing experiencing from the tether—so appropriate in the view of traditional psychology—attaching it exclusively to internal psychic processes. A human being often succeeds in overcoming a crisis not so much by working through the traumatic event internally (though that is necessary as well) as by active, creative, socially useful activity, which as an object-oriented practical activity realises a conscious aim on the subject's part and has, also, a socially useful end-product, while as an activity of experiencing it creates and fosters a fund of meaning for the individual's life.

Let us sum up what has been said so far. There are certain life-situations which cannot be resolved either by object-related or cognitive activity. They are resolved by the processes of experiencing. Experiencing must here be distinguished from the concept of experiencing* traditional

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result of natural causes, in all respects subject only to the immanent laws of one mental function—memory; and that same fact can be given significance as being the result of a particular process of consciousness—"displacement", a motivated attempt by the subject to cope with conflict in his life-relations. In other words, as a mental fact it is considered within the area of a mental "function" abstracted from the individual's volitional sphere, while as a fact of consciousness it is viewed within the area of human life and activity, within "the ontology of human life" (202)—as an event important for performing an actual life process, and having meaning—capable of "telling" something (or contrariwise of withholding something) about the individual's existence. Forgetting, as a process of consciousness, can assume the nature of something deliberate, intentional (84), i.e., it can be viewed not as a natural fact but as an *act* (76), a step of sorts taken by the individual.

in the psychological literature, where it denotes the direct presentation of psychic content to consciousness. We understand experiencing as being a special activity, a special kind of work reconstructing a psychological world and directed towards the establishment of correlation between consciousness and existence in terms of meaning, the overall aim of the work of experiencing being to give greater meaningfulness to life.

Such are the very general, introductory theses concerning experiencing as seen from the standpoint of the psychological theory of activity.

We shall now turn to the existing psychological literature on experiencing, and consider two fundamental questions. The first of these relates to how we are to understand the nature of critical situations which give rise to the need for experiencing. The second concerns ideas on the processes of experiencing themselves.

2. THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITICAL SITUATION

A psychological situation is determined by, firstly, what the actual "internal necessity" of a person's life is at the given moment; secondly, what the internal and external conditions of life are; and thirdly, what means are available to the person for realising that "internal necessity" under the given conditions. A situation becomes critical when the relationship between these three components is such that realisation of the "internal necessity" becomes impossible. This is the general idea we shall take as our starting point in analysing the key concepts employed in modern psychology for describing critical situations. These concepts are: stress, frustration, conflict, and crisis.

Before proceeding to the characterisation of these types of critical situations it would be sensible to give a little time to two general problems. The first of these lies in elucidating the structure of description of empirical critical situations. The second arises over the transformation of an ordinary, "normal" situation into a critical one.

The descriptive pattern most frequently met with in work on critical situations (especially in writings on frustration and crisis) includes *objective circumstances* (e.g., loss of a valued object, "hindrances", prohibitions), *subjective state* (e.g., dissatisfaction, despair), and *behavioural consequences* (e.g., panic or aggressive reactions) (70). This pattern sometimes assumes the existence of a simple, one-way causal linkage between these entities: objective circumstances evoke subjective states which in turn evoke behavioural consequences. It would in our view be more adequate to use a pattern showing *development* of an integral psychological situation, a development which takes place through mutual influences operating among all these components of the situation, each of these being "reflected" in the other and acting upon it, thus altering the situation as a whole (cf. 80).

In employing this pattern for analysing a critical situation faced by a specific person, it is important to bear in mind the following methodological points. Since we are speaking of a *psychological* situation, the "objective circumstances" bringing it about are not circumstances placed outside the subject's life. They must be described in their unique context of the given individual's life, i.e., not as physical circumstances but as existential circumstances which offer him (or deprive him of) certain possibilities for the realisation of his motives and values. Further, whatever the existential aspect may be, it does not fully indicate, or mechanically predetermine, the nature of the situation. The actual character of a psychological situation is, in the last count, determined by the "internal state" created. Although a situation may be objectively insoluble, so long as the individual retains a belief in its solubility, so long as and inasmuch as he is making attempts to solve it, that situation has not become critical in the exact sense of the term. Conversely, even if the situation is from the viewpoint of an outside observer entirely resolvable, so soon as the individual acquires a conviction of its being impossible[1] the situation then becomes a critical one, with all its attendant consequences.

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[1] The content of the conviction of impossibility can vary according to which aspect of the situation is dominant. If the in-

The "behavioural consequences" observed in a critical situation must be viewed not so much as consequences, rather as formations which are, on the one hand, the direct expression of the individual's actual perception of his world, "symptoms" from which the observer can attempt to reconstruct it, while, on the other hand, they are the bearers of that world perception, the living body without which it simply does not exist (clenched fists are not merely a sign of anger, not merely a form of its expression, they are a form of its bodily existence), and thirdly, these phenomena are attempts to resolve, indirectly, the situation itself.

Within the framework of our idea of the development of the integral psychological situation, we must find space for the question of the threshold, or critical point, at which a "possibility" state and orientation towards solution of life problems are replaced by an "impossibility" state and a re-orientation of consciousness and activity into an "experiencing" régime. M. H. Appley, for instance, distinguishes four critical points at which, given continuing difficulties in problem-solving, there is a change in the essential features of behaviour: at the first of these points, the "instigation threshold", inborn and acquired skills which have proved inadequate are replaced by coping behaviour; the second point, the "frustration threshold", is a watershed between previous solution-oriented behaviour and the ego-oriented behaviour which succeeds it (anxiety reactions); at the third point, the behaviour acquires features of "desperation and panic"; and finally, when the "exhaustion threshold" is passed, disturbances in behaviour occur (13).

This construction is a very interesting one, but it leaves

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dividual's attention is focused on the unactualised "internal necessity", the "impossibility" state is expressed in varying versions of the feeling of dissatisfaction; if attention is focused on life conditions, then ideas of constraining circumstances will predominate within the "impossibility" state; if the individual's attention is focused on his own inability to act, feelings of helplessness and powerlessness will predominate.

many questions unanswered and, most importantly, it is not universally applicable. It can be applied only to a certain category of critical situations, where the problem put to the subject involves achieving a definite practical result; it is totally inappropriate for, say, analysis of the development of an inner-conflict situation. Here too a whole series of stages can be distinguished, the study of which, incidentally, shows that the customary causal patterns of one-way relationship between a "situation-in-itself" and an internal state (conflict-anxiety) are here inadequate. Thus L. Rangell's fine-drawn analysis, distinguishing 13 stages of development in intra-psychic conflict, demonstrates that anxiety is a cause of conflict as much as an effect of it. In many cases of intra-psychic conflict the individual first rehearses in consciousness, as it were, the actualisation of the prohibited activity (a "trial temptation" as Hartman and Loewenstein put it [105]), in order to check, from the alarm signals generated, what the danger of punishment would be if that activity were really carried through. It is not conflict, yet, but a miniature, controlled model of conflict,—one which can, however, get out of control under certain circumstances and turn into a real conflict (191).

The conclusion to be drawn from studies of this kind is that in a more generalised perspective the question of critical-situation threshold should be seen as a matter of the individual's "investigation" of the situation for "possibility". This "investigation" is not cognitive in intent, nor is it intellectual in method, it is trying to find answers not to universal questions but to questions of vital interest to the individual. It is not rational cognition, but probing of the internal and external bounds of possibility, a testing-out of the world and of the self.

Seen in this way, the points at which experiencing becomes essential are always points on a border-line, where the individual comes up against a reality "such as never was", to which he has no answer; thus such points require creativity and can become growing-points of the personality, points where "new conscious experience" (163) is built, where wisdom can be gained, etc.

Let us recapitulate: there are four key concepts used in modern psychology in descriptions of critical life situations—stress, frustration, conflict, and crisis. In spite of the enormous amount of literature[1] that has been produced, theoretical representations of critical situations are still inadequately developed. This applies with particular force to theories of stress and crisis, where many authors confine themselves to a simple recital of actual events having stress or crisis situations as their consequence, or characterise these situations in general terms such as loss of equilibrium (mental, spiritual, emotional), without any theoretical definition of these terms. Frustration and conflict have been, separately, dealt with much more fully, but in spite of this it is not possible to establish clear correlations even between these two terms (70), not to mention the total absence of attempts to bring all four of the concepts mentioned above into an ordered mutual relationship, to establish whether they cut across one another, how each of them should, logically, be used, etc. The prevailing situation is that researchers studying one of these themes tend to bring any critical situation under the heading of their own favourite category, so that for a psychoanalyst every such situation is a conflict situation, for disciples of Hans Selye it is a stress situation, and so on, while authors whose interests are not particularly bound up with these problems will choose to speak of stress, conflict, frustration or crisis on largely intuitive or stylistic grounds. All this leads to great confusion in terminology.

In view of this situation it is a theoretical task of the first importance that we are about to address in the following pages—to distinguish, for each of the concepts applied to critical situations, a special categorical field, which will give us the area in which it may properly be used. In setting about this task, we are going to start from a general provision in which the type of critical situation is determined by the nature of the "impossibility" state in which the individual is trapped. And this "impossibility" is in turn determined by which life necessity remains unfulfilled as the result of the inability of the *types of activity* available to the individual to cope with the existing *external* and *internal* conditions of life. So external and internal conditions of life, type of activity on the part of the individual, and the specific necessity he faces, are the principal points by which we shall characterise the main types of critical situations and distinguish them one from another.

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[1] On stress and related problems, by 1979 there were 150,000 works in print, according to figures given by the International Institute of Stress (213).

Stress

The concept of stress has suffered the most from the lack of clarity in establishing and delimiting categories. Initially it meant a non-specific response by an organism to the action of harmful agents, a response apparent in symptoms of a general adaptational syndrome (212; 214). Now the concept is applied to anything and everything, to the extent that a sort of tradition has grown up to start reviews of relevant studies by a catalogue of the entirely heterogeneous phenomena that have by some miracle contrived to shelter under the umbrella of the concept, such as reactions to cold and reactions to criticism, hyperventilation of the lungs during intensive breathing, the joy of success, fatigue, and humiliation (101; 137; 177; 243, et al). It has been remarked, by Rolf Luft, that many people count as stress anything that happens to a person not actually lying in bed (147, p. 317), while Hans Selye goes further and says that "even while fully relaxed and asleep, you are under some stress" (214, p. 32) and that "complete freedom from stress is death" (*ibid.*). If we add that Selye considers that stress reactions are to be found in all living things including plants, then we can see how this concept, with its obvious derivatives (stressor, micro- and macro-stress, good stress and bad stress), has become the centre of a system with positively cosmological claims, boasting itself to be nothing less than "the leading stimulus of life-assertion, creativity and development" (239, p. 7), "providing the foundations of all aspects of human life" (*ibid.*, p. 14)—or, more probably, the foundations for home-grown philosophical constructs.

Similar transformations of a specific scientific concept into a universal principle are so well-known in the history of psychology, the workings of the transformation process have been so well described by L. S. Vygotsky (248), that the present state of the concept under consideration can very well be indicated in some words which Vygotsky used on another occasion, long before the "stress boom": "This discovery, which has been inflated into a world-outlook like the frog which blew itself up to the size of an ox, this *bourgeois* turned *gentilhomme*, is now coming into the most dangerous stage of its development—it can explode as easily as a soap-bubble;[1] it is at all events entering upon a period of contestation and condemnation, both of which surround it on all sides" (248, p. 304).

Indeed, in today's psychological works on stress determined efforts are being made to set limits, one way or the other, to the pretensions of this concept, by bringing it into line with traditional subject-divisions and terminology. With this aim in mind, R. S. Lazarus introduces the concept of *psychological* stress, which unlike a physiological highly-stereotyped reaction to a harmful agent is a reaction, mediated by an assessment of threat and by defensive processes (136; 137). J. P. Averill follows S. B. Sells (211) in considering the essential feature of a stress situation to be loss of control, i.e., absence of a reaction adequate to the given situation, when the consequences of refusal to react are of significance to the individual (17). P. Fraisse proposes that stress should be the name given to a particular kind of emotive situations, that "this term should be reserved for repetitive or chronic situations in which adaptation disorders may show themselves" (79, p. 112). Y. S. Savenko defines psychological stress as "a state in which a person finds himself under conditions which hinder his self-actualisation" (207, p. 97).

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[1] What Vygotsky is speaking about here is only the excessive extension, beyond all reason, of the bounds of the concept, not of course that its content has disappeared and that it should be banished from the scientific vocabulary.

The list could be made much longer, but these examples will suffice to show the main tendency in efforts made to find the right place in psychology for the concept of stress. The general line of argument is against non-specificity in describing situations as stress-producing. Not every demand of the environment produces stress, only those demands which are assessed as threatening (136; 137), which disrupt adaptation (79) or control (17), or which hinder self-actualisation (207). "No one, surely," to quote R. S. Razumov's appeal to common sense, "thinks that any muscular exertion must be a stress-producing agent to the organism. No one considers a quiet stroll to be a stressful situation" (194, p. 16).

But none other than the very father of the theory of stress, Hans Selye, considers that even sleep, let alone taking a walk, is not without stress. Stress, according to Selye, is "the non-specific response of the body to any demand made upon it" (214, p. 27).

One can understand the psychologists' reaction—in truth, how is one to reconcile this formulation with the idea, inseparable from the concept of stress, that it is something unusual, out of the ordinary, exceeding the bounds of an individual's functional norm? How can you subsume in one thought "any" demand and "extreme" demand? It would seem impossible, and psychologists (and physiologists too—see 101) are discarding the "any", i.e., the idea of stress being non-specific, and substituting the idea of it being something specific. But removing the idea of the non-specificity of stress (of situations and reactions both) means killing the very thing in the concept which called it into being, its fundamental meaning. The force of the concept lies not in the denial of the non-specific nature of stimuli and of the organism's responses to them (213, 214) but in the assertion that any stimulus, alongside its own specific action, makes non-specific demands upon the organism, to which the response is a non-specific reaction in the organism's internal environment.

It follows from the above that if psychology is going to employ the concept of stress, then the task is to avoid the unjustifiable over-extension of the term but to preserve its basic content—the idea of stress being non-specific. To do this, we must make explicit what the conceivable psychological conditions are under which the idea of stress offers an exact reflection of that section of psychological reality which is created by those conditions. It is not disputed that breakdowns in self-actualisation, in control, etc., evoke stress; those are sufficient conditions for its existence. The problem is to discover what are the minimal necessary conditions which give rise to the non-specific entity, stress.

Any demand made by the environment can evoke a critical, extreme situation only in the case of a being incapable of coping with any demands whatsoever, a being also whose whole internal necessity is immediate (here-and-now) satisfaction of any need—in other words, a being whose normal life-world is "easy" and "simple", i.e., such that satisfaction of any need takes place directly and immediately, encountering no obstacles either from external forces or from other needs, therefore without, it is to be assumed, calling for any activity on the individual's part.

Such a hypothetical state of existence, where goods are given directly and immediately and all life is reduced to immediate "being", can be seen fully realised only in the case (and even then with some reservations) of the foetus in the mother's womb, but partial relics of such a state enter into any and every life, appearing as the set towards here-and-now satisfaction, what Sigmund Freud called "the pleasure principle".

Obviously, realisation of such a set is continually disrupted by the most ordinary demands, by *any* demand, of reality; if we characterise such disruption as a particular critical situation called stress, we are then approaching a concept of stress in which one can indeed conjoin the "extreme" and the "non-specific". The logic and the content of the conditions described above make it quite clear how one may consider stress a critical event and at the same time view it as a permanent life-state.

The category area appropriate to the concept of stress, then, may be denoted by the term "vitality"* or "sheer being", this to be understood as indicating an inalienable dimension of existence, of which the "law" is the set towards here-and-now satisfaction.

Frustration

The essential indicators of the frustrating situation—the majority of definitions are agreed on this—are the presence of strong motivation to achieve a goal (to satisfy a need) and of an obstacle preventing this (107; 119; 125; 150; 178; 204 et al.).

Accordingly, frustrating situations may be classified by the nature of the motives frustrated and by the nature of the barriers. One classification of the first kind, for instance, is A. H. Maslow's (167), which distinguishes between basic, "inborn" psychological needs (security, respect, love), frustration of which is pathogenic in nature, and "acquired needs", frustration of which does not provoke mental disorders.

The barriers hindering an individual's advance to a goal may be physical (e.g., the walls of a prison), biological (illness, old age), psychological (fear, intellectual insufficiency), and socio-cultural (norms, rules, prohibitions) (107; 125). We may recall also the division of such barriers into external and internal, employed by T. Dembo (65) in her description of her experiments; she called those barriers which hindered attainment of the goal "internal", and those which prevented the subject from escaping the situation, "external". Kurt Lewin, analysing the external (in this sense) barriers which adults use to control children's behaviour, distinguishes "physical-corporeal", "sociological" ("the instruments of power possessed by the adult in virtue of his social position" [150], pp. 126-27) and ideological (a form of social barrier marked by the inclusion within it of "goals and values recognised by the child") (*ibid.*) The illustration given for this last is "Remember you are a girl!"

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* Vitality is here used in the sense of "that which differentiates the living from the non-living".—*Trans.*

The combination of strong motivation to attain a given goal and obstacles barring the path to it is, undoubtedly, an essential condition for frustration, yet at times we overcome considerable difficulties without falling into a state of frustration. So one must pose the question: what conditions suffice to produce frustration or, to put it another way, where and how does a situation of impeded activity pass over into a situation of frustration? (cf. 148). It is natural to look for the answer in assessments of the state of being frustrated, seeing that it is this state which differentiates a situation of frustration from one of difficulty only. Yet in the literature on frustration we do not find an analysis of the psychological meaning of the state, most authors confining themselves to descriptive statements—that a frustrated person experiences anxiety and tension (107), indifference, apathy, loss of interest (204), guilt and alarm (125), fury and hostility (107), envy and jealousy (92), etc. In themselves these emotions do not make our question any clearer, and apart from them we are left with only one source of information—the behavioural "consequences" of frustration, or frustration behaviour. Perhaps the special features of such behaviour can shed light on what occurs at the transition from a difficulty situation to a frustration situation?

The following forms of frustration are usually quoted: (a) *motor excitation*—aimless and disorderly reactions; (b) *apathy* (in a well-known study by Barker, Dembo and Lewin one of the children placed in a frustrating situation lay down and stared at the ceiling); (c) *aggression* and *destructiveness;* (d) *stereotype*—a tendency towards thoughtless repetition of fixed behaviour; (e) *regression,* which can be understood as "a reversion to behavioural patterns that were dominant earlier in the course of the individual's life" (204, p. 247) or as a "primitivisation" of behaviour (measured in the Barker, Dembo and Lewin experiment as a lowering of "constructiveness" in the behaviour), or fall-off in "quality of execution" (56).

These then are the types of frustration behaviour.

What, though, are its most essential, central characteristics? Norman Maier's monograph (160) answers the question with a definition of his own—it is "behaviour without a goal". In another work, the same author explained further that the central assertion of his theory is not that a frustrated person has no goal, but that "a frustrated person's *behaviour* is without a goal, i.e., that the behaviour sample under discussion lacks goal orientation" (161, pp. 370-71). Maier illustrates his thesis by an example, in which two people hurrying to buy a train ticket get into an argument in the queue and start fighting, the net result being that both miss the train. This behaviour does not have as its content the goal of getting a ticket, it is therefore, in Maier's definition, not adaptive (i.e., meeting a requirement), but "behaviour provoked by frustration". The old goal is not replaced here by a new one *(ibid.)*.

To bring out this author's position precisely we need to view it alongside some other opinions. Erich Fromm, for instance, considers that frustrated behaviour (particularly aggressive behaviour) "constitutes an attempt, although often a futile one, to attain the frustrated aim" (92, p. 26). K. Goldstein on the contrary asserts that behaviour of this kind is not subordinated to any goal, that it is disorganised and chaotic. He calls such behaviour "catastrophic" (100).

Against this background, Maier's point of view may be formulated as something like this: the essential characteristic of frustrated behaviour is the loss of orientation to the original, frustrated goal (this is in opposition to Fromm's opinion); this characteristic is sufficient in itself (contrary to Goldstein's view)—frustrated behaviour is not without all goal orientation, it can contain an aim of some sort (that, say, of insulting the opponent in a frustration-provoked quarrel as painfully as possible). The important point is that attainment of this goal is entirely meaningless as regards the original goal or motive in the given situation.

The disagreements among these authors help us to pick out two most important parameters by which we should characterise behaviour in a frustrating situation. The first, which we may call "accordance with motive", lies in the presence of a meaningful, result-promising link between the behaviour and the motive which is an integral part of the situation. The second parameter is the organised nature of the behaviour—organised by any goal whatsoever, regardless of whether achievement of that goal will lead to realisation of the motive first indicated. If we suppose that each of these parameters can in every individual case have either positive or negative significance, i.e., that behaviour can be either ordered and organised by a goal, or disorganised, and can also be either in accordance with motive or not, we then get the following typology for possible "states" of behaviour.

Typology of "States" of Behaviour



In a situation presenting a person with difficulties we may observe behaviour corresponding to all these four types.

Behaviour of Type 1, in accordance with motive and subordinated to an organising goal, is obviously not frustrated. And these internal characteristics of behaviour are important, because the outward appearance of behaviour (whether it be the individual's observed indifference to a goal previously attractive, or destructiveness, or aggression) cannot of itself be an unambiguous indication of the individual's being in a state of frustration: we may be dealing with intentional exploitation of aggression (or of any other actions commonly attributed to frustration), such exploitation being usually accompanied by the individual "working himself up" to an appropriate emotional state (rage, say) in *conscious* calculation of attaining his goal by this means.

Such pseudo-frustrated behaviour can pass over into behaviour of Type 2: having deliberately "thrown hysterics" in the hope of getting his own way, the individual loses control over his own behaviour, he can no longer stop himself or regulate his actions at all. Control by the will has been lost, but this does not mean that control through consciousness has been completely lost too. Since the behaviour is no longer organised by the goal, it loses the status of goal-directed *action*, but it still retains, nonetheless, the status of a *means* of realising the basic motive in the situation, in other words a meaningful connection is retained in the consciousness between the behaviour and the motive—the hope of resolving the situation. A good illustration of this type of behaviour is provided by "profitable" hysterical reactions originating in "voluntary heightening of reflexes" (133, p. 72) but later becoming involuntary. The observations of army doctors, for instance, made in cases of soldiers suffering from hysterical hyperkineses, show that the men were quite conscious of the connection between violent shaking and the chance of avoiding return to the battlefield.

Behaviour of Type 3 is chiefly characterised by loss of the connection whereby motive gives meaning to action. The person loses conscious control over the connection between his behaviour and the original motive: although his separate actions still remain in accord with some aim, he is not now acting "in pursuit of" something, but "in consequence of" something. Such is the behaviour of the man purposefully fighting his opponent at the ticket-office while the train pulls out of the station. "Motivation therefore," says Maier, "is separated from causation as an explanatory concept" (161, p. 371, cf. 230, p. 101).

Behaviour of Type 4 may be denoted by the word Goldstein used—"catastrophic". This behaviour is controlled neither by the will nor by the consciousness of the individual, it is both disorganised and lacking any connection, in content or meaning, with the basic motive in the situation. The last part of this statement, be it noted, does not mean that other possible forms of connection between motive and behaviour are also broken (first and foremost "energetic" connections), for if that were the case there would be no grounds for considering the behaviour as having any relationship to the frustrated motive, or for describing it as "out of accordance with motive". The supposition that the psychological situation continues to be determined by the frustrated motive is an essential premise for considering the behaviour as a consequence of frustration.

To return to a question posed earlier, that of distinguishing a difficult situation from a frustrating situation, we can now say that according to our typology behaviour of Type 1 is proper to the first (difficulty), and behaviour of the other three types to the second (frustration). From this standpoint one can see the inadequacy of the linear representations of ability to tolerate frustration that are usually employed to describe the transition from a difficult to a frustrating situation. In fact the transition occurs in two dimensions—along the line of loss of control by the will, i.e., disorganisation of behaviour, and/or along the line of loss of control by consciousness, i.e., loss of "accordance with motive" in behaviour, which on the level of internal state is correspondingly expressed in loss of patience and loss of hope. We shall leave it at that for the present; later on we shall have further opportunity to consider the relationships between these two phenomena.

It is not difficult to define the categorical field appropriate to the concept of frustration. It is quite obvious that it is determined by the category of activity. This field may be imaged as a life-world where the conditions of existence are chiefly characterised by difficulty, and the internal necessity of existence is realisation of motive. Active conquest of difficulties along the way to "motive-accordant" goals is the "norm" of such existence, and the critical situation specific to it arises when difficulty becomes insuperable (148, pp. 119, 120), i.e., passes into impossibility.

Conflict

To define the psychological concept of conflict is a complicated business. If one aims at a definition which will not contradict any of the current views on conflict, one will end with a formula absolutely devoid of psychological content—conflict is the collision of something with something else. The two main questions in conflict theory—exactly *what* comes into collision, and *what is the nature* of the collision—are given totally different answers by different authors.

The answers given to the first question bear a close relation to the general methodological orientation of the writers. The partisans of psychodynamic conceptual systems define conflict as simultaneous actualisation of two or more motives (drives) (113; 125). Researchers with a behaviourist orientation assert that one can only speak of conflict when alternative possibilities for reaction are present (70; 78). And lastly, from the standpoint of cognitive psychology the collisions of conflict are between ideas, wishes, aims, values—the phenomena of consciousness, in a word (47; 73; 238). These three paradigms of consideration of conflict intermingle, in some authors' work, to produce compromise or "syntagmatic" constructions (see, for example, 204), and if the actual products of such combination do in most cases appear eclectic, the general idea of such a synthesis looks very promising; after all, behind the three paradigms alluded to one can easily glimpse three categories which are basic to the development of contemporary psychology—motive, action and image (253), which ideally should be organically fused in each and every theoretical construct.

Our second question—the nature of the relationship between the colliding forces in a conflict—is equally important. It subdivides into three constituent questions, the first of which concerns the comparative intensity of the opposing forces, and the answer usually given is that these forces are approximately equal (150; 159; 170 et al.). The second sub-question concerns the orientation of the two conflicting tendencies. Most authors do not even consider any alternative to the customary view of conflicting urges as being diametrically opposed. Karen Horney brought this view into question with her statement of the interesting idea that only neurotic conflict (conflict marked, in her definition, by incompatibility of the conflicting forces and by the persistent and unconscious nature of the urges involved) can be viewed as the result of collision between diametrically opposed forces. The "angle" between the directional lines of the urges in a normal, non-neurotic conflict is less than 180 deg., so that under certain conditions behaviour can be evolved which will more or less satisfy both urges (113).

The third sub-question concerns the content of the relationships between the conflicting tendencies. Here one should, in our opinion, distinguish between two basic forms of conflict—in one, the tendencies are inherently opposed, i.e., they are contradictory in content, and in the other, they are incompatible not in principle but only owing to conditions of place and time.

When attempting to clarify the category basis for the concept of conflict one should remember that ontogenetically conflict is a comparatively recent formation (191). R. A. Spitz (229) supposes that true intra-psychic conflict starts to exist only when "ideational" concepts have appeared. Karen Horney (113) names consciousness of one's own feelings, and the presence of an internal value-system, as the essential conditions for conflict, while D. R. Miller and G. E. Swanson consider the essential pre-condition to be the ability to feel guilt—"Only if a man has learned to become guilty about a particular impulse does he experience conflict" (170, p. 14). All of which demonstrates that conflict is possible only when the individual possesses a complex inner world and when that complexity is actualised.

Here lies the theoretical frontier between the "frustrating situation" and "conflict". A frustrating situation, as we have seen, can be created by barriers that may be material but may also be ideal, for instance by a prohibition laid upon engaging in a certain activity. These barriers, and prohibitions particularly, when they appear to the subject's consciousness as something self-evident and not to be discussed, are in effect external barriers, psychologically speaking, and produce a situation of frustration, not conflict, despite the fact that it may seem to be two internal forces that are coming into collision. The prohibition may cease to be self-evident, may become a matter of inner doubt, and then the frustrating situation is transformed into a conflict situation.

Just as the difficulties of the external world are opposed or dealt with by the individual's activity, so the complications of the internal world, i.e., crossed wires among the individual's life-relationships, are opposed or dealt with by the activity of his *consciousness*. The *internal necessity* or directional force of activity of the consciousness is towards achieving a state of consonance and non-contradiction within the inner world. The consciousness is called upon to measure motives against one another, to choose between them, to find compromise solutions etc.,—in a word, to overcome the complication. The critical situation here is one where it is subjectively impossible either to get out of the conflict situation or to resolve it, by finding a compromise between contradictory urges or by sacrificing one of them.

In the same way as earlier we distinguished between a situation of impeded activity and a situation that makes activity impossible, here one should distinguish between a complicated situation and a critical, conflict situation, which sets in when consciousness surrenders in face of a subjectively insoluble contradiction between motives.

Crisis

Although the problems produced by crises in the life of individuals have always received attention from humanitarian thought, including psychological thought (see, e.g., 117), it is only comparatively recently that "crisis theory" appeared on the psychologist's horizon, as an independent theory developed mainly within the frames of reference of preventive psychiatry. It is an accepted thing to see its origin in E. Lindemann's remarkable paper analysing acute grief (152).

"Historically, 'crisis theory' has been influenced by four major intellectual developments: evolution and its implications for communal and individual adaptation, fulfilment or growth theories of human motivation, a life-cycle approach to human development, and interest in coping behaviour under extreme stresses..." (173, p. 7). Among the intellectual sources of crisis theory one also finds mentioned psychoanalysis (especially such concepts as mental equilibrium and psychological defence), some of the ideas of Carl Rogers, and the theory of rôle-playing (116, p. 815).

Let us turn first to the empirical level of description of crisis as understood in this general conception.

On the empirical level we find the *causes* of crisis indicated as being events like the death of someone close, other forms of separation (divorce, for instance), severe illness, organic changes due to age, drastic changes in living conditions and responsibilities (getting married, losing social status, retiring), and many others (10; 53; 59; 103; 110; 152; 216; 251).

The forms through which crisis is expressed are usually sub-divided into the somatic (headaches, loss of appetite, disturbance of sleep, sexual disorders, etc.), the psychic (anxiety, depression, anguish, de-realisation, de-personalisation, etc.), and the behavioural (lowered efficiency in activity, aggressive and auto-aggressive reactions, difficulties in communication, disorganisation of settled modes of conduct, etc.). Almost all the phenomena mentioned in such catalogues can arise within other kinds of critical situations also—in stress, conflict and frustration—and consequently are not specific to crisis. More specific are: the sense that "life (like this) is impossible"; feelings that existence is meaningless, that one has lost oneself; intention or attempts to commit suicide; and similar all-embracing inner experiences which affect the whole of life, or the most essential, basic aspects of the individual life.

Studies made of various life-crises have built up a rich stock of empirical material. Set against this, the theoretical work done on the problem looks so scanty that it seems too soon to speak of a psychological *theory* of crisis. The current ideas on crisis have achieved a status of some independence not on account of any original theoretical constructs, but because they play an integral part in the practical provision—intensively developed in many countries—of short-term psychological and psychiatric help for people finding themselves in difficulties, such help being made available without the great expense to the client involved in psychoanalysis. This "crisis theory" is inseparable from the mental health services, crisis prevention programmes etc., which explains both its obvious merits—direct interchange between theory and practice, concepts firmly rooted in clinical observation—and its equally obvious shortcomings—eclecticism, insufficient elaboration of its own system categories, and lack of clarity as to the connections between the concepts employed and the ideas of academic psychology.

Let us distinguish the dominant theoretical approaches used to describe crises.

The clinical approach. This is most clearly represented in Lindemann's famous paper (152). The event serving as cause of the crisis is interpreted, within the lines laid down by this approach, as a psychotraumatic affect (usually external). So far as the crisis itself is concerned, although it is held to be a normal, non-pathological state, it is nevertheless described in terms following a medical paradigm, as a species of illness (or more precisely as a syndrome with its own pathognomonic symptoms, characteristic course and various possible outcomes), sometimes requiring short-term treatment, usually psychotherapy. Emergence from the crisis is accordingly described as a recovery, expressed in disappearance of symptoms, restoration of work capability and of normal functioning.

The homeostatic adaptational approach. Those favouring this approach include such a great authority in crisis studies as G. Caplan. In the terms of this approach, the cause of the crisis is seen as the individual's confrontation with a problem which he cannot escape and which he is unable to solve (53; 55), i.e., the arisal of crisis is understood as a consequence of insufficiency of the subject's available skills in adaptive behaviour. The crisis itself is described as "short psychological upsets" (53, p. 521). G. Caplan writes: "In a crisis ... the homeostatic mechanisms are temporarily unable to maintain the usual balance because of the alteration in the environment... This leads to a rise of tension ... and to a temporary lowering of the efficiency of the system because its various parts are no longer acting in harmony" (*ibid.*, p. 522). Let us take special note of that last formulation: the crisis state is being characterised on the one hand as an internal disharmony in the system, on the other as a dislocation of its outward-directed activity. The struggle with crisis is interpreted as development of "internal adjustive changes, and also changes in the relation of the system to its external world" (*ibid.*), and the emergence from crisis as the establishment of "a new balance between the altered system and its altered environment" *(ibid.)*.

These first two approaches were elaborated through the practice of preventive psychiatry and refer mainly to situational crises arising more or less accidentally as a result of abrupt changes in the individual's external world. The third approach has been produced prior to and independently of preventive psychiatry, within the field of developmental psychology.

The individual development approach. This is an attempt to bring within the scope of psychological analysis not only isolated acts and situations within a human life, but the life itself as a whole. The "whole" is differently seen by different authors—as a journey through life, as a biography, as a life-cycle, as an individual's fate, as the story of a life. Nor is there any unanimity in their definitions of the motive forces and determinants in a life; some authors put the accent on biological factors, others on the social and historical, and yet others on the strictly psychological. All these differences apart, one can say that this approach sees the life of an individual as a process of development which progresses through a regular series of "phases" or stages, while the transitions from one to another of these take the form of crises. The cause of crisis is understood to be the ending, in bankruptcy, of one of these phases, which occurs because the possibilities open to the given personality no longer match up to its own, and/or society's, expectations and demands at the given stage of development. The crisis itself is described as a period of break-up of the outlived integrated state of the personality, and in the course of this break-up the person experiences a painful sense of loss of identity. Conquest of the crisis is seen as a process in which new formations in the personality are developed, a new integrity and a new internal organisation is formed; emergence from the crisis is the opening-up of a new phase of development.

Which of these theoretical approaches measures up most adequately to the reality of crisis, and is most productive for development of our theoretical conception of crisis?

The first, clinical approach has made a great contribution to the study of crises, for by supplying the fine-drawn observations of clinicians it has helped to give us striking empirical descriptions of how crisis declares itself. But at the present stage of developments the clinical approach offers no further perspectives either theoretically or practically, for to pursue it consistently would mean distinguishing between a limitless multitude of empirically discovered crisis "syndromes" (the grief syndrome, the disablement syndrome, the jealousy syndrome, the dismissal syndrome, etc.), each of them corresponding to an actual life problem and sub-dividing, naturally, into a large number of possible variants. It may be that distinguishing and describing such separate syndromes has its uses, but it needs to be done with a general psychological understanding of crisis in terms of its content as the point of departure, not just the formal medical paradigm. The latter, following its own immanent logic, founded in the study of somatic diseases, is liable to see human experiencing in too "naturalistic" a manner. In fact the regularities of experiencing cannot be deduced from the general laws of functioning, normal and pathological, of the human organism.

The second, homeostatic approach also has its origin in physiological studies of the organism. It is, fortunately, so devoid of psychological content that it does little to hinder the actual practice of psychological analysis or of psychological assistance to people in crisis situations. The authors adhering to this approach in fact do no more than declare their support of it (one must after all offer some sort of general theoretical structure!), and then, passing on to actual analysis, rely on an adaptation approach (but one far from being the same as the homeostatic).

The main point, in making an evaluation of the clinical and homeostatic approaches in their relevance to the problem of crisis, is that they are incapable of capturing the specific nature of this kind of critical situation, the ways in which it differs from other critical situations, and from others which are not critical at all. The "homeostatic" description of crisis which was quoted earlier could have been applied just as well to a frustrating situation or a stressful situation.

It is our impression that the third of the approaches mentioned, that of personality development, is the most productive and the most adequate for describing the particular critical situation to be called crisis. Our grounds for saying so are that in this developmental system the human being is seen not as an organism but as a personality and, most importantly, is seen from the standpoint of his *specifically human integrity*—on the one hand the synchronous, structural integration of his personality and on the other the diachronous, temporal integrity of his life. And the chief intuitive sign of crisis is indeed its *all-embracing* character: when we say that someone is in crisis, we cannot help but picture this person as undergoing essential changes of some kind, to imagine that not some part of him only, but his entire make-up is affected, that everything most essential in him is being shaken, that the processes under way are vital not at one isolated moment only, but for the whole future of his life.

But if we accept the individual development approach as the most adequate and specific for describing crisis, we are then faced with the problem of how to bring together developmental crises and situational crises. On the one hand we have the theoreticians who have worked on the ideas of normative or developmental crises making a strict distinction between these and situational, traumatic crises (71), principally on the grounds that the latter are accidental while the former follow known lines and are preceded by a developmental build-up; on the other hand we have the theoreticians of situational crises refusing on principle to analyse the integrated line of development of a personality but picking out from the long-term perspective of development, to put under the microscope as it were, a particular crisis period (116).

If we want to summarise the main differences between these two kinds of crises, each with its corresponding theory, we can say that they differ in origin and in outcome. In origin, because situational crises occur at random, from the operation of external, unforeseen factors, while developmental crises arise from the operation of known regularities, as a result of internal restructuring. In outcome, because emergence from situational crises is seen mostly as restoration of a previously existing state which was disturbed by the crisis event (it is hardly accidental that ideas of homeostasis should figure so prominently in crisis theory), while emergence from "normative" crises is seen as a transition to a new stage in individual development.

Real and important as these differences may be, one cannot in our view accept them as so absolute that the two kinds of crises must be kept entirely separate from one another and dealt with in different theoretical compartments. The fact is that the regularity in the onset of "normative" crises is only very comparatively "regular", firstly because the transition to a succeeding stage of development is frequently accomplished without crisis, in a gradual, evolutionary manner, and secondly because external causes are always needed to set in motion the crisis that has been prepared by the preceding course of development, and these external causes are often so important in themselves that they cannot be viewed as "triggers" and nothing more. Furthermore, the randomness of situational crises is sometimes fairly dubious, as the accumulated experience of psychotherapy shows. Of course the traumatic event precipitating a crisis takes place quite independently of the individual's intentions, but analysis of data from real cases shows that patients at times themselves contribute to (or do not do enough to prevent) the event's occurrence, and quite often it proves to have been not entirely unexpected to them.

The second difference, in outcome, is likewise not absolute. The underlying categories involved in this distinction include the archetypal opposition of human identity and human metamorphoses (25, p. 262). Analysis of actual cases of human beings in crisis indicates that the real processes taking place are underlain by the dialectics of identity (preservation) and metamorphosis (development). After all, situational problems reach the stage of crisis precisely because they are making it impossible for the individual to actualise himself in his old form. One cannot emerge from a situational crisis unchanged. Even if a person succeeds in retaining the integrity of his personality, in preserving self-identity, that retention and preservation is only possible at the price of some development (or degradation). In order to remain oneself one must become different. A similar logic holds good for normative crises also: development of the personality and its transition to the next stage of its life-journey are unthinkable unless it preserves its own personal self-identity, unless there is an unbroken chain of history of one and the same personality, otherwise the result of every crisis would be that a human being did not "find himself" but on the contrary "lost himself".

The differences between developmental and situational crises, then, are not absolute. Of course all these differences are real, and important, and must be borne in mind when we elaborate general theoretical representations of crisis—borne in mind as factors which are opposed but dialectically conjoined.

It now remains for us to define the fundamental characteristics of our concept of crisis as a particular critical situation. The category field within which the specific nature of crisis has meaning is presented in the concept "a human life as a whole". This field can be imaged on the ontological plane as a life-world in which the subject is the individual, and the specific internal necessity is the self-actualisation of the individual, the realisation of one's own life-need, one's own life-plan. The normal conditions of this existence are: (a) complexity of the individual, requiring him to struggle to maintain his own integrity, and (b) difficulty in existence, requiring efforts to be made to achieve the real embodiment and realisation of that integrity. The psychological "organ" carrying out the integrated intent of the personality with regard to itself and its own life, under conditions of difficulty and complexity within its world, is the will (for the time being we merely assert this axiomatically, grounds for the assertion will be given later). The will is the tool used to overcome the "multiplied", one by another, forces of difficulty and complexity. When in the course of a person's life and development conditions are created which break down the integrity of his personality and his self-identity, and/or hinder his self-actualisation, and the will proves helpless in face of these conditions—and not for a given isolated moment, but in the long-term perspective of life-intent actualisation, then the critical situation specific to this dimension of life—crisis—is brought about.

Thus each of the concepts embodying the idea of a critical situation has corresponding to it a particular category field giving the functional norms of that concept, which must be borne in mind if its employment for theoretical purposes is to be precise. On the ontological plane, the category field reflects one particular dimension of human life, a dimension with its own regularities and characterised by the conditions of life, the type of activity, and the specific internal necessity appropriate to it. We shall now bring all these characteristics together, in Table 1.

What significance have these distinctions for the analysis of critical situations and for the theory of experiencing in general? The above typology enables us to achieve better differentiation in describing extreme situations.

Of course an actual event may affect all these "dimensions" of life at once, evoking stress and frustration, and

Table 1

Typology of Critical Situations

Ontological field	Type of activity	Internal necessity	Normal conditions	Type of critical situation
"Vitality"	Life of the organism	Here-and-now satisfaction	Direct presentation of life-goods	Stress
A particular life-relation	Action	Actualisation of motive	Difficulty	Frustration
The internal world	Consciousness	Internal consonance	Complexity	Conflict
Life as a whole	Will	Actualisation of life-intent	Difficulty and complexity	Crisis

conflict, and crisis, but it is this very interpenetration of critical situations, found empirically, which makes it essential to differentiate between them with exactitude.

The actual critical situation is not a rigidly set formation, it has a complex inner dynamic, in which the different types of "impossibility" situations influence one another through internal states, external behaviour and the objective consequences of that behaviour. Let us say, for instance, that difficulties encountered in an attempt to attain some goal can, owing to prolonged non-satisfaction of the need felt, evoke a build-up of stress, which in its turn has a negative effect upon activity undertaken and produces frustration; further, aggressive urges or reactions evoked by frustration may come into conflict with the individual's moral attitudes, that conflict again produces an intensification of stress, and so on. In the course of all this, the main problem area of a critical situation can shift from one "dimension" to another.

Furthermore, from the first moment of the onset of a critical situation the psychological struggle with it, put up by the processes of experiencing, also starts to operate, and these processes further complicate the general picture of the dynamics of the critical situation, since they may, while having an advantageous effect in one dimension, merely make things worse in another. But all this is matter for our next section.

It only remains for us to underline the practical importance of the conceptual distinctions made above. They assist in achieving a more precise description of the critical situation in which a person is caught up, and on this description largely depends the correct choice of psychological help to be offered.

3. THE PROCESS OF EXPERIENCING

In the preceding section the subject under discussion was the critical situation, i.e., that which precedes experiencing, and we must therefore proceed now to a review of the ideas now current on the "future" and the "present" of the process. We shall look first at the "future-in-intent", i.e., the aims and motives of experiencing, and then at the future-in-eventuation, i.e., its results. The sub-section after that will be devoted to the "present" of experiencing, the way in which psychological literature views the actualisation itself, the techniques or "machinery" (207) of experiencing. The last item to be dealt with in the section is the problem of classifying different kinds of experiencing.

Determination of Experiencing by Goal

Although it is rare for experiencing, however represented in different conceptions—as psychological defence, compensation or coping behaviour—to be considered as a process directly determined by a consciously recognised goal, it is considered by all authors to be a process subject, in one way or another, to determination by goal. Analysis of relevant psychological writings shows that goal determinants ascribed to experiencing processes coincide with the main "internal necessities" of life which we found in our discussion of the critical situation:

1. Here-and-now satisfaction
2. Actualisation of motive (satisfaction of need)
3. Establishment of order in the internal world
4. Self-actualisation.

Of course all these "internal necessities" appear in psychological literature under varying names, but as a rule the goal postulated for the experiencing process in this or that conception is fairly obviously related to one of these "necessities" as listed. For example, behind defence-mechanism goals such as avoidance of suffering (65), removal of an unpleasant state (107), and denial of painful elements in experience (81) it is not hard to glimpse the same hedonistic urge towards here-and-now satisfaction.

For the purpose of classifying and analysing the views now current on determination-by-goal of experiencing, it is helpful to imagine the process being simultaneously subordinated to more than one of the four determinants already named, and that one of these operates as ultimate goal or motive, and the others as immediate or intermediate goals. If the overall "goal formula" of an instance of experiencing is expressed as the relationship between immediate (and intermediate) goals and ultimate goal, we then get quite a large number of possible combinations. Let us consider those which are most distinctly presented in the literature on experiencing.

For Sigmund Freud the dominant understanding of psychological defence was that which may be denoted, according to the proposed schema, as 3/1. That the "denominator" in the goal formula of psychological defence, i.e., the ultimate goal of defence processes, was held by Freud to be the "pleasure principle", follows from, for instance, his representation of displacement as the prototype of all the special mechanisms of defence (88), while the "motive and goal of all displacement is nothing else but avoidance of unpleasure" (87, p. 153). It also follows from Freud's view that the motives behind defence mechanisms are consequences of cognitive (ideational) and emotional infantilism, and in infantilism the pleasure principle is all-important. So far as concerns the "numerator" in the formula, or the immediate goals of defence mechanisms, Freud held that they are in the majority of cases intended to achieve harmony in the internal world. Displacement is a means of avoiding a disharmony which has arisen in the inner (ideational) life, this dissonance being either an incompatibility between the ego and some experience*, idea or feeling, as Freud considered during the early period of his work (91), or a contradiction between the conscious and the unconscious, as he later held, or a contradiction between Id, Ego and Super-ego, as he formulated it in 1923, when *The Ego and the Id* was written (86).[1]

The schema put forward in *The Ego and the Id* provided the basis for further elaboration of ideas on psychological defence by Anna Freud, in her book *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*. The ego defends itself against instincts and against affects. The motives of defence against affects are determined by the motives of defence against instincts, for the affect is one of the representatives of the instinctive process. However, "if the ego has nothing to object to in a particular instinctual process and so does not ward off an affect on that ground, its attitude towards it will be determined entirely by the pleasure principle: it will welcome pleasurable affects and defend itself against painful ones" (82, p. 62). This variant of experiencing can be denoted as 1/1 in the table as proposed, immediate and ultimate goals coincide, and both are concerned with "here-and-now" satisfaction.

Matters are rather more complicated when it comes to defence against instincts. In all cases defence is called forth by anxiety, but there are anxieties and anxieties: the fears of the ego can be evoked by most diverse threats, and the goals of the defence process will vary correspondingly. When what is called anxiety of the super-ego is present, the ego defends itself against instincts not because these are contradictory to its own requirements, but in order to maintain good relations with the super-ego, to which the given instincts seem unacceptable (82). The "goal formula" of this sort of defence may be represented as a two-stage relation, 3/3/1: the defence process seeks to alter the internal links between the ego and the instincts (3) in order to achieve harmony between the ego and super-ego (3) and so avoid pain (1). When so-called "objective anxiety" is present, the organisation by goal of the defence mechanisms is rather different—3/2/1: the main motive—to avoid pain (1) compels the ego to accommodate itself to the demands of external reality (2),[1] and for this purpose to achieve certain inner relationships, in particular to inhibit instincts (3).

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[1] This version of determination-by-goal of defence mechanisms is not the only one to be found in Freud's work, but it is the main one. One should qualify this statement, however, by mentioning that he saw as equally important the idea that the central function of defence mechanisms is related to neuroses: in an addendum to *Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety* Freud describes defence as the general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis (87, p. 163).

Although many kinds of psychological defence, as described by Sigmund and by Anna Freud, have other "goal formulae", one can state nevertheless that the dominant note in their understanding of this process is the recognition of the pleasure principle as providing the ultimate goal.

Among those who have studied coping behaviour, its main aim is seen as achievement of a realistic accommodation between the individual and environment, which will allow the individual to satisfy his needs. In terms of our table, the denominator in the goal formula for this type of experiencing will be (2). The defence mechanisms that are considered by theoreticians of coping behaviour to be a sub-species of coping behaviour are here classifiable as variant 1/2, which means that the immediate goals of these defence mechanisms are seen as being achievement of the greatest possible emotional well-being under the given conditions, but this goal is viewed in its relation to what is considered the more important goal of adaptation to reality. The function attributed to the defence mechanisms is that of providing time for other, more productive coping processes to come into play (103; 119 et al.).

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[1] The grounds on which we classify the urge to accommodation as an "internal necessity" of Type 2 will be made clear in Chapter II.

Among the mechanisms where the principal motive is the second of the types of "internal necessities" in our table, we may point also to a fairly widespread variant indicable as 3/2: these are the mechanisms which, through achieving internal accommodations (the actual technical process of achieving such accommodations is something we shall be speaking of later), make permissible the actualisation, direct or indirect, of an activity which is psychologically forbidden and therefore internally impossible. Among them are numbered the mechanisms which in psychoanalytical descriptions are shown as furthering the channelling, control and direction of impulses (134; 210; 220 et al.). They are, incidentally, often counterposed to defence mechanisms (193, 210).

In many descriptions of the processes of experiencing their main goal is considered to be achievement of a non-contradictory and integrated state in the internal world, while all other goals are seen as intermediate only. In the opinion of many authors the defence processes serve specifically to integrate the ego. The ego's need for synthesis, harmony and integration is often acknowledged as an independent motive in defence and compensation, in the literature of psychoanalysis (82; 113; 122). The same "internal necessity" is appropriate, too, for the processes of reducing cognitive dissonance described by Leon Festinger (47; 73).

The most widespread variant of experiencing subject to this main goal can be given the formula 3/3 (such, for example, is suppression, as treated by Karen Horney: "giving predominance to one trend by submerging all discrepant elements is an unconscious attempt to organise the personality" [113, p. 57]); though the variants 4/3 and 2/3 are conceivable. An example of the first of these two is provided by self-actualisation processes, seen as a means of resolving inner conflict between the real ego and the ideal ego. The second, 2/3, may be illustrated by behaviour in which realisation of even such an apparently self-sufficient motive as the sexual proves in fact to be a means of avoiding disintegration of consciousness (131).

Variants 1/4, 2/4 and 3/4, where the basis of the experiencing process is the urge to self-actualisation, are clearly delineated in Y. S. Savenko's presentation (207) of the mechanisms of psychological compensation: whatever the immediate goal of a compensating process may be—"achievement of a comfortable internal state" (1), or the reduction to order of varying urges (3)—its ultimate goal is to ensure the possibility of self-actualisation (4).

We have now reviewed the main varieties of determination-by-goal of experiencing.

"Success" of Experiencing

One of the most far-reaching distinctions drawn when experiencing processes are being analysed bears something of the nature of a value judgement, since it consists in a division into "successful" and "unsuccessful".

Researchers for whom the central categories are "coping" or "compensation" usually bring in the concept of "defence" to denote "unsuccessful" processes, keeping their key term for the "successful" processes (103; 173; 207; 231). But the authors who consider the concept of psychological defence to be a general category, covering all processes of experiencing, either speak of "successful/unsuccessful" defence, or else insist that the traditional meaning of defence—which they feel to be linked only with "unsuccessful", negative or pathological processes—must be extended to include the more effective, positive and healthy processes as well (27; 29; 203), or they propose that "successful" defences should be brought under the head of sublimation (72).[1] These nuances of terminology will have to be borne in mind when we come to speak of the negative sides of defence mechanisms.

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[1] Sublimation gets used in this way because most psychoanalysts do not count it as a form of defence at all, and even

The concept of "unsuccessful" experiencing has considerable variations in import for different authors. There is a whole scale of degrees, at one end of which we find comparatively mild intimations that processes of this kind distort reality and are based on self-deception, etc. (103; 109; 119; 170; 171 et al.), while at the other end of the scale "unsuccessful" experiencing is qualified as potentially pathogenic (55; 99; 193; 231; 256), or even as pathological, not just pathogenic psychodynamic activity (227). However, even the most negative qualifications of these processes are always accompanied by reminders of their positive functions, especially in assisting integration (*ibid.*).

One has to admit that the optimal variant seems to be the position, taken up by some researchers, of "blaming" defence processes not so much for the content of their goals as for the shortsightedness of the goals, for lack of scruple as to the means of achieving them, and for negative side-effects of their operation. From this standpoint the defence mechanisms are rather like lazy and not-too-honest servants who may have good intentions but carry them out by regrettable means, making their master pay dearly for their "help".

We already know what these goals are—defence processes are aimed at releasing the individual from discord among impulses and ambivalence of feelings (82), at preventing him from becoming conscious of undesirable or painful contents (103; 112; 119; 220), and, most importantly of all, at removing anxiety and tension (107; 111; 112; 125 et al.). But the means of achieving these goals, that is the defence itself, is represented by rigid, automatic,

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such an authority as Anna Freud can at one point write of the need to include this mechanism along with the nine most widely encountered means of psychological defence (regression, repression, reaction formations, isolation, undoing, turning against the self-projection, introjection, reversal)—yet can at the same time counterpose sublimation to all of these, as being a mechanism "which pertains rather to the study of the normal than to that of neurosis" (82, p. 44).

compulsive, non-voluntary and unconscious processes, which operate unrealistically, without taking account of a situation as a whole and without any long-term perspective (107; 134; 170; 171; 210 et al.). So it is hardly surprising that even if the goals of psychological defence are achieved, it is at the price of objective disintegration of behaviour (125), of concessions, regression, self-deception (109; 134; 207), or even neurosis.

In short, as Theodore C. Kroeber said, "an individual with adequate defense mechanisms but nothing more may avoid the fate of hospitalisation..." (134, p. 184), but that is the most he can count on.

This maximum result of defence is at the same time the minimum result which "successful" experiencing can produce. The highest forms of human experiencing—the top end of the scale of "success"—leading to development, self-actualisation and improvement of the personality, are very rarely analysed in psychological literature. The upper limit set by the overwhelming majority of psychologists for the "success" of experiencing—for its results, means and nature—is not set very high. "Successful" coping behaviour is described as raising the subject's adaptive capabilities (55), as being realistic, flexible, for the most part conscious, embodying voluntary choice, active (53; 134; 170). Even those authors who consider the principal internal necessity of human life to be self-actualisation, the urge to perfection, and the full realisation of potential (6; 167; 207) and who view experiencing as related to this motive, usually see it only as a means of removing or compensating for hindrances to self-actualisation, not as a process capable of making an independent positive and irreplaceable con-

Table 2

Characteristics of "Successful" and "Unsuccessful" Experiencing Processes

Characteristics	Defence	Coping
Basic goals	Removal, prevention or mitigation of unpleasure	Accommodation to reality, making satisfaction of needs possible

Characteristics	Defence	Coping
Course of development as regards: voluntary intent, consciousness	Processes involuntary, automatic, mainly unrecognised in consciousness, rigid	Processes goal-directed, largely recognised in consciousness, flexible
relation to external and internal reality	Denial, distortion and concealment of reality from self, flight from it, self-deception	Set towards admission and acceptance of reality, active investigation of real situation
differentiation	Forms of behaviour taking no account of overall situation, operating by "frontal attack"	Realistic recognition of overall situation, ability to sacrifice a partial and immediate good. Ability to break situation down into small, potentially soluble tasks
attitude to outside help during experiencing	Either no effort to seek help and rejection of help offered, or desire to lay whole burden on helper and refusal to try and solve own problems	Active search for and acceptance of help
Results, consequences and functions	Can lead to partial improvement (e. g., localised decrease of tension, subjective integration of behaviour, removal of unpleasant or painful sensations), but at the price of deterioration in overall situation (regression, objective disintegration of behaviour up to and including neurosis). Function positive in that an escape-route from shock is provided, giving a person time for preparation of other, more effective forms of experiencing	Processes ensure orderly, controlled satisfaction of needs and impulses; they preserve a person from regression, lead to accumulation of individual experience in coping with life-problems

tribution to the perfecting of personality, as capable not merely of ridding the personality of something negative but of adding something positive to it.[1]

We find isolated hints in the work of a number of researchers that the highest forms of human experiencing proceed not on the plane of adaptation but in the context of assimilating cultural values (95; 164), that they are creative in their manner of operation (207), and that their result can be "a widening of the boundaries of the individual consciousness to reach the universal" (74, p. 569; 75), but on the whole the investigation of these processes by modern psychological science has been totally insufficient.

Two types of experiencing, then, broadly characterised as negative and positive, the "unsuccessful" and the "successful", have been analysed in greater or lesser detail in psychological literature. Accepting the generally found (though not universally accepted) terminological identification of "unsuccessful" processes with psychological defence and of "successful" processes with coping, we can now bring their general characteristics together in tabulated form (see Table 2).

The Techniques and Processes of Experiencing

Up to now we have been mainly concerned with the characteristics of the functional "locus" or place of experiencing, i.e., its causes, goals, functions and results; we have now to turn to analysis of what fills that place, to the actual "body" of the process, to investigation of how the "technology" or "engineering" of experiencing is depicted in psychological literature. The problem falls into three parts: first we shall touch upon the question of the carriers of the experiencing process—of what can carry out its functions; next we shall discuss the various technical dimensions of the process and the elementary operations executed within each of those dimensions; and lastly we shall touch on the question of the internal structure of experiencing.

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[1] The hero of a story by Bunin says, recalling how his brother was arrested, that the event "did not become fully a part of my experience straight away, but it did so eventually, and even served in my mature years as a stimulus to my forces" (I. A. Bunin, *Zhizn Arsenieva* (The Life of Arseniev), Moscow, 1982, p. 157).

a) *"Carriers" of Experiencing*

We have already seen that any mental function, "any psychological process or quality can under certain conditions take on a compensatory significance" (207, p. 100), i.e., can execute the work of experiencing.

There is in the literature a plethora of studies in which we find discussed the compensatory and defensive functions of an amazing variety of kinds of behaviour—from artistic creation and professional work[1] to theft (4) and crime in general. The same role can be performed even by what might seem such peripheral processes as disturbance of constancy in perception.[2] E. Menaker (168) sees the self-image as a defensive formation, and H. Lowenfeld (157) asserts that shame is also defensive in origin. In experiencing a situation "executive" work can be done by wit, humour, sarcasm, irony, clowning (90; 172; 198).

This catalogue, which could be continued indefinitely, indicates that the range of possible carriers of experiencing includes absolutely all forms and levels of behavioural and psychic processes.

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[1] Chekhov's Uncle Vanya and Sonya are anxious to get back to their ordinary work as quickly as possible in order to get rid of a feeling of oppression: "It weighs on you. Must occupy yourself with something... Work, work!"

[2] W. A. Myers describes a case of micropsia occurring during a psychoanalytic session, and explains it by using the interpretation Ferenczi gave to a child's "Gulliver fantasy"—that the unusual reduction in the perceived size of things and people should be attributed to compensatory fantasy on the child's part, and that this fantasy fulfilled the wish to reduce terrifying objects to as small a size as possible (175). O. E. Sperling, on the contrary, analyses exaggeration as a defence (226).

b) *"Technological" Dimensions and Elementary Operations of Experiencing*

Any carrier of experiencing produces the desired effect because it produces certain changes in the psychological world of the person concerned. To describe these one has to have a special language, or more than that—a special conception of the psychological world, and every researcher studying the processes of experiencing either relies, intentionally or otherwise, on an already available conception, or creates a new one. The activity theory also cannot avoid this problem. To solve it, consciously and purposefully, is so complex a matter that it would be quite unforgivable to refuse to make full use of all resources available at the present moment in scientific history, which sees activity theory lagging behind, but offers a positive legacy of accumulated thought upon this problem, stored in psychological literature.

Even using all resources, though, the task is far from simple. In the following pages we are to make the first step only towards its solution—to try and systematise the main transformations in the psychological world which, according to descriptions in the literature, bring a person through a critical situation. Two methods of making such a systematisation are possible. One is to search for the simplest mechanisms, the elementary components from which the ego constructs more highly organised formations (227). A more productive approach seems to be that attempted by Y. S. Savenko (207): the units of systematisation here are not elementary mechanisms but "dimensions" of the personality, each of which has a whole cycle of transformations of the psychological world corresponding to it.

Our own attempt at systematisation will follow a similar path, but with the difference, that we are not taking as point of departure any particular conception of the structure of personality which would prescribe the "dimensions" to be used, but—since we are here concerned with an overall review—are merely making a first deduction for our own benefit of what the "dimensions" are, from the descriptions available in the literature of various processes and mechanisms involved in experiencing. Since the material to be analysed consists of these descriptions (although the subject-matter of course remains the reality of experiencing), we shall speak of different paradigms for analysis of the technology of experiencing.

The Energy Paradigm

Conceptions involving energy are very current in psychology, but they have been very poorly worked out from the methodological standpoint. It is not clear to what extent these conceptions are merely models of our understanding and to what extent they can be given ontological status. Equally problematic are the conceptual links between energy and motivation, energy and meaning, energy and value, although it is obvious that in fact there are links: we know how "energetically" a person can act when positively motivated, we know that the meaningfulness of a project lends additional strength to the people engaged in it, but we have very little idea how to link up into one whole the physiological theory of activation, the psychology of motivation, and the ideas of energy which have been elaborated mainly in the field of physics.

Among the more actual of the theoretical problems raised one should point first of all to the paradox involved in the psychological idea of energy: on the one hand it is held that no "non-objective" energy, mental energy as a thing-in-itself, can exist, but on the other hand the existence of surplus energy seeking an outlet is also admitted. This problem is linked with the opposition of the concepts "energy" and "force". Although Joseph Nuttin (178, p. 5) writes that "in psychology it is generally very frequent for no distinction to be made between 'force' and 'energy' ", we should mention that the distinction is sometimes made. David Rapaport and Morton M. Gill, for instance, assert that both concepts are vitally necessary in psychology, since the concept of force cannot explain such phenomena as "substitution" and "transformation", and "energies which (by definition) are directionless quantities cannot account for directional phenomena" (192, p. 156).

We cannot, however, plunge into these problems here. Our task is to distinguish, from available descriptions of experiencing processes, those transformations—presumable or obviously present—which involve energy-related ideas, and illustrate these.

Withdrawal of energy. The most widely encountered of the operations of experiencing is the "withdrawal of energy" from some content of the consciousness. As an example we can quote the well-known interpretation which Sigmund Freud gave of the work of mourning—a gradual withdrawal of the libido attached to the image of the loved one now lost (85). The separation from an object or an idea of a corresponding "sum of excitation" is one of the most important hypotheses in the psychoanalytical theory of defence processes (220). In purely formal terms the same operation, "withdrawal of energy", forms the basis for the particular mechanism of "intrapsychic adaptation" which F. V. Berezin identified (34, pp. 287-88) and called "lowering the level of inducement". The sense of the process is to remove anxiety evoked by a threat (real or imaginary) to the person's vital urges, by lowering the level of inducement resulting from those urges.

Discharge of energy. This operation can be illustrated by such mechanisms as reaction and catharsis (in the psychoanalytical sense), which are often taken to be identical, and mean release of the energy of suppressed affects by means of recollection and verbalisation of the displaced content.

Supply of energy. As illustration we can take the "cathectic" mechanism which supplies energy to actions, objects and ideas (69, 115). The process of learning conscious control over the energy-supply operation is one of development of the art of self-motivation. An instance we have already mentioned, the "psychological way out" evolved by political prisoners in the Schlüsselburg fortress (140), can be interpreted as just such a channelling of energy, by the prisoners, into the activity forced upon them by the prison administration.

Transmission of energy. This operation does not always represent the sum of the operations of energy withdrawal and energy supply, as might at first seem to be the case, since the law of conservation of energy does not apparently extend to the psychological category of energy. Transmission of energy from one mental content to another is not necessarily linked to any reduction in the "charge" of energy still present in the first of the two. In the case we have just spoken of, we can say that the basic motive of the revolutionaries (the fight against the autocracy), from which they drew the energy to carry out their forced labour, was itself in no way weakened, but rather strengthened. This "violation" of the law of conservation of energy is bound up with the operation of its *generation.*

Transmission of energy has two main forms—*transfer* from one content (motive, action, idea) to another, and *transformation* from one form into another.

As an illustration of the first we can take the mechanism of "impulse transformation"—"the ability to appropriate some energy from an impulse by disguising it through symbolisation as its opposite" (134, p. 188). In its defensive function the mechanism is a "reaction formation"—transformation of an impulse into its opposite, with the possibility of the first one breaking through, in which case it is usually considered not to have been transformed (82; 134; 203)[1].

It is exceptionally important to distinguish between two possible results of transfer of energy. In one (as happens with reaction formations) the content receiving the energy does not become organically bound to it; this recipient-content becomes strong enough to determine actions appropriate to itself, but its strength is not its own, but the borrowed energy from the "donor" motive; it does not alter this motive, but in most cases actually serves it, although the two may seem to be opposites. In the second type of transfer the energy becomes fixed within the new content, "grows into" it, and here we have, it would seem, the genesis of a motive—a new motive is born, a new activity only genetically connected with the "donor" motive, and functionally already "autonomous" (5). Fixation of energy differs from supply of energy and can be considered a separate operation in the energy paradigm. As illustration of transfer of energy with fixation one can take the process of "shift of motive towards goal" (when it appears as a developmental mechanism),[1] also sublimation, in the sense not of finding socially acceptable channels for satisfaction of primitive impulses, but in that of actual transformation of those impulses.

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[1] Solicitude or courtesy can be "reaction formations" by means of which a person attempts to defend himself from his own aggressive urges. A. F. Losev (156, p. 57) analyses a passage in Dostoyevsky's *Eternal Husband* thus: Pavel Pavlovich is caring for Velchaninov, who is ill; Velchaninov had previously been his (P.P.'s) late wife's lover. In the midst of his meticulous attendance upon the sick man, Pavel Pavlovich attempts to cut Velchaninov's throat with a razor as he lies asleep; no thoughts of doing any such thing had been in his mind up to that moment. "Pavel Pavlovich wanted to kill me, but didn't know that he wanted to," thought Velchaninov. "Hm! He came here 'to embrace me and weep' as he very slimily put it himself, that is he came here to cut my throat, but thought he was coming 'to embrace me and weep'. Weeping and embracing is something quite opposite to wanting to cut someone's throat."

The second type of energy transfer is linked with transformation of its form. Examples of this operation are: the mechanism of conversion,[1] and one of the phases of catharsis (as understood in psychoanalysis) linked with psychosomatic interchange. "The operation of Breuer's cathartic method lies in leading back the excitation," writes Freud, "from the somatic to the psychical sphere deliberately, and in them forcibly bringing about a settlement of the contradiction by means of thought-activity" (91, p. 50).

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[1] The concept of "shift of motive towards goal" was introduced into activity theory by A. N. Leontiev to describe the phenomenon occurring "when someone starts to perform certain actions under the influence of one motive but then continues to perform them for their own sake, because the motive has as it were shifted towards the goal" (142, p. 302). This process of "shift of motive towards goal" is seen in Leontiev's conception as one of the mechanisms in development of activity and of personality. For example, a first-year pupil sets about doing homework only in order to be allowed to go and play afterwards. The actions of learning are still without independent motive, they are set in motion by motives concerned with play. But as a result of the learning the child gets a gook mark and the approval of adults, interest in the subject learned is aroused, and learning actions acquire an independent meaning for the child. Motives for learning which had been "merely understood", i.e., without sufficient energy in them to prompt action, now become "operative in reality". The result of this topping-up with energy is the birth of a new, psychologically independent activity, learning *(ibid.,* pp. 512-14).

Generation of energy. This operation scarcely figures at all in descriptions of experiencing processes, yet it deserves to be seen as having great theoretical significance. Generation of energy is exactly what we ought to see (viewing things in their formal relation to energy) in the result of aesthetic catharsis (or in one of its results, to be more precise): "The spectator goes away not 'discharged' but 'filled', 'inspired' ..." (74, p. 568). Any success, achievement or good fortune raises a person's energy potential, as it were, and this is expressed in his setting up higher goals for attainment (178) and being capable of overcoming considerable difficulties and obstacles.

The Space Paradigm

Here we consider the "spatial" dimensions used in descriptions of experiencing processes. Two classes of dimension can be distinguished—the content-psychological and the formal-topical. In the first class are such specifically psychological oppositions as conscious-unconscious, intrapsychic—interpsychic, and in the second are spatial references not specific to psychology but none the less important to it, such as far—near, wide—narrow, etc. Let us consider these.

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[1] Freud introduced the concept of "conversion" to denote the transformation of a free "sum of excitation" (i.e., energy which has become separated from an idea incompatible with the ego when that idea as displaced) into somatic symptoms (91, p. 49).

The psychosomatic dimension may be illustrated by the mechanisms mentioned in the last section, conversion and catharsis.

Conscious—unconscious. This is the most fundamental dimension for psychoanalytical theory of defence mechanisms. A whole series of defence processes, displacement above all, presuppose the existence of two "spatial" fields, the conscious and the unconscious, and that crossing-over of contents between these are psychologically vital events. Freud said (89) that displacement is a topical-dynamic process.

Interpsychic—intrapsychic. Crossing of the interpsychic (or more precisely the interpersonal) into the intrapsychic, and the reverse movement, is particularly characteristic of projection (projection being here defined as a process whereby a person attributes his own personality traits, characteristics aud motivations to other people [112]),[1] and of introjection. Introjection is "the process by which the functions of an external object are taken over by its mental representative, by which the relationship with an object 'out there' is replaced by one with an imagined object 'inside'. The resulting mental structure is variously called an *introject*, an *introjected object*, or an *internal object*..."; the super-ego, in particular, "is formed by introjection of parental figures..." (203), pp. 77-78). The function of introjection as a defence mechanism, in the psychoanalytical view, is to reduce the anxiety caused by separation from the parents. The mechanism is known to others, outside the world of psychoanalysis. Its operation is quite clearly traced in Lindemann's "work of grief" (152). And in Yuri Trifonov's story *The Old Man* (Starik) we read: "Pavel Yevgrafovich's wife died, but her conscience is alive."

Intrapsychic space itself can serve as the arena of experiencing processes. This includes most of the mechanisms we shall be considering under the informational-cognitive paradigm. As one example we can cite "isolation", which Anna Freud describes as removal of "the instinctual impulses from their context, while retaining them in consciousness" (82, p. 35). Experiencing processes can also develop in *interpsychic space*, the space of communication (see below).

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[1] Unlike other "mechanisms" of experiencing, projection is widely discussed in Soviet psychological literature (50; 51; 130; 196; 206; 209; 223-225 et al.).

Activity space. Experiencing processes are often described as transforming or replacing structural components of activity, in other words as effecting *substitution.* The basic concept of substitution is that two activities are involved in the exchange, the two being separated in time and to some degree at least differing one from the other, the later one being capable of solving, at least partially, problems which faced the first one and were unresolved by it. The substitute activity may differ from the original one *by being transferred to another plane* (to that of fantasy, for instance, from that of practical activity); *by change in the form of activity* (request may be replaced by demand, demand by threat); and *by a shift towards genetically earlier modes of behaviour.* Besides change in the activity itself, one can point also to change in the immediate goal or objective of the activity. This list of "parameters" of substitution is not the only one possible. Miller and Swanson, for instance, propose as the parameters of substitution the following: source of action, action itself, corresponding emotion, object (169).

Kurt Lewin sees substitution as close to "instrumental" activity in the sense that the substitute activity serves as an instrument for the satisfaction of "the inner goal of action" (150). This is so, but only under certain conditions. In our view substitution can perform two functions in relation to the original activity, that of an "instrument" or means, and that of experiencing, depending on the psychological content of the intermediate situation between the original and the substitute activity. If this was a situation of difficulty only, then the substitute activity appears in an "instrumental" function, as a means of attaining the same goal: if you cannot get through on the telephone, you can send a telegram. If there is no such alternative and the person falls into a state of frustration, the substitute activity appears in its function of experiencing. This latter function gives meaning to the action of one ot T. Dembo's experimental subjects: after prolonged failure to accomplish the experimental task (throwing rings over bottles) she burst into tears, went out of the room and hung the rings on a coat-hook (150, p. 181).

We must emphasise that we are speaking of the meaning to the person of the substitute activity, and this may change essentially in the course of its performance, according to the objective course of events and to change in the subjective state of the person, so that one and the same substitute activity can realise both the functions described above.

Many authors follow Sigmund Freud in considering substitution to be not a particular defensive or compensatory mechanism but the basic mode of functioning of the unconscious (229). Miller and Swanson (169; 170) use the concept of substitution as the central category in their theory of psychological defence, interpreting every defence as one or another form of substitution.

Formal-Topical Dimensions

"Direction". Y. S. Savenko refers to this dimension both the mechanism of "rebound action"—the term he uses for "an exhaustive single-stroke response to its cause, directed not upon that cause but upon an unconnected object" (207, p. 103), and likewise the mechanism of switching. "Transferred aggression" (107), when anger is discharged not upon the person causing offence but upon someone else, is one of the most striking examples of change in the "direction" of activity. Clearly change of "direction" is also found in object substitution, sublimation, and reaction formations, which have alrealy been mentioned.

Widening—narrowing of the personality's psychological space. This dimension is very capacious as regards the number of mechanisms that can be referred to it. Y. S. Savenko defines narrowing of the personality's space as a "renunciation" of self-actualisation, of certain self-actualising actions already accomplished, this being expressed in various kinds of concession, retreat, limitation, inhibition, etc. (207).

Anna Freud devotes a whole chapter to the defence mechanism of "restriction of the ego". In one of her descriptions, a small boy abandons an occupation which a moment before had been affording him intense pleasure —painting over "magic drawing blocks"—on seeing how these came out for Anna Freud herself, who was sitting beside him. Evidently, runs her explanation, he was unpleasantly struck by the difference in quality of execution, and decided to limit or deny himself in order to escape the galling comparison (82, p. 101). Different processes of self-limitation (self-denial) are very important in coping with somatic illness, when the interests of health require, or the illness itself obliges, the patient to abandon plans which have become unrealisable, to foreswear a level of ambition that has ceased to be realistic (33; 59; 103 et al.).

Effective functioning of the mechanisms for "widening" the psychological space is particularly vital for adequate experiencing of events which are positive for the individual concerned—success, social recognition, recovery from illness, unexpected good fortune, etc., since these events just as much as negative ones pose a problem for the individual which may not be solved successfully (108).

Opening out—closing down of psychological space. Opening out and closing down are operations linked to those just mentioned, but not fully coinciding with them. Under this head comes fencing off, separation and raising of barriers in interpersonal communication, also their opposite, opening oneself out, etc. (for illustrations see Chapter III).

"Distance". A change in psychological "distance" (195) often serves the purposes of experiencing. Here we include mechanisms operating on the interpsychic plane—distancing oneself from former intimates, former values, or on the contrary drawing close to them—and some on the

intrapsychic—the mechanisms of isolation, of displacement, "discrimination" ("the ability to separate idea from feeling, idea from idea, feeling from feeling") (134, pp. 185-86). The mechanism of "discrimination", according to T. Kroeber, in its defensive function appears as isolation, but in its coping function as objectivity, "the separation of ideas from feelings to achieve an objective evaluation or judgement where situations require it" *(ibid.)*.

Up—down. This spatial dimension is heavily loaded with symbolism and associated with a scale of values. Many processes which actualise experiencing have a markedly "upward" direction, linked, in terms of content, with their very character. Thus displacement is directed "downwards", but catharsis "upwards". The "up" and "down" are obviously not to be understood in a naturalistic sense. Later, in Chapter III, we shall have the opportunity to demonstrate through an actual example the importance of "upward" psychological movements in bringing about experiencing.

The Time Paradigm

This paradigm is employed much less frequently than the preceding ones in descriptions of experiencing processes. One can refer to it the following operations: *Drawing contrasts between times* (207)—seeing experienced events in relation to other real or possible events in the past, present or future. For instance, the consoling reflection that "this is not too bad, it might have been worse", "at least it is better now than it used to be (or will be in the future)", etc.

Setting an event in long-term perspective (173)—an operation differing from the one above in that the event experienced is seen by the subject not in comparison with another event but in long-term perspective, that of a human lifetime or even the lifetime of all humanity.[1]

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[1] It should be noted that this mechanism is found operating in other terms than those of time. Kurt Goldstein, for example, in defining courage as "an affirmative answer to the shocks of

In the course of experiencing, *fixation* upon a particular period or moment may occur. "Grief is a prototype and perfect example of an affective fixation upon something that is past, and ... involves a state of complete alienation from the present and the future" (89, p. 244).

The Genetic Paradigm

Within the framework of this paradigm, which links up with the preceding one, the time-axis of life is polarised by the idea of development. Under this head one may place the following mechanisms:

Regression. In psychoanalysis regression means "a defencive process by which the subject avoids (or seeks to avoid) anxiety by return to an earlier stage of libidinal and ego development" (203, pp. 138-39).

Catharsis. This mechanism, already mentioned more than once, belongs here when given the significance attached to it by T. A. Florenskaya (74), that of a process which carries out the work of experiencing and simultaneously develops the personality.

Introjection also appears both as defence mechanism and as a mechanism of development, increasing the autonomy of the ego (203).

Sublimation. If it is considered that in the process of sublimation primitive impulses are not merely camouflaged but truly transformed, then the transformation must be recognised as a developing force.

The Informational-Cognitive Paradigm

All cognitive processes, insofar as they serve to further experiencing, are of a "partisan", "ideological" nature, i.e., their dominant feature is the interest and motivation of the individual, not the objectivity of the reflection.

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existence", writes that "this form of overcoming anxiety requires the ability to view a single experience within a larger context", that is, it presupposes a set towards the possible (100). Ideas very close to this are voiced by F. V. Bassin and co-authors (29; 31).

This means that they are all in one way or another evaluative operations. But among them one can single out one group of processes which are based directly upon operations for evaluating reality, and another group in which evaluation is not the actual means of accomplishing the work of experiencing.

On this basis, then, we distinguish two dimensions within the informational-cognitive paradigm—that of "evaluation" and that of "interpretation" (cf. 207). Interpretative mechanisms differ from evaluative ones in that they at least appear to take the form of objective, impartial reflection.

Evaluation

As an illustration of intrapsychic, evaluative mechanisms one can take the processes which lower the level of "cognitive dissonance" evoked by decision-making. As the experiments made by Leon Festinger and his fellow-workers show, after choosing one of two almost equally attractive alternatives, the experimental subjects exhibited a process of re-evaluation in which they raised their evaluation of the alternative chosen and lowered that of the one rejected, thus reducing the cognitive dissonance, phenomenally felt as a sense of regret (58).

Interpersonal evaluative mechanisms are represented by a large number of devices aiming to maintain or raise the evaluation of self, the evaluation of oneself made by those around one, one's sense of personal value, personal dignity, etc. In their monologue form—which assumes the presence of a listener or spectator but not of a "Thou", another person of equal status—these devices include various "demonstrative" actions such as boasting, bravado, direct or oblique stressing of one's own virtues and advantages (physical, intellectual, economic, in possession of superior knowledge, etc.). In their dialogue form they maintain a struggle, carried on directly in the course of communication, against the other party's open or concealed evaluation of oneself. The object of evaluation and evaluative struggle can be anything one relates to oneself—actions, motives, traits, right through to possessions and place of work. The struggle against negative evaluation may be passive, evasive (when the subject disassociates himself from some category of people slightingly spoken of in conversation) or active, counter-attacking (when attempts are made to discredit the author of the evaluation and his motives in making it, or doubts are cast on the values on which the evaluation was based, etc.). In dialogue, evaluative struggle often takes the form of sarcasm, malice, irony (198).

Interpretation

The mechanisms of this dimension can take an intellectual and a perceptive form.

The intellectual form. Among the various intellectual operations (comparison, generalisation, inference, etc.) which assist in experiencing, special note should be taken of the operation of causal interpretation of events. Explanation or discovery of causes (origins, bases, reasons, motives, persons at fault, and so on) for an event being experienced (such events include external happenings, one's own behaviour, intentions or feelings) is a most important element in the experiencing process, upon which its content very largely depends. This operation is most strikingly exemplified in the well-known mechanism of rationalisation. This is defined as the ascribing of logical reasons, or reputable grounds, to behaviour for which the real motives are unacceptable or unknown (107; 134), or as the justification, to others or to oneself, of one's own insufficiency (125).[1]

The perceptive form. Perceptive forms of "interpretation" arise when events (external and internal), other people, and oneself, are being apprehended. The devices proper to these three occasions can be well represented by the defence mechanisms of, respectively, denial, projection, and identification, and of these we shall consider the first and the last, since they have not so far been mentioned in this review.

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[1] Rationalisation is distinguished from intellectualisation, which, as T. Kroeber puts it, "... retreats from the world of impulse and affects to a world principally of words and abstractions" (134, p. 186).

Denial is usually defined as a process by which the individual rids himself of traumatic perception of external reality. It is thus counterposed to displacement, the mechanism of defence against psychic pain produced by internal, instinctive needs (82). But the term is sometimes used to describe defensive distortion "of perception of internal states" (34, p. 284). T. Kroeber writes that the basic formula of denial is "there is no pain, there is no danger" (134), but this should not delude us into seeing as simple the real processes resulting in denial of some external fact. R. D. Stolorow and F. M. Lachman (231) describe a case of experiencing—a young girl who at the early age of four had lost her father—and show how a whole defensive system was built up in her consciousness to enable her to deny to herself the fact of her loss. The system was a complex structure which developed as her personality developed, re-interpreting the changing circumstances of her life (her mother's remarriage, for example, in itself an indication of her father's death) in such a way as to preserve the patient's faith that her father was still alive.

Identification. If projection enables a subject to see himself in another, then identification enables him to see another in himself. In identification the individual overcomes his own feelings of loneliness, incapacity or inadequacy by assuming the characteristics of another, more successful person. The identification may sometimes be not with a person but with an organisation or institution (109). Anna Freud describes cases in which fear or anxiety is overcome by identification, voluntary or involuntary, with the "aggressor". A little girl who was afraid to walk through a dark hall overcame her fear eventually and then confided the secret of her triumph to her younger brother, "There's no need to be afraid in the hall, you just have to pretend that you're the ghost who might meet you" (82, p. III). Identification can reach such intensity that someone comes "to live in the lives of other people" (*ibid.*, p. 125). Such cases are not uncommon when the death of someone near and dear is experienced (125; 152; 234).

Bringing our discussion of the "technological" dimensions of experiencing to a close at this point, one should however point out that it would have been possible to delineate two other paradigms, of dynamics and values, which have in the pages above been diffused throughout the others. The "dynamic" paradigm, though, can be seen as the result of "multiplying" ideas relating purely to energy and denoting *intensity*, by those content-spatial ideas which introduce *direction* into the description of mental processes. So far as the values paradigm is concerned, it is too rarely represented (in its pure form, i.e., not that of the evaluative dimension) in specialist, psychologists' descriptions of experiencing, although it has been rather deeply explored in philosophy and artistic creations.

c) *The Problem of the Internal Structure of Experiencing*

As a rule it is not any single mechanism that operates in experiencing, but a whole system of such mechanisms is created. "Clinical evidence shows that the defence-motives are themselves subject to defence formation, and indeed whole hierarchies of such defence and derivative motivations layered one over the other must be postulated to explain even common clinical phenomena" (220, p. 28). But admitting the existence of systems and hierarchies in defence and compensation does not of itself free authors from atomistic presumptions and allied illusory hopes of discovering, sooner or later, an all-embracing set of defensive or compensatory "prime elements" from which the systems are constructed. These hopes closely resemble Watson's (and many reflexologists') dream of finding an inborn repertoire of basic, "atomic" reactions—those little bricks from which any conceivable behaviour could be constructed. Seeing that, there is every reason to suppose that theoretical thought on experiencing processes will evolve in the same way; in the physiological study of behaviour, the evolution was notable for its shift from reflexological ideas of movement to N. A. Bernstein's physiology of activity. It is all the easier to "prophesy" such an evolution because it is already taking place, both on the level of empirical studies of people overcoming critical life situations, where clinical experience is literally forcing specialists towards conclusions on the uniqueness of every individual case, and likewise on the level of theoretical study of reflexes. As Y. S. Savenko writes, "it seems a promising approach to view compensatory mechanisms as being 'heuristic', i.e., as being a system of techniques formed specifically to meet a situation, and which are not without creativity, since they are not confined to a set of habitual patterns" (208, p. 71).

Setting one's sights on this kind of methodology does not mean denying the existence of more or less abiding mechanisms of experiencing; it does mean understanding such mechanisms as special "functional organs" (139; 143; 146; 259), i.e., as certain organisations built up in order to realise the aims of an actual experiencing process (105).

Such a "functional organ" or mechanism of experiencing, once formed, can become a habitual means of dealing with life-problems, and can be utilised by the subject even when a situation is not one of impossibility, when it continues to be experiencing only in origin, not in function.

When experiencing is prolonged, it can be observed to bring into play a large number of successive means and strategies. Although there is much variation, particular regularities may be observed in the order of their occurrence. D. A. Hamburg and J. E. Adams, analysing ways of coping with illness, found the following order of phases in experiencing: "At first, there are efforts to minimize the impact of the event. During this acute phase there tends to be extensive denial of the nature of the illness, its seriousness, and its probable consequences. Such avoidance defenses appear to serve a useful function in preventing the patient's being overwhelmed, and permitting him to make a more gradual transition to the exceedingly difficult tasks that lie ahead... Most of our patients sooner or later came to face the actual conditions of their illness, sought information about the factors relevant to their recovery, and assessed the probable long-term limitations... This transition from denial to recognition is usually not accomplished at a single point in time, but rather as a series of approximations through which the patient gradually comes to a comprehensive understanding of his situation" (103, p. 278). But denial may be the second phase in the process, indicating a pathological development of the experiencing (231).

The Problem of Classifying Experiencing Processes

The preceding sections have shown the extent and variety of the empirical material which is relevant to the concept of experiencing. It can well be understood that perhaps the most important theoretical problem of all is how to bring order into all this variety.

There have been a number of interesting attempts at classification of defensive, compensatory and coping mechanisms, but on the whole a sense of disenchantment hangs over the problem. H. H. Sjöbäck has described the numerous difficulties arising when a classification of defence mechanisms is attempted. The principal one is that "the theory of the defensive processes ... contains no propositions, whether implicit or explicit, limiting the class of defense mechanisms" (220, p. 181). "The classification of the separate mechanisms is arbitrary, and the borderlines between them are not distinct and clearly marked," remark E. R. Hilgard and R. A. Atkinson (107, p. 515), while R. Schafer pessimistically asserts that "there cannot be any 'correct' or 'complete' list of defenses, but only lists of varying exhaustiveness, internal theoretical consistency, and helpfulness in ordering clinical observation and research findings" (220, p. 181).

To some extent Schafer is right, but it does not follow therefrom that the problem of bringing order to the facts revealed by study of experiencing processes is an insoluble one. This means only that it is insoluble as at present formulated. To look for an "authentic" and "complete" catalogue of the processes of experiencing is to pose the problem in mistaken terms. Behind these lurks an unsatisfactory assumption concerning the processes and mechanisms of experiencing, that sees them as naturally formed, self-sufficient, substantive entities, as things, as facts and not as acts—an assumption whose crudely naturalistic essence is not altered by the widely found notion that defensive and compensatory mechanisms are theoretical constructs, inasmuch as they themselves are not directly observed (82; 207; 220).[1]

Roughly speaking, one can say that there are two opposite but complementary methods of cognitive systematisation. The first is the empirical, and from this all scientific investigation starts. Its aim is to describe the objects under study and to make a first division of them into groups, usually in the form of a generic-specific classification. It is this method which predominates at present in the study of experiencing processes. It is essential in the early stages of study of any complex reality. But the true goal of science lies not in achieving ever more abstract generalisations—which is what the empirical method leads to—but reproducing the concrete in thought (2). "Theoretical reproduction of the real and concrete as a unity of the multiform is achieved by the only possible, and scientifically correct, *method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete*" (97, p. 296).

Our next chapter will be an attempt to apply this theoretical method of "ascent" to the investigation of experiencing.

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[1] It is worthy of note that in reflexology and behaviourism, with which we have earlier compared the methodological situation in the theory of experiencing, the crude-naturalist idea of "units" in the process under study has led inevitably to a refusal to investigate their essence (222).

Chapter II.
TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULARITIES IN EXPERIENCING

1. CONSTRUCTION OF A TYPOLOGY OF "LIFE-WORLDS"

The general aim of this work is to elaborate theoretical concepts of experiencing. In relation to this aim, the point of the preceding chapter was to prepare the ground: we have introduced the concept of experiencing into the range of categories operative within the psychological theory of activity; we have demarcated the area of psychological reality appropriate to that concept, and we have shown how this reality is reflected in already existing conceptions. Thus we now have, on the one hand, an exceedingly abstract idea of experiencing in terms of activity theory, and on the other, some notion of the corresponding empirical field, in the form of an array of facts, generalisations, distinctions, classifications and suppositions concerning the regularities of experiencing processes. The task now is to try and bring the basic abstractions of activity theory to bear upon this empirical scene, i.e., to carry out a systematic "ascent" from the abstract to the concrete.

* * *

Experiencing, taken in the most abstract sense, is a struggle against the impossibility of living, in a certain sense it is a struggle against death in life. Naturally not everything in life that dies, or is threatened, requires experiencing—only that which is essential, significant, a matter of principle for the given form of life, that which forms its internal necessities. If one could isolate and describe particular forms of life and establish their immanent laws or "principles", then clearly those laws would essentially determine not only the "normal" life processes, but also the life processes taking place in extremity, that is, the processes of experiencing. In other words, for each form of life there is a corresponding type of experiencing, and once this is so, in order to elucidate the fundamental regularities of experiencing processes we must first establish the fundamental psychological regularities of life and typologise the "forms of life". The construction of such a general typology is the immediate task of this first section of our present chapter.

The Concept of Life and Activity Within A. N. Leontiev's Theory

If we are to perform our task, we must first analyse the category of life itself, as it appears to the psychologist. Within the terms of reference of the activity theory, analysis of this, the ultimate category for the psychologist, has to be made in close connection with the theory's own central category—activity (and indeed this has already to some extent been done by A. N. Leontiev [142]).

In Leontiev's work, the concept of activity first appears (first as regards logical construction, that is, not first chronologically) in the context of a discussion of the concept of life in its most general biological meaning, "in its universal form" (*ibid.*, p. 37), where life is defined as "a specific interaction of bodies organised in a specific way" (*ibid.*, p. 27). The specificity of this interaction, as distinct from interactions within inanimate nature, is that it represents an essential condition of existence for one of the bodies interacting (the living body), and further that it is of an active and object-orientated nature. The specific processes which make up this side of the interaction are the processes of activity (*ibid.*, p. 39). "Activity is a unit of the substance of life, not of something added to it. . ." (138a, p. 81). This definition of Leontiev's is valid for prepsychological life, and for life mediated by psychological reflection, and for human life mediated by consciousness. But in this last case "life" may be understood in two ways, and there are, correspondingly, two concepts of activity. When life is viewed in a non-individualised manner, as an abstract "human life in general", activity is seen as the essence of that life and as the material from which individual existence is made up. When the life under consideration is a concrete, individualised, finite life-span (e.g., as presented in a biography), as "a totality, or better a system, of activities following in succession one upon another" (*ibid.*), then the word "unit", applied to activity in the original definition of life, has to be understood as "a part": a life as a whole consists of parts which are activities. We are no longer speaking of activity in "the general, collective meaning of the concept" (*ibid.*, p. 102), but of particular or separate activities, each of which "corresponds to a particular need, dies away when that need is satisfied, and is reproduced anew. . . ." (*ibid.*).

The central, key point for the concept of the separate activity is the question of motive. This, which may at first sight seem a subsidiary matter, in fact proves to be of decisive importance for the activity theory, as it were, the central nerve, crystallising the main ontological and methodological concepts of the theory. The idea of motive which Leontiev introduced—"understanding motive to be the object (material or ideal) which stimulates activity, directing the latter upon itself"—is, as he noted himself, "different from that generally accepted" (*ibid.*). It evoked a flood of critical comment, some of it suggesting slight corrections and some rejecting the idea outright (11; 43; 244 et al.). The most direct cause of this lack of acceptance was that commentators saw the thesis not as a meaningful abstraction but as a generalisation from empirically observed facts on stimulation of activity, to be verified by direct reference to those facts. If in the process of such reference even one fact appeared which did not fit in with the idea of activity being stimulated by an object corresponding to a need, then the idea could be discarded as not in accord with the facts, or at the most not fully satisfactory.

And there are plenty of such facts. Really, run the protests addressed to Leontiev, how can an external object[1] in itself suffice to stimulate the individual to activity? Does not the individual first have to perceive the object, before it (and "it" by that time is no longer the object itself, but its mental image) can have a motivating effect upon him? And even the mental image of the object is far from enough to produce activity on the part of the individual. For that to happen, one must actually have the need to which the object corresponds, otherwise living beings would immediately, upon meeting with an object of need, set about satisfying the need, whether or not this was called for at the given moment—and this contradicts the facts of what actually happens (244). Furthermore, an objective accentuation of a need must somehow be reflected in the mind, otherwise a person would be unable to give preference to any one of all the activities possible (42; 244). And lastly, the final event in this series of reflections must be the making of a connection between two mental images —the image of the need and the image of the corresponding object. Only when all this has been accomplished will stimulation take place, and the stimulating agent therefore is not the object itself but its significance for the subject. Thus runs the argument advanced against Leontiev.

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[1] Object in the sense of something external, present and apparent to the subject, not necessarily a material object.

One can sum up the general conclusion of these objections in the following counter-thesis: an object of need is not in itself capable of stimulating and directing activity on the part of a person, i.e., is not the motive of activity (11). Although it is possible to advance a counter-argument against the counter-thesis by pointing to the facts of what is known as "field behaviour", where things themselves apparently cause a person to act, this counter-argument is not decisive. In the first place, on purely logical grounds: Leontiev's formula is after all laying claim to be generally valid, whereas "field behaviour" is just one class of processes in activity. Secondly, because "field behaviour" itself can be variously interpreted, and one of the possible interpretations for it is that it comes into operation not through the action exerted by an object itself but as a result of the subject's perception of it (and how could it be otherwise?)—the perception presumably stimulating the corresponding need, which in its turn is expressed in the mind as, say, an immediate desire to possess the object perceived. The illusion that the object itself is a sufficient initiating agent is produced because its significance is concealed (98).

And if stimulation even in the case of "field behaviour", which might seem to be the case most amenable to explanation by Leontiev's formula, is seen on closer inspection to be mediated by various reflections of object and of need, what then are we to say of behaviour stemming from voluntary decision or conscious calculation, where absence of direct stimulation by an object is obvious?

If, then, we consider the formula that the motive of activity is an object which corresponds to a need of the individual as an attempt to generalise from the entire fund of empirical observations on stimulation of activity—then it would appear that the formula will not stand up to criticism.

But the whole point is that this formula is of quite another order. Its claims are quite different, its status in logic is quite different, from those tacitly attributed to it by criticisms of the sort just described. That is to say: it does not claim to take in the full variety of possible facts pertaining to stimulation of individual activity; its logical nature is that of an abstraction, and an abstraction of a fairly high order at that, i.e., a statement from which a long road of theoretical "ascent" must be travelled to bring us to concrete cases. That is not to say that the statement itself, before any "ascent" is made, does not contain some concrete truth; the formula under discussion, like any abstract law, does coincide with the actual or concrete state of affairs, but only when certain conditions are fulfilled (cf. 150).

If we are to establish what these conditions are, we must describe the ontology which provides the basis for Leontiev's theory of activity and his understanding of motivation—an ontology which is the exact opposite of that attributed to them by his critics, according to which his understanding would indeed be inadequate. These two ontologies may be provisionally called: "The ontology of the life-world", and "the ontology of the isolated individual".

For the latter, the situation taken as primary for subsequent theoretical development is one where you have, on the one hand, a separate being isolated from the world, and, on the other hand, objects, or more precisely things, existing "in themselves". The space between them, empty and contentless, only keeps them apart one from another. Subject and object are both thought of as existing from the beginning and as definite, prior to and independently of any practical connection between them; they are independent natural entities. Activity, which brings about a practical connection between subject and object, is still in the future; in order to commence, it must receive sanction while the primary situation of separation between subject and object still prevails.

This cognitive image provides the basis for all classical psychology and is the source of its fundamental ontological postulates ("immediacy" [240], "conformity" [182; 184], identity of consciousness and mind, self-identity of the individual) and of its methodological principles.

The way in which activity is understood, within the "isolated individual" ontology, is directly defined by the "postulate of conformity" (182; 184), according to which any activity of the subject is of an individual-adaptive nature. If subject and object (or, strictly speaking, individual and thing) are laid down in the primary ontological figuration as separate and independent one of another, then the "conformity" of activity—introduced at a second stage of affairs—can be seen as based on either one of two quite opposite mechanisms.

The first possibility, followed up in conceptions with a cognitive orientation, can in its most extreme and highly rationalised form be reduced to a view that activity is based on calculation. Even the emotion-based variant of this idea (the basis of action is feeling) still retains the main cognitivist thesis: activity is sanctioned by mental reflection (rational or emotional). The reflection precedes the activity; subject and object are linked to begin with by exploratory procedures within the subject's mind, aimed at discovering the significance of the object, and only thereafter does the activity take place which links them in practice. The model followed in description of each and every behavioural process is here, whether intentionally or not, the goal-directed, voluntary, conscious activity of a human adult.

The second possibility, characteristic for reflexology and behaviourism, is given its most clear-cut expression in B. F. Skinner's radical behaviourism. The "conformity" of behaviour is here explained as follows: it is supposed that the subject is endowed, in advance of individual experience, with ways of reacting which were fully pre-formed prior to any active contact with the environment and independently of it, which are not altered in their ontogenesis, and which are "put out", ready-made, into the environment by the organism. The "conformity" of behaviour composed of such motor "outputs" is not explained by the individual having once achieved success in such-and-such a situation by such-and-such a reaction and then operating in the same way in a similar situation, anticipating the same result. A reaction always remains a blind, random trial, there are not grounds for ascribing to it any inner direction towards a goal, or any mediation by mental reflection of the objective connections of the situation. The mechanism of individual adaptation is thus conceived of as analogous to adaptation of species (221); reactions, like mutations, happen randomly to prove useful or harmful to the organism; by virtue of this the probability of their repetition is altered, and behaviour acquires an apparently intentional direction, but in fact continues to be an assortment of blind trials "unelucidated" by any mental reflection. Here any and every subject is thought of on the model of an animal, and an animal at a pretty low evolutionary level at that.[1]

What manner of ontology, then, is to be counterposed to the "subject-object" gnoseological schema found in classical psychology? The ontology of "the life-world".[1]

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[1] In behaviourist experiments using highly-developed animals, these are placed in situations where their organism produces behavioural responses of a much lower order than some which the given animal is in fact capable of showing.

Only within the framework of this ontology can A. N. Leontiev's idea of motivation, outlined above, be properly appreciated and given its rightful place within the activity theory of psychology.

As activity itself is a *unit of life*, so its main constituent cause—the object of activity—is a *unit of the world.*

Here we must stress, most insistently, how important it is to make a fundamental distinction, as Leontiev does, between "object" and "thing". "We must delimit the concept of 'object", he writes. "Usually this concept is employed with a dual meaning—as meaning a thing standing in some relation to other things . . . and in a narrower meaning, as something standing opposed (*Gegenstand* in German), something resistant (*objectum* in Latin), something upon which action is directed (*predmet* in Russian), i.e., as something which is, in relationship to a living being, that upon which activity is directed (as in 'object of consumption', . . . 'object of thought' and so on)" (142, p. 39). An object is thus not simply a thing lying outside the life-circuit of the subject, but a thing already absorbed into the subject's being, which has become an essential feature of that being, has been subjectivised by life process even before any special ideal appropriation (cognitive, exploratory, informational, etc.) takes place.

If we are to get clear the true theoretical meaning of the proposition that the object is the true motive of activity, we must understand that the everyday "obvious fact" of a living creature existing separately from the world cannot serve as an ontological base-point, because nowhere do we find a living creature before and outside of its interconnections with the world. It is from the first "lived into" the world, linked with it by the material navel-cord of its own life. This world, while still an objective, material entity, is not "the physical world" in the sense which that carries for the science of physics, which studies the interactions of things: this is the life-world. It is the life-world, in fact, which is the sole stimulator and source of content for the creature living in it. That is our primary ontological picture. When we start from that and begin to construct a psychological theory, and pick out (abstract) a particular activity as the "unit of life" for a person, then the object of that activity appears, in this abstracted form, not in its own self-sufficiency and self-identity, not as a thing representing itself, but as "a unit" representing the life-world, and it is by virtue of this representative character that the object acquires the status of a motive. To base a psychological theory on the statement that the object is the motive of activity is to start from the conviction that life is ultimately determined by the world. At this initial stage of theoretical construction there is no differentiation of actual functions performed by the motive (stimulation of activity, direction of activity, formation of meaning), we are not yet speaking of the various forms of ideational mediations involved in the initiation and regulation of concrete activity on the part of an actual, concrete person—that will all transpire later, that is not what we start from but what we will come to, "ascending" from the abstract to the concrete.

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[1] There is a whole string of synonyms for this: "vital ontology", "ontology of human existence" (200, 202), "life-space", "psychological space" (118), etc.

The proposition about motive which we have been discussing is in methodological status an abstraction (or more exactly a component part of such an abstraction) from which this "ascent" is to be made.

We have already shown how activity is deduced from an "isolated individual" ontology, one where subject and object are disunited. We now have the essential basis for establishing the conditions whereby the concept of activity can be deduced from a "vital" ontology. Bearing in mind what has been said above, the task can be formulated as follows: what must the conditions and characteristics of a life-world be, if the abstract idea of activity as a process stimulated by the object of need—that object in itself—is to be realisable, i.e., is to coincide with a concrete activity[1].

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[1] To make this clearer: if we were speaking of, say, the law governing free fall of (solid) bodies, we would have to discover the physical conditions under which this law precisely described what happens in empirical cases of bodies falling (cf. 150).

The first and most basic of such conditions is simplicity of the life-world. Life can in principle consist of many interlinked activities. But it is also quite possible to conceive of a creature having only one single need, one single relation to the world. The *internal world* of such a creature will be *simple*, the whole of its life will consist of one activity.

For such a creature no knowledge of the dynamics of its own need is necessary. For the need, being the one and only need, will in principle be insatiable (cf. 67) and therefore always operative: for such a creature the process of need satisfaction is the same thing as living, so that psychologically it cannot be completed (though it may of course come to an end; but its ending would be equivalent to death).

If we further assume the *external world* of our hypothetical creature to be *easy*, i.e., consisting of one single object (or more precisely, one object quality), which forms a kind of "nourishing broth" that corresponds exactly to the need of the creature and is in continuous, direct contact with it, enfolding it—then no ideational reflection of it in the mind is needed before that object can stimulate and direct the activity of the individual.

A simple internal world and an easy external world constitute the conditions or characteristics we were seeking, given which the formula of activity being stimulated directly by the object of need is fulfilled to the letter.[1]

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[1] It is worth taking especial note of the fact that we are here entering the realm of extreme thought or thought about extremes: here every word—activity, object, need—is transformed almost into its opposite. For an object, after all, is something with a shape, something differentiated, something solid, but in the hypothetical world just described it becomes an undifferentiated, elemental environment. And activity is always taken to mean something effortful, overcoming resistance, but here it is reduced to consumption, almost to mere assimilation, of the needed object. And what need can we be talking of, when the creature living in this simple and easy world suffers no want of anything? If this is so, if in this realm concepts lose their representability and stability, if there are no empirically

If we complement these characteristics of the life-world—simplicity and ease—by their opposites, complexity and difficulty, we then have two pairs of opposed categories, one of which (simple-complex) refers to the internal world, and the other (easy-difficult) to the external. These categories, counterposed, will give us a typology of life-worlds or forms of life—the conclusion which our argument was intended to arrive at.

This typology is structured (see p. 106) as follows: the object of analysis is "the life-world". This has external and internal aspects, denoted in the figure as "external world" and "internal world". The external world can be either easy or difficult. The internal world can be either simple or complex. The intersections of these categories give us four possible states, or types of life-world.

Before proceeding to a step-by-step interpretation of the typology thus obtained, we should discuss in rather more detail the categories determining it.

The concept of "the life-world" has probably had more attention devoted to it by Kurt Lewin than by any other psychologist. Since Lewin was so deeply concerned with the problem of transforming psychology into an exact science based on principles of reasoning "like Galileo's" (150), it is no surprise to find that the most important thing for him, in matters of the psychological world,[1] was the question of whether or not it is an enclosed world, i.e., is it possible to use the laws prevailing within it to

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observed things and processes which concepts thus taken to extremes can reflect—then perhaps it is not worth while for scientific thought to concern itself with such an area? Physics, mathematics and philosophy discarded that argument long, long ago. And theoretical psychology should do the same: as in mathematics, where if you wish to describe the behaviour of a function over a certain interval you must first establish its limits, regardless of whether or not the function is defined at the limiting points (e.g., $\frac{1}{x}$ when $x=0$), so in psychology also we cannot understand the finite and empirically observed if we are unable to think of things at the limit, of extremes. As Engels said, "all true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite. . ." (3, p. 234).

[1] For Lewin the concepts "psychological world", "life-space" and "life-world" are synonymous.

Typology of Life-Worlds



explain any situation S_1 from the preceding situation S_0 (or conversely to predict from any S_0 the subsequent S_1). Lewin held that the psychological world, unlike the physical, does not meet this requirement, and is in consequence an open world. In other words, the physical world has nothing outside of itself: knowing in totality the situation in the physical world and all the laws of physics governing it, it would be possible (so Lewin considers) to predict all the changes due to happen in it, for nothing from outside can interfere with the course of the physical processes determined once and for all by the laws of physics. But beyond the bounds of a given psychological world there is an external, transgredient reality which acts upon it, interfering in the course of psychological processes, and it is therefore impossible either fully to explain, or to predict, events in the psychological world, by means of psychological laws alone. An example given by Lewin (151): if someone is writing a letter to a friend, and suddenly the door opens and the friend himself appears, these two psychological situations, while following one upon the other, are so related that it is impossible either to predict or to explain the second in terms of the first.

But does not this openness of the psychological world make it impossible to see it as "a world" at all?—how can you have an independent world, if events within it are influenced by processes that do not obey the laws governing it? The concept can only be saved if one can envisage a world which dynamically is not enclosed, but within which a strict determinism obtains none the less (151). To solve this problem Lewin puts forward mathematical arguments to demonstrate the possibility of closed fields which still, like open fields, are in contact at all points, central as well as peripheral, with external space: for instance, a plane placed in three-dimensional space, or more generally n-dimensional space within $(n+1)$-dimensional space (*ibid.*).

One may feel that formalism of this kind does not really solve the problem Lewin has set himself, of demonstrating the possibility of strict determinism within a dynamically unenclosed psychological world. Discussion of the content of the matter is much more important. It should be mentioned that in Lewin's reasoning on the physical world there is a vital inaccuracy (in spite of the fact that he himself saw the danger of it)—that of taking as identical the physical world and nature as a whole, the universe. The presence of such things as buildings and biocoenoses, which undoubtedly have physical existence, can be described in terms of the physical processes that put them there, but cannot be either explained or predicted as inevitable by even the absolute knowledge of all physical laws, in spite of the fact that those laws were in no way infringed when these things came into existence. So according to Lewin's own yard-stick of "predictability" the physical world, like the psychological, is open, i.e., it can be acted upon by influences from non-physical realms whose regularities cannot be grasped by the physical view of reality. But such influence operates in entirely physical ways, in accord with physical laws, by physical means only, and in this regard—in view of the absence from the physical world of events and phenomena alien to it—it is closed, without anything external, since any process of another order, having no physical embodiment, leaves no trace upon the physical world, does not affect it.

In just the same way the life-world, or psychological world, of a given being is simultaneously both open and closed. The psychological world knows nothing non-psychological, nothing alien to it or of another order can appear within it. But in the psychological world there appear from time to time special phenomena (difficulty and pain, in particular) which though entirely psychological, and appertaining strictly to the reality of life do, as it were, give a nod in the direction of something non-psychological, something to which the given life-world could not itself give rise. Through these phenomena something looks in upon the psychological world which transcends that world, something "from the other side", but it does so having already donned the mask of a psychological fact, having adopted psychological citizenship as it were, and thus having achieved the status of a fact of life. Only the obverse side of these phenomena gives pressing hints of some independently existing, alien order which does not obey the laws of the given life-world.

Phenomena of this kind may be provisionally referred to as "border-line" factors, they constitute the *external aspect* of the life-world, they as it were lay the basis from which springs realistic perception of external reality.

In other words, the phenomena of difficulty and pain bring into the originally homogeneous psychological world a differentiation between what is internal and what external, or to be more exact, the external appears within the psychological world in the phenomena of difficulty and pain.

Here it should be especially noted that in speaking of the difficulty of the external world we shall be referring not only to the experience* caused by it, but to difficulty as an actual characteristic of the world; not of the world "in itself" of course, not of the world before and apart from the individual's existence, but of the world as "a fraction where the divisor is the subject", the world seen through the prism of the individual's life and activity, for difficulty can be discovered in the world only through activity, there is no other way.

Up to now we have been viewing matters phenomenologically, standing as it were inside life and seeing the world from there, with its eyes. Seen from the outside, "easiness" in the external aspect of a life-world appears as full provision (to the creature concerned) for all life processes, direct availability to it of all objects of need, while "difficulty" is seen as the presence of obstacles to the attainment of objects of need.

The internal aspect of the psychological world (or the internal world) means the internal structure of life, the organisation, conjunction and mutual interconnection of the separate units of life. (Here we are departing from organic, natural, purely biological connections between needs.) For the sake of convenience, *simplicity* of the internal world was brought into the argument—and will in the main continue to figure there—as meaning its uniformity; but in fact this kind of life-world, which has one "unit" only, is just one variant of the world which is, internally, simple. Strictly speaking, simplicity should be understood as meaning absence of supra-organic structuring and conjunction of separate life instances. Even when a person has many relationships with the world, his internal world may remain simple, if for him those relationships run together into a subjectively undifferentiated, single whole, or if the relationships are totally disconnected, each one being actualised by the individual as if it were the only one. In the first case, the psychological world is a whole without parts, in the second it consists of parts without a whole.

We have now been through the categories employed to give us our types of life-world. We should now pause to consider one point concerning the way in which these types are described. Each life-world will be classified primarily in terms of its space-time organisation. And since we are distinguishing between the internal and the external aspects of the life-world, we shall accordingly be separately describing external and internal time-space (or the external and internal aspects of the life-world's integral time-space).

We must here introduce some conventional expressions used in the description of time-space. So far as its external aspect is concerned, the main characteristic noted will be presence or absence of "*extension*", here used to denote *spatial distance* (of objects of need) and *length of time* required to cover that distance. "Extension", clearly, is a transference to the time-space dimension of the "difficulty" concept, or the expression of that concept in time-space categories: for whatever the actual difficulties in life may be—whether goods are out of reach spatially, or concealed, or blocked off by obstacles—they all come to the same thing in that they mean the individual's needs cannot be directly satisfied, they require the individual to make efforts to overcome them; thus they can all be reduced to one conventional scale of measurement—"extension".

The internal aspect of time-space refers to the degree of structure found in the internal world, i.e., presence or absence of "*conjunction*", by which we mean subjective integration of different units of life. "Conjunction" is expressed in the *interconnection* of different life relations within internal space. In respect of time, "conjunction" means subjective links of *consecution* between actualisations of various relationships. Extension, distance, duration, conjunction, connection, consecution—these are all terms we shall be using to describe the time and space of the life-world.

And to conclude with, one last preliminary consideration. As what are we to view each of the types in the typology suggested above? Both as a representation of a particular section of psychological reality, and at the same time as a schemata to assist understanding. These schemata are strictly defined, formally speaking, by the categories determining them, but can at the same time be filled with living phenomenological content. These two aspects taken together make our types into uniquely useful instruments in psychological thinking. Types are something like living models which, while clearly endowed with psychological reality, can be effectively used for cognitive purposes thanks to the definiteness from the categorical point of view.

2. Type 1. THE INTERNALLY SIMPLE AND EXTERNALLY EASY LIFE-WORLD

Description of Life-World

The world that is internally simple and externally easy can be visualised if we imagine a creature having one single need, and living under conditions which make the object of that need directly available. If we suppose the single need to be for nourishment, then absolute "ease" of the external world would be assured if fully prepared nourishing substances were conveyed directly from it into the creature's organism. There is in this case no distance, no activity, separating need and object, the two are in direct contact.

The external world is tailor-made to fit the life of our creature, having neither too much nor too little of anything needed for its life; it can be "divided" by that life without remainder. The external world is in its nature one with the life-world, consequently in this psychological world there are none of the special phenomena which would announce, within the psychological world, the existence of an external world, and so would serve as a kind of frontier between them. The life-world and the external world are fused together, so that an observer from the subject's view-point would not see the world and would consider the creature itself substantive, i.e., a being not requiring another being for its existence (228), while an observer from the standpoint of the world would single out any creature from it and would see what V. I. Vernadsky (241) calls "living substance".

The life of the subject in such a world is naked being, being completely open to the world. Strictly speaking one cannot call such a creature a subject, for it exercises no activity and therefore does not distinguish itself from its object. Its existence is a pure culture of life-activity wrapped in endless bliss, primary living or vitality.

Let us now describe the space and time of this life-world. "Ease" in respect of space-time has to be seen as absence of any "extension" in the world's external aspect, i.e., there is no distance in space and no duration of time.

The first of these conditions can be expressed phenomenologically by saying that for the creature living in this world there is no "there", all external space is reduced to one point, "here on the spot"; while the second condition reduces all external time to "now, at once". So the phenomenological structure appropriate to the external aspect of the creature described can be indicated by the expression "on the spot-and-at once".[1]

The simplicity of the internal world, or absence of any "conjunction" between separate points of internal space-time, i.e., between actualisation of separate relations by the individual, makes these relations into absolutely separate entities, completely particularised and utterly blind to one another. In other words simplicity (and even more so uniformity, one of its variants) of the internal world means total absorption in the life relation being realised, total attachment to the given point in space and time. Furthermore, there is in internal space no subjective connection between its different areas, which phenomenologically is expressed in the abolition (or non-existence) of any "that" and "other than", there being only an all-sufficient "this" (or "one"). So far as internal time is concerned, it is without any sequential connections, i.e., any relation of "now" to "later" as regards its separate points. The present point or moment, outside any idea of "before" and "after", i.e., devoid of future and of past, has no knowledge of its own end, its own boundary in time, and is therefore apprehended from within, phenomenologically, as "always" (or "for ever"). Thus the internal aspect of this existence is a state of being "this-always" (or "for ever-one"), i.e., the prevailing state is apprehended as that was, is, and will be (to use temporal categories beyond the reach of such a world).

We have, then, described the easy and simple life-world in its existential and temporal-spatial characteristics; we must now describe the world-sensation appropriate to such an existence.[1] It is of course rather strange to speak of the world-sensation of the creature existing here, inasmuch as we cannot, strictly speaking, even suppose it to have any psyche. It has no need of one: sensations are unnecessary, for abiotic qualities of objects do not come within the orbit of its life (142); attention is unnecessary, for there are no alternatives to concentrate on; memory is unnecessary, by virtue of the absence, as already indicated, of any division of time into past and present, and so on. Nevertheless, a psychological description of this life cannot be considered complete unless it reveals its immanent world-consciousness. This does not mean that we are going to describe a fiction—the world-sensation of this life is as real as the life itself, but it is dissolved in life, not singled out from it.[2]

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[1] The difference between "on the spot-and-at once" and "here-and-now", which will be mentioned later, lies in the hermetic isolation of the "on the spot-and-at once" structure within itself. It is "here" and "now" squared, so to speak, not only devoid of any positive connection with other points in space and time, but without any counter-position to them.

It is easy to see that our hypothetical creature leads, psychologically, a completely inert, passive existence: activity, either external or internal, is not needed in the easy and simple world.

Passivity in general is a very variable thing, according to whether it relates to present events or to events in the past or the future: events taking place now are suffered, and if they are positive (good) the "sufferance" is emotionally felt as pleasure, or as unpleasure if they are negative; an event to come is awaited (with hope, if positive, or with fear, if negative); past events are recollected (the positive ones with nostalgia or regret, the negative with repentance or relief).

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[1] Our description of a life-world is built up in several layers, mediating each other. The first defines the existential conditions of life—are there goods or not, is there any connection between different activities or not, etc. The second layer, dealing with space and time, translates the given conditions into the language of space/time definitions. It mediates the passage from purely existential to phenomenological description, in which we discover the time/space structuring of the consciousness which corresponds to such an existence. We are not here considering the question of whether such a consciousness exists, only that of what its horizons would be if it existed. This layer of description deals with consciousness but not with all of it, only with its existential stratum. This phenomenological layer is pre-eventual, it gives us only the conditions of movement for differentiated psychological processes, which are then followed out in the last, psychological layer or level of description.

[2] Our attitude to the question of such a formation having any reality or not can be compared to attitudes regarding the reality of the existence, in antiquity, of aesthetics, ethics, science, art—all the cultural forms differentiated in the modern world (see, for instance, 41).

But the psychological world we are now describing is, as has been shown, marked by space-time conditions devoid of both prospect and retrospect; the past and the future are as it were impacted into the present, or rather are not yet separated out from it. Therefore passivity in relation to past and future events is here reduced to sufferance only, and in consequence all the potential variety of emotional experience, of time is reduced to pleasure and unpleasure only. Thus *the pleasure principle* is the central principle of the world-sensation proper to the easy and simple life-world; pleasure would be the goal and the highest value in such a life if it were consciously built and lived.

It is important to note the immensity of pleasure and unpleasure emotions in this psychological world. As we saw, the internal aspect of space and time within this world can be phenomenologically expressed as "this-always", i.e., any existing state of affairs entirely fills all the space and time that can be felt. So that if one envisages this creature undergoing any deprivation, even the most insignificant to outside observation, then the corresponding result in terms of world-sensation would be sheer pain, all-engulfing and without end, a kind of elemental horror—in effect death, for here just as pleasure is the principle and the sign of life, so pain (which instantly flares up into panic horror, owing to the time and space characteristics peculiar to this world) is the principle and the sign of death.

Prototype

We can view as prototypes (of the existence and world-sensation outlined above) the life of the foetus and the life of the infant (though to a lesser extent in the latter case), with their corresponding "infantile" world-sensation. The grounds for doing so are obvious enough—the ease and simplicity of infant existence at this stage of development of the individual's world provide all that is needed for its life processes—and they do so "of themselves", without requiring any particular activity either to gain the good things of life or to coordinate and conjoin relationships.

These conditions of intra-uterine and infant life, which every child has to pass through, produce their corresponding world-sensation, and it forms the infantile foundation of consciousness—something which stays with a human being ineradicably, a primary basis stratum exerting an influence "from the depths" upon consciousness and behaviour throughout life.

Naturally this world-sensation is still, during the intra-uterine stage of development, *dissolved in* life, inextricable from existence. It is in other words psychologically latent, and is therefore devoid of all emotionality. All the same, this world-sensation can be described as blissful, unclouded satisfaction, compared to the disturbances which await the human being with the arrival of difficulty and complexity. It is a "plus" which does not know itself to be one, and only in the coming collision with a "minus" will it show forth its positive quality of "what was in the beginning". Carl Jung, describing the symbolism of re-birth, has given us a profound interpretation of the human urge to go back, to "the ineffable sweetness of childhood" (123).[1]

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[1] In this connection, it may be that it makes genetic sense to attribute an infantile origin to one important phenomenon in human life—sloth, which has been little studied by psychologists but which often becomes (in its pure form or in the forms of excessive dependence, passivity, inertia, indecision, etc.) an actual life problem, and the target of various educational or even psychotherapeutic measures. The infantile origin of sloth, which is fairly obvious anyway, is shown in the fact that it paralyses action, i.e., reduces a person to the state of infantile inaction which is proper to the easy and simple life-world, and by the further fact that the most acute attacks of sloth come over many people at the time when they should be getting out of bed in the morning, i.e., performing an action which will bring them out of

Strictly speaking, the end of the pre-natal period sees the first rents torn in the enveloping state of blissful satisfaction. First of all, of course, the trauma of birth itself, but after that is over the child suffers temporary deprivations with regard to one need or another, since life circumstances and the real attributes of time make instant satisfaction of all needs no longer possible.

Any particular pain (or discontent) felt by an infant grows, if its cause is not removed, and grows very quickly, into a state of all-embracing horror (so far as one can judge from crying, movements, and mimetic expression), a horror which covers the whole horizon of its world-sensation, because it "does not know"[1] that the pain will come to an end sometime, since "sometime" does not yet exist in its world. This extension of pain from one organ or relationship to all relationships is extremely indicative of the inner structure of the psychological world of early infancy: separate relationships are as yet undifferentiated, they form a kind of amorphous mass, so that events in one part of the mass spread without hindrance to all its other parts.

Hedonistic Experiencing

When the envelope of the easy and simple existence is torn open—that is the point from which we can approach the main object of our theoretical study, experiencing; here, the experiencing proper to the life-world just described. In that life-world taken in its pure form there is no place for experiencing, since its ease and simplicity, i.e., the fact that all life processes are provided for and

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a state symbolically and somatically close in many ways (warmth of the micro-environment, the so-called "foetal position", dreaming, and possibly other factors as well) to being in the womb.

One might define sloth as "supra-situational passivity", by analogy with the term "supra-situational activity", a concept introduced by V. A. Petrovsky into the usage of activity psychology (182).

[1] Need we specifically stress that this is not rational knowledge, not conscious knowledge? It is knowledge via the "mind" which produces Helmholtz's "conclusions", attitudinal knowledge.

contain no contradictions, exclude all possibility of any situations arising which call for experiencing. More than that, even when existence suddenly, for one reason or another, ceases to be easy and simple, and such situations do arise, the creature "educated" by the easy and simple world is not capable of experiencing in the true sense of the word. It is not capable of it because an essential premise of experiencing is the occurrence of ideational transformations of the psychological world (although experiencing is not reduced to them), and the creature under consideration is without any ideational characteristics at all. Its life is entirely material and corporeal, indeed essentially intra-corporeal, since its external contacts are limited to taking in needed substances and getting rid of unneeded ones, processes requiring no activity on its part. Being incapable of "responding" to a critical situation either by external practical activity or by ideational transformations in its psychological world, the creature responds by the only means available to it—changes within the body. These equate to the concept of physiological stress reactions.

Does this mean that there is no experiencing which is proper to the easy and simple world and which obeys the laws of that world, i.e., first and foremost, the pleasure principle? No, it does not, because the infantile world and its regularities do not disappear when the existential conditions that produced it have disappeared, and the regularities of that world can determine experiencing processes.

If a living creature has once known easy and simple existence, the phenomenological structures built up by such existence do not lie inert in the past history of the given creature's life, they continue as active, ever-living, ineradicable strata of its consciousness, and they are existential strata in the sense that they are a force, which strives to define all consciousness its way, to direct its processes into channels appropriate to those ancient structures, to impose its own functional régime upon consciousness. This ineradicability of infantilism (infantilism/infantile are the words we shall use from now on to denote the existential and consciousness formations produced by the easy and simple world) is very simply explained: in each and every life-world, however "difficult" and "complex" it may be, however powerful and multiform the "organs" of outward and mental action it has caused to develop, with their corresponding phenomenological structures,—in every world, there still remains the primal "vitality" atomically represented by an act directly satisfying a need.

Acts of consumption and their meaning, significance and rôle, may be radically transformed in the new life-world compared to what they were in the easy and simple world (and they were then life itself), but they always retain the primal "vital" residue which lives by the law of pleasure. Thus infantile structures and infantile consciousness are not merely inherited by a person from that former easy and simple life, they are reproduced again and again by satisfaction of any need.

In a complex and/or difficult world a subject may build up a consciousness appropriate to that world, but the new formation will not abolish infantile consciousness, will not take its place; it is built up on top of it, and there are complex, sometimes antagonistic relations between the two.

Infantile consciousness itself still exists in the new life, in the form of attitude. This means it is psychologically active, is not an inert stratum of recollections but an attraction towards easy and simple existence, the root factors of which are firstly (corresponding to the external, space-time aspect of the easy and simple world) the urge to "here-and-now"[1] satisfaction of need—that is, satisfaction requiring no effort and no waiting—and secondly (corresponding to the phenomenological structure "for ever-one") the urge to possess the object of need so completely (even to lose the self within it, to identify with it) that the life relation actualised in the given case will fill the whole horizon of the psychological world, creating an impression of oneness and thus causing other relations, and possible consequences for them of this need-satisfaction, to be forgotten.

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[1] We use "here-and-now" in describing the infantile attitude, rather than "on the spot-and-at once", the term we employed in describing space-time in our Type 1 life-world; this is deliberate, to underline that we are speaking of operation of this attitude under other space-time conditions, where "extension" of space and time *is* known.

Such are the roots of the infantile attitude. If we are to define the nature of the experiencing processes which it determines, we must note one particular feature of this attitude. Being carried over from the previous easy and simple existence (cf. 15), the infantile attitude seeks restoration of the blissful world-sensation lost along with that former existence. Let us stress: restoration of *that world-sensation*, not of the easy and simple existence itself. Why? The point is that, as has already been said, in the easy and simple proto-life all future differentiations (separate activities, infantile attitude, opposition of the external and the internal, etc.) exist in unarticulated unity and in potentiality only. This applies to sensation of the world also. When the easy and simple existence is broken apart, the primal emotionally neutral state of proto-life acquires a powerful positive emotional charge, by contrast with the panic horror evoked by the break-up. The infantile attitude born at that moment "recognises" two states of being—an "easy" and a "difficult" (or more precisely an "impossible") one, not in their pure form but in that of the corresponding world-sensations of "bliss" or "horror"; it recognises them and instantaneously absorbs this polarity of affect, which, as it were, draws a vector of dominant urge on the phenomenological map of its world. From within the infantile attitude, as in general from any phenomenological position, existence and consciousness are indistinguishable, and the easy and simple existence is identified only by the "blissful" world-sensation, and thus the infantile attitude burdens the psyche with a hankering after this sensation, regardless of whether the sensation will be adequate if achieved, whether it is existentially provided for, whether it is guaranteed to last for any length of time, what the price for it will be in terms of consequences, and so on. All such questions do not even arise for the infantile consciousness.

It is therefore quite understandable that the type of experiencing determined by this attitude consists of processes which alter the psychological world and which have as their goal attainment of positive emotional states and avoidance of negative ones, processes which are essentially non-realistic, subordinate to momentary impulse, taking no account of the external and internal interdependencies of life.

The analysis made in Chapter I gives us grounds for asserting that the processes of psychological defence correspond to the type of experiencing which has been theoretically arrived at in this section. Of course a type of experiencing described in theoretical terms cannot completely coincide with the full range of known defence mechanisms; that is in principle impossible, firstly because the theoretical description is too abstract to take account of the full empirical variety of defensive devices, and secondly because the sum total of mechanisms identified as defensive resembles an accumulated heap rather than an organised whole. As we saw earlier, this class of mental processes does not have clear-cut, unambiguous and generally accepted boundaries, either within itself or between it and other categories of mental process. Yet there is, none the less, a generally prevalent impression of psychological defence as of something in which the main aim is attainment of the highest degree of emotional comfort possible under the given circumstances (119). And defence itself is considered to be a consequence of cognitive and emotional infantilism (83; 87), and this makes it possible to take psychological defence processes as the prototype for our theoretically derived type of experiencing which obeys the regularities of the easy and simple life-world.

The type of experiencing described, the culmination of the train of theoretical argument just concluded, is still somewhat abstract even though it can be related to certain empirical facts. This does not of course mean that we have failed to make the promised "ascent from the abstract to the concrete", only that the "ascent" has not been completed. We have reached a point, along one line of "ascent", at which the "power" of the abstractions used to start the forward movement has been exhausted, so that further movement in this direction will require an "injection" of experimental, empirical knowledge—not, one may add, of any knowledge, but of knowledge reached through the guidance of the abstractions already made. But that is matter for another, specialised study.

3. Type 2. THE INTERNALLY SIMPLE AND EXTERNALLY DIFFICULT LIFE-WORLD

Description of Life-World

The feature distinguishing this life-world from the preceding one is difficulty. Here the good things of life are not presented directly, external space is full of barriers, hindrances and resistant objects which prevent need-satisfaction. If life is to go on, these obstacles have to be surmounted. And the main thing here is that not only difficulty itself, i.e., the psychological "face" of the obstacle, has to be surmounted, but its material body also, which has its own definitions, indifferent to the goals and needs of the life being considered, and this makes it essential that an "organ" should be constructed which is capable of transcending the existing limits of the life-world. Such an "organ" must be corporeal on the one hand, in order to communicate with the world-in-itself in its, the world's, own "objectual" language, while on the other hand this "organ" must be permeated from within by sensitivity, must from within be life. Every time the life-world is transcended and its limits extended by such an organ, this is in fact an advancement of the boundaries of life to take in areas previously quite outside it.

If we now proceed from phenomenological to strictly scientific description, our "organ" proves to be "living movement" (36). As N. A. Bernstein has brilliantly demonstrated (37), this movement must, if it is to be successful, be built up anew on each occasion, in each new behavioural situation, because each situation is unique in its dynamic characteristics.

The external, visible accord with goals pursued which can be observed in the behaviour of living creatures, in a situation that is unique substantively and dynamically, cannot be explained except by their forming a psychological reflection of that situation.[1] External, object-orientated activity, and mind—activity mediated by mind would be more precise—this is the fundamental neo-formation essential for life in a difficult as opposed to an easy world.[2]

What of space and time in this life-world? Difficulty in the external world means, in time-space terms, that we now have "extension", i.e., distance in space (of life-goods) and duration of time (length of time needed to surmount the spatial distance). Phenomenologically this is expressed in the appearance of new dimensions, "there" and "later" in the internal aspect of space and time, alongside the previous "here" and "now". In other words the internal aspect of the psychological world is expanding, to include some perspective in space and in time.

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[1] Failure to realise this uniqueness of every situation, and disregard for it in both the experimental and the theoretical field, is characteristic for all the behaviourists from Thorndike to Skinner; it opens the way to an "atomic" view of behaviour, and this in turn leads to apparent goal-accordance being explained either by probability (blind-probe motor "atoms" that get reinforced then become more frequent) or, at the opposite, cognitivist end of the spectrum (E. C. Tolman [235], for instance), by a kind of orientation from a map of the environment which is outside of movement itself, precedes it, and is independent of the actual, practical movement.

In fact, as N. A. Bernstein was the first in the history of behavioural studies to demonstrate on the basis of sufficient and concrete evidence, movement must be analysed as something goal-determined from within, "elucidated" by a psychic reflection, of a given situation and itself an essential factor in that reflection.

[2] It is this category-image, of passage from an easy to a difficult world, that is behind attempts to educe theoretically an evolutionary necessity for the appearance of mental reflection. In A. N. Leontiev's and A. V. Zaporozhets' hypothesis (142, pp. 49-50) the appearance of mind is considered in the context of transit from an "elemental environment" in which goods are presented in pure biotic form, to a world of objects where the biologically vital qualities of things are hidden by their abiotic outer envelope. This distinction between two types of situation—those where mental reflection is not required, and those where it is—discussed by P. Y. Galperin (94), also corresponds to the difference between the easy and the difficult world.

So far as the internal structure of the life-world is concerned, that remains simple, as before. The fact that there is no internal articulation and structuring of life, although space and time have expanded, means that there is no "conjunction", i.e., no spatial linkage of life-units (= relations = separate activities) and no linkage of temporal sequence between them. To use M. P. Foucault's metaphor (77), there is no internal "table" on which the subject can "put before himself" his relations to the world, so as to see them in apposition, measure them against one another, compare them, plan the order of their realisation, etc.—and without this facility the internal world remains "simple" despite multiplicity and objective interconnection of life relations. But for the sake of convenience in argument we shall continue to speak of an imagined life-world in which simplicity is accounted for by a presumed uniformity—i.e., where the subject is presumed to have only one need, one life relation. Phenomenologically, this simplicity is expressed as "this always".

Let us now describe the life and world-sensation of the creature that lives in the difficult and simple world. Activity in this world is distinguished by an indeflectable thrust towards the object of need. This activity is affected by no distractions, no temptations to turn aside, the subject knows no doubts or hesitations, no feelings of guilt, no torments of conscience—in short, the simplicity of the internal world frees activity from all internal barriers and limitations. The only obstacles it knows are external ones.

Every attainment of the object appears to be a matter of life or death. Indeed it is so, psychologically, for here we have identification of the one single life relationship (activity) with all of life as a whole. Emotionally and energetically, therefore, the activity of this creature is marked by a frenetic quality—to attain the exclusively desired object the creature will undertake any effort, all is staked on the one card, any means is justified, any risk worth taking, any sacrifice acceptable.

In consequence of the internal world's simplicity, the structure of meaning in the imaging of the external world is also simplified to the uttermost. Everything is black or white; every object is given meaning only in terms of its being useful or harmful with respect to the individual's single need, always felt at full pitch.

It is another matter when we come to the technical, operational aspect of activity and its corresponding reflection in the mind. The problematic part, so far as the life of such a creature is concerned, lies mainly in this area. The world puzzles it only in this external, technical respect: "How to do it, how to reach it?" is the main question to be answered. And the basic, general rule in solving this constantly renewed life-problem lies in adequate reflection of reality, so that activity may be structured in accordance with reality. This accordance with reality is, in the difficult world, the essential condition of existence and life preservation. Subordination to the dictates of *reality* here becomes the law and the principle of life.

What are the relations between the pleasure principle and the reality principle? They were well-known in philosophy and psychology long before psychoanalysis came on the scene.[1] Freud provided the terminology, and described the relationship with disarming simplicity: "We know that the pleasure principle is proper to a *primary* method of working on the part of the mental apparatus, but that, from the point of view of the self-preservation of the organism among the difficulties of the external world, it is from the very outset inefficient and even highly dangerous. Under the influence of the ego's instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced by the *reality principle*. This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure" (84, p. 10). Vygotsky and Luria wrote: "All this is extremely elementary, a matter of ABC, and clearly should be numbered among those truths which are held to be self-evident and incontestable. . ." (249, p. 6).

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[1] Sigmund Freud, incidentally, made no claims to priority or originality, so far as this part of his theory was concerned. He pointed out that as early as 1873 "an investigator of such penetration as G. T. Fechner held a view on the subject of pleasure and unpleasure which coincides in all essentials with the one that has been forced upon us by psychoanalytic work" (84, p. 8).

Nevertheless, a whole series of unanswered questions still remains here. The first of them concerns the degree of independence to be attributed to the reality principle. Freud does not provide an unambiguous answer to this. In some instances he called the reality principle a modification of the pleasure principle, while at other times he said that the reality principle takes over from or succeeds the pleasure principle. On the whole, though, Freud gives the impression that for him the reality principle serves the pleasure principle and is not independent of it. In a certain sense this is true, particularly when reality is taken to mean the material reality of things, yet it seems to us that the accent needs to be shifted slightly. If keeping to reality is so important that without it life in a difficult world would simply not be possible, surely one must suppose that situational compulsions to bow to reality will sooner or later produce a supra-situational, overall "set" towards doing so. Genetically, of course, this develops under the influence of the pleasure principle and emerges from it, or more precisely it draws its energy from life processes appropriate to the pleasure principle, but in the end this umbilical cord is severed and a new law, not reducible to terms of anything else, makes its appearance in the life-world—the reality principle.

A second and more important question is clarification of the internal psychological mechanisms which see to it that the reality principle is followed. The principle has, as it were, two faces. One is turned outwards, and is manifested in the urge to make external movements match up adequately to the objective conditions of the situation, by means of precise mental reflection of those conditions; the second face is turned inwards. Its purpose is to restrain possible emotional outbursts, which because of the "simplicity" of the internal world continually threaten to occur, when need is unsatisfied, and to annihilate in a chaotic upsurge all the complex organisation of activity which is to achieve, eventually, satisfaction of need. In other words, the inward face of the realistic "set" is the mechanism of patience.

Let us consider the space-time structure of this mechanism. We stated above that the space-time of the life-world now under consideration can be phenomenologically expressed as "this-always" in the internal aspect, and "here-and-there", "now-and-later", in the external.

What does this signify? "This-always" signifies that the individual's "consciousness" is always occupied by one and the same thing: upon one thing ("this"), the object of need, all feelings, expectations and activity are directed. The individual belongs wholly to this relationship with the world, nothing else exists for him. And just as this relationship fills the whole spatial horizon of his life, so it also fills its entire perspective in time ("always").

As regards the external aspect of space-time, this is essentially different from the one proper to Type 1. The object of need may be either in direct contact with the individual, or it may be at some remove. The same applies to its proximity or remove in time. But the most important point here, for our characterisation of the "difficult" life-world as opposed to the "easy", is not so much this objective distancing as the fact that this is "taken in" by the individual, by means of particular psychological forms (phenomenologically indicated as "there" and "later"). Thanks to these, the subject's psychological world is wider and more differentiated than the infantile world. Whereas in the latter any subjective "there" and "later" was an impossibility, and any objective postponement or removal of satisfaction became an internal, emotional catastrophe, what we now see is the phenomenological "there" and "later" contriving to accumulate in themselves all that emotional energy, making control of the emotion possible. If we simplify and rationalise to the utmost, we can say that failure to satisfy the single need which makes up the individual's entire world would be felt as the end of that life, as death, did not the individual know that "there", somewhere, is the source of life, and that "later", sometime, it can be attained.

The same thing can be put another way using the terms of emotional categories: when the forms "there" and "later" are not present, the subject's emotional state veers between "bliss" and "horror", but when these psychological forms of space and time have made their appearance, differentiation of those basic affects takes place, such that the emotions produced now allow, in their structure, for the psychologically distant and still-to-come; we now find "security" (when the situation is one of future good, not yet attained but surely guaranteed), "despair" (in a situation of imminent failure), "hope" and "fear" (in cases intermediate to the first two) (66).

The appearance of space-time "extension" ("there" and "later") enriches and diversifies the structure of the psychological world, which is now capable of grasping, in its own formations, the previously incomprehensible futurity and distance. And the most important point is that future and distance figure here not as absolute, physical entities viewed from a point outside the processes taking place, from the standpoint of an absolute observer outside space and time who projects real processes against ideal space-time coordinates. In other words, the future here is *not* that which now is not, but will be later, it is seen in reverse: the phenomenological future ("later") represented in hope, fear etc., is paradoxically that which now is but later will not be. The hope of gaining the object is the form of the psychological future, actually present now, and disappearing, as such, when the object is in reality gained.

One fundamental thesis emerges from this argument: object-orientated activity presupposes the existence of definite internal, phenomenological conditions ,without which such activity would be psychologically impossible. These conditions form an involved and shifting complex of mechanisms, which for convenience we can denote in sum as "patience", and which is phenomenologically structured by the factors outlined above, in terms of the space-time of the difficult and simple world and in psychological terms (in the emotional aspect) as the states of "despair", "fear", "hope" or "security". In other words, object-orientated activity would be psychologically impossible were it not that simultaneously with it—as its obverse side, so to speak—there proceeds internal work to restrain the panic affects evoked by an unsatisfied need. This work is performed by means of partial subjective actualisation of the objectively absent good (in the form of hope, for instance), which fills in with meaningfulness the gap between "now" and "later".

All this goes to reinforce our conviction that the reality principle is an independent psychological set having its own internal mechanisms, not simply a modification of the pleasure principle.

Prototype

Let us point to some well-known prototypes for the simple and difficult life-world. Clearly these include all cases in which a single need (motive, relationship) occupies a position of marked dominance and operates with an intensity incomparably stronger than that of other needs. When the content of the dominating motive is an abstract idea or conviction, we are dealing with the fanatic; when its content is an idea with concrete connotations or even an actual object or action, we are dealing with the maniac.[1]

Analysis of the psychology of fanaticism reveals the characteristics we defined when describing the creature of life-world Type 2: frenetic behaviour, readiness to sacrifice all, and to use any means, to attain the object, coupled with a narrow and limited perception of the world.

Prototypes of this category can be seen not only in personalities of a certain kind, but in certain states of personality, persisting for longer or shorter periods, sometimes normal and sometimes pathological. These include the so-called "impulse drives", which are "stimuli and urges of acute onset, which override the entire consciousness and behaviour of the patient; with their onset all other wishes and desires are suppressed" (186, p. 63).

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[1] The word is used here not in the psychiatric meaning of mania as applied to affective disorders (manic euphoria, manic rage, manic confusion), more in its colloquial meaning, overlapping with that used in psychiatry for impulse-control disorders (kleptomania, pyromania, dromomania, etc.).

The examples closest to the given theoretical type occur within the domain of psychopathology, but it does not of course follow that any state corresponding to life-world Type 2 is pathological. Consciousness enters this state every time that a motive is actualised which calls for a certain action by the individual, and there is no alternative motive (at least at the given moment).

Realistic Experiencing

The general basis of all the experiencing processes proper to the given type of life is the mechanism of patience. This, properly speaking, can itself be considered an experiencing process. It is an exemplary demonstration that life, as soon as the primary state of blissful satisfaction has been left behind, cannot exist without experiencing processes that will hold it firm against the various destructive and disintegrating forces which attack it in a difficult and complex world.

Before proceeding to discussion of the mechanisms which come into being on the basis of patience, it is essential to compare and contrast patience, a mechanism subordinate to the reality principle, and psychological defence, which operates according to the pleasure principle. On the one hand, these two are direct opposites, on the other, they meet at one point. Both defence and patience actualise in consciousness a feeling that a good is present which objectively is absent, but the modalities of that actualisation are quite different. Defence sees the good as existentially present, patience sees it as due to be present; defence creates an illusion that a problem is solved (or does not exist: "the grapes are sour..."), patience builds a consciousness that it can be solved; defence refuses to see that the positive emotional states it achieves (or the negative ones it abolishes) are not justified by actual existence, while patience is directed towards removing the reasons for that being so; and lastly, defence takes as its basic ground the inviolability of subjective factors (wishes, self-assessments, sense of security and so on), and for their protection distorts the image of reality, while patience takes reality as its basic ground and constrains subjectivity to fit in with reality.

The mechanism of patience operates only within certain limits (drawn by the state of development which the mechanism itself has attained): beyond these limits, when an "impossible" situation (frustration) arises, other experiencing processes are required.[1]

In very general terms, one can distinguish two variants of "realistic" experiencing.

The first takes place within the bounds of the impaired life relation. In the simplest, "zero-line" example of this variant of experiencing, a way out of the critical situation that subjectively seemed to be insoluble is found, not thanks to any independent psychological process, but owing to an unexpected objective resolution of the situation (success is achieved after failure, agreement obtained after refusal, what had been lost is found, what had been forbidden is permitted, etc.). This is truly a "zero" instance, for here the critical situation is not psychologically surmounted, but in fact done away with thanks to effective behaviour (cf. 33), or thanks to a fortunate combination of circumstances.

More complex instances, calling for special activity by the individual, are dealt with by compensation for lost (or lowered) capabilities, or by substitution. Whatever the technical details of the process, it starts from the fact of the existing impossibility, under the given conditions, of satisfying the given need, and from the imperative urgency of satisfying it in one way or another.

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[1] The objection may be raised that if patience comes into operation before an "impossible" situation arises, then by definition it cannot be experiencing. The explanation is that patience is a mechanism developed to deal not with frustration but with stress, i.e., with the critical situation corresponding to the easy and simple world. And it is thanks to patience that a situation which would be critical for the creature of that life-world is not so for the individual in the difficult life.

Since we are speaking of realistic experiencing, which does not take refuge in self-deception, the only conceivable way out lies in an alteration of the psychological situation, one which will despite all make possible real satisfaction of the frustrated need. Two things make possible, in this psychological world, the solution of "no-go" life-situations —the ability of the subject to postpone satisfaction of need, for a period sufficient for development of compensatory facilities, or for finding or creating ways round whatever is blocking off the goal; and secondly the ability to make do with any substitute for the object of need, so long as the substitute can satisfy the need. This last point is particularly important; the individual in the simple and difficult world knows no object (or person) in its (his) defined individuality and uniqueness of value, he prizes in it only one quality—the ability to satisfy his need. The narrow and intense nature of this individual's outward direction to the world creates an illusion of the individual being exceedingly strongly fixated on the given object, of being literally "fused" with it—but the object has only to disappear, thus creating an "impossible" situation, and it quickly becomes apparent that here was an illusion only: the individual with a simple internal world is in principle prepared to accept any surrogate which will satisfy the given need even partially, because all qualities of the object which have no direct relation to the need satisfied have no psychological meaning for the individual and are disregarded.

The second variant of "realistic" experiencing differs from the first in that there are no subjective connections made, no recognition of a succession existing between a disrupted relationship (the disruption of which makes experiencing necessary) and a subsequent relationship, normal realisation of which indicates that experiencing has been successful. Although objectively, to an external observer, who identifies the person according to his individual qualities, both before and after experiencing takes place, it may seem that the new activity is a substitute for the old, frustrated activity, and a compensation for it, internally (to the person himself) the two activities are in no way linked. It is a "compensation" which changes nothing in the previous, disrupted relationship, which in no way compensates for its disruption; it is a substitution in which nothing is replaced "as it was", for the new activity has its own problems to solve. And since every activity actually engaged in is equivalent in meaning to the whole of life, when the individual's internal world is simple, "experiencing" of this kind is in effect a leap from one life (which has come to grief, and is abandoned) to another life, one psychologically started afresh, in spite of being constructed with the psycho-biological material of the same individual. An illustration of this variant of experiencing is provided by Chekhov's character "Darling" (*Dushechka*), who lives in the pages of one short story through several separate, unconnected lives.

The law of our second type of experiencing, then, is the reality principle. The foundation-stone for experiencing of this type is the fact that reality is "deaf to all entreaty", it is insurmountable, struggle against it is useless, and so it has to be accepted as it is, one must bow to it, knuckle under, and try to win some possibility of need-satisfaction within the limits and constraints it imposes.

Among the varieties of experiencing which we analysed in Chapter I, none exactly corresponds to "realistic" experiencing, but if we allow some approximation, we can say that its empirical prototype is coping behaviour. When coping is contrasted with psychological defence one commonly finds, as well as direct stress on the realistic nature of coping, note is being taken of the rationality of coping processes, of the fact that they are capable of taking the overall nature of a situation into account, i.e., qualities are noted which may be summed up as recognition of reality. Besides, the mechanism taken as the prime example of coping behaviour is adaptation, and adaptation is by definition a process whereby the internal and subjective is made to fit in with and follow the external, the objective—reality.

4. Type 3. THE INTERNALLY COMPLEX AND EXTERNALLY EASY LIFE-WORLD

Description of Life-World

Set against Type 1, with which we started, Type 3 shows change in only one category-dimension—simplicity of the internal world is replaced by complexity—but this is enough to produce a radical transformation of the entire life-world.

Let us pause once more, to consider the concept of complexity. We have already said that even when a person has many life relations, his internal world may remain simple. More precisely, one must distinguish between objective and subjective complexity of the world. The former is produced when, regardless of what the person's intentions may be, his external behaviour inevitably gives rise to all manner of social, biological and physical processes which may affect one or another of his life relations. In other words, any action of the subject "in realising one activity, one life relation, proves objectively to realise some other life relation also" (138a, p. 211). But it is entirely possible to conceive of a psychological world which internally, subjectively, remains simple, in spite of the fact that the relations entering into it intersect in the field of real action. When this is so, the subject is psychologically participating in only one life relation at any given moment, his consciousness is never "between" relations, at a point from which both "this" and "that" can be seen, with their mutual interdependence; behaviour is actualised as if no other relations existed besides the one being actualised—not because the individual has decided to pay no attention to them, to disregard or to sacrifice them, but because he is incapable psychologically of retaining consciousness of more than one relation at any one time. In short, objective interconnection of relations, i.e., objective complexity of the life-world, does not of itself bring about internal, subjective complexity of that world. The latter is the result of a particular internal activity linking together and coordinating different relations.

Complexity of the internal world is "conjunction" of its separate units (life relations) within internal space and time. In the spatial aspect "conjunction" appears as simultaneous linkage of relations, i.e., the ability to hold two or more relations within the field of inner vision at one time; phenomenologically this is expressed as "this and that". In the temporal aspect "conjunction" means the presence of sequential links, "first—then", between relations. At one moment there are subjectively many life relations ("this and that") present together, developing successively in a certain order—first one, then another.

What is the life and activity of a creature like when it lives in such a world?

The external world yields to action by the creature with absolute ease, and this renders impossible any finite action, just as finite movement is impossible in an absolute vacuum: it is either absent or it is infinite, owing to the absence of resistant forces. But action only has meaning if it is finite, tending towards its ultimate object, therefore the "ease" of the world does away with actions (and consequently with their operational constituents), and equally does away with the non-psychological "distance" which under real conditions commonly separates the direct result of an action from its meaningful consequences, those which directly concern the motives (needs) of the individual.[1]

The "ease" of the external world, then, abolishes all processes intervening between an initiating action by the individual and the realisation of his motive. All the internal structure of activity, and its substantiality, have as it were dropped away; each separate activity comes to fruition instantly the moment it is initiated ("here and now").

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[1] For instance, between the writing of a play—the direct result of complex action—and fame, which may be the motive and the ultimate result of such work, numerous processes intervene (reading of the play, its acceptance for production, production itself, the actors' performances, recognition of the play's merit, public expression of such recognition)—processes in which the author cannot figure as "subject", but which nonetheless enter as an essential component into his activity, the motive for which was the desire to win fame.

This life is entirely non-situational. In this psychological world there are no situations in which "something may turn up", situations surrounded by favourable or unfavourable circumstances, set about with limitations of time to cause "worries" (i.e., actions that have to be completed within a given time), offering opportunities for compromise between irreconcilable tendencies, producing unexpected turns when "suddenly", "just then", something occurs ... and so on. And if there are no situations, nor are there any of the material factors which form the very body of ordinary life—factors which may appear superficial and haphazard, but which nonetheless play an active part in the innermost (including motivational) processes, and are both concrete and mobile, and very hard to pin down by rational assessment and calculation.

The existence of an initiative-producing individual in the easy life-world is as dangerous as it is full of "magical" possibilities; this is naked being, stripped of the wrappings of difficulty and of the cushioning viscosity of the external world. In this world it is impossible "to think twice" and "recollect oneself", for any initiative instantly brings about all its most far-reaching consequences.

The question then arises: what limitations does ease of the world impose upon all the variety of concrete forms assumed by complexity of life? One can see that in the easy life-world there are no empirical, situational, "bodily" intersections between different life relations. But going on from there, we have two theoretical possibilities, which would affect the future course of our mental experiment very differently.

The first possibility is to accept as objectively true the thesis that relations are materially non-intersecting. In this case, since every life relation is accorded instant, unimpeded realisation, and is in no danger of colliding with another life relation in the material field of operation, not a single life relation will fail to be achieved. The world is absolutely transparent to the individual, result is always the same as ultimate goal, embodiment is the same as intent. Life is devoid of any inner alternatives, any inner tension; the only thing required of the individual for realisation of life is to appoint the order in which his activities are to be carried out. And the only reason for our having to assign to the individual the work of appointing an order is that we are speaking of an internally complex world, so its various relations have to meet somewhere—and if this is not in the course of their realisation, it must be at the point of decision-making. But there is no internal necessity in this life-world for them to meet in consciousness and be given their order of fulfilment, since the absolute ease of the world means that its "permeability" is unlimited and can therefore allow all life relations to be realised at one and the same objective moment, even if that moment is subjectively divided by the number of the relations concerned. We see, then, that the abstractions involved, if we take this first of our two possibilities, are so great that they cease to be fruitful.

The second theoretical possibility is to suppose that this external world, although easy, retains the inter-relationships of the ordinary world, and on this account—though instantaneously fulfilling any initiative by the subject—is not subordinated to that initiative only, but also to objective laws and relationships, so that result is never equivalent to intent, but goes beyond the bounds of the one relation which provided the basis for the given initiative. In other words, deep in the recesses of the easy world all the bodily, material life relations which would operate in the solid, difficult world are in fact taking place, *but* (and this is very important for our definition of the easy-and-complex life-world) all these real intersections, occuring throughout the time and space required for their realisation, are absent from the activity and the consciousness of the individual in the easy-and-complex life.

The situational-empirical, objective connections and intersections of relations, then, take place beyond the curtain, so to speak, of this life-world, somewhere outside it, delivering inwards only the results of such collisions. In front of the curtain, on the stage of the psychological world, different life relations collide only in the pure value form, in their concentrated essence—figuratively speaking, they collide not as bodies, as activities, but as souls, or motives and values.

As the various life relations are not indifferent to one another, being interconnected and interdependent, there is need for a special internal activity which will measure them against one another, compare them, weigh up their value, subordinate one to the other, etc. This internal activity is nothing else but consciousness.

As difficulty of the world produces the need for mind, so complexity calls for the appearance of consciousness. Mind is the "organ" called upon to take part in solving external problems, but in the complex-and-easy life-world the basic problem area is internal. Mind serves external, object-orientated, situational action, but in this world there is no such thing, owing to the "ease" of the world. In it, the principal acts of life-activity are those which in the everyday world are performed prior to concrete, situational action, or after it. What acts are these?

The first of them is choice. If all activity in the complex-and-easy world is reduced, essentially, to consciousness, then consciousness is in its turn reduced, half of it, to choice. Every choice is a tragic matter, for a dilemma of motives has to be solved. The tragic quality comes from the fact that the individual faces a problem which is vitally important on the one hand, and logically insoluble on the other. Once the problem of choice has arisen, it must be solved, yet it is impossible of solution. Why? Firstly, because each alternative in any given case is a life relation or motive, something which does not turn up at random like a concrete means or mode of action but is an organic, essential part of the given form of life, and therefore something which can only be abandoned, left unrealised, at the price of disintegration or total collapse of this life form;[1] and secondly because there is not, and cannot be, any rationally convincing reason for preferring one life relation (or motive) to another. Such preference is only possible when there is a common yardstick against which things may be measured, while separate life relations and motives are in principle heterogeneous, having nothing in common except the circumstance—incidental to their content—of pertaining to the same individual. Thus consciousness is compelled to solve problems which are paradoxical, to compare the non-comparable, to measure things which have no common dimension.

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[1] Disintegration of an established form of life is not always, by any means, a negative phenomenon, e.g., it can be positive as regards moral growth, but it is always a traumatic event psychologically, inasmuch as there exists (as we have already remarked, quoting the theoretical ideas of A. G. Asmolov) a powerful force of inertia which seeks to preserve an existing form of life.

True choice, the pure culture of choice, is an act without any sufficient rational basis, an act full of risk, without origins in the past or the present, an action with no fulcrum.

That of course applies only to choice in its most extreme form. In concrete reality, the psychological situation of choice is always hedged about with arguments *pro* and *contra*, such as circumstantial factors, and temptations, and current ideas on morality and "normal" behaviour, and universal imperatives, and "historical" models and social norms of behaviour. The closer choice comes to its essential nature the less its burden of responsibility is shuffled off on to the prompting voices or ready-made decisions just mentioned. For true choice, all these are no more than the list of answers at the back of the arithmetic book; it is no good just copying them out, you have to work out the answers for yourself.

The main problem and the main drive of the internally complex life is how to get rid of the painful necessity of constantly making choices, how to develop a psychological "organ" to cope with complexity, one which will incorporate a yardstick for measuring the comparative significance of motives and be capable of integrating life relations firmly into a single whole of individual life. This "organ" is value consciousness, for value is the only yardstick against which motives can be compared. The *value principle,* therefore, is the supreme principle of the complex-and-easy life-world.

The relationship between value consciousness and choice is complicated and ambivalent. However, as a point of departure for our consideration of the question we can take its simplest rationalistic presentation: consciousness, armed with a certain system of values, sets the alternatives against the value scale, each alternative receives its rating, and the one which is rated the highest is chosen. It might seem that this is what in fact happens. But we know very well that the actual process of making real choices often departs from this schema. One reason for this may be that the individual does not have any clear conscious idea of his own competing motives. But experience shows that even when such consciousness of motives is present, the fact that a person clearly recognises the superior value of one motive does not mean that it will be preferred in reality, and that the subject will carry out the activity to realise that motive. How are we to explain this absurd (from the rational point of view) discrepancy, this lack of unambiguous dependence of choice upon evaluation?

In the first place, by the fact that values in themselves have no stimulating energy and force and therefore are incapable of directly compelling motives and behaviour to obey them.

A value does, on the other hand, have the power to produce emotions, for instance if a choice already made is clearly in conflict with it. This means that value must be taken (in the terms of the psychological theory of activity) to be in the same category as motive, for emotions relate to separate activities, reflecting the course of their realisation of various motives (138; 140; 142).

So values do not, on the one hand, possess stimulating power, and therefore cannot be held to be motives, but on the other hand, they have to be recognised as motives since they do possess emotionality. The explanation is that the activity theory distinguishes different kinds of motives. It is possible to suppose that in the course of individual development values undergo a definite evolution, changing not only in content but in motivational status as well, in the place they occupy and the rôle they play in the structure of life-activity. In the earliest stages values exist only in the form of the emotional consequences when behaviour has offended against them, or conversely has asserted them (first stirrings of guilt or of pride). Then values take on the form of "acknowledged" motives, then that of meaning-formative motives, and finally that of motives both meaning-formative and operative in reality. At each stage the value is enriched by a new motivational quality, without losing those previously present.

This should not be taken to mean that values are actually motives, or are a particular kind of motive, and nothing more. To identify value and motive completely would be a conscious refusal to enrich the working plan of the activity theory by adding another category to it. Describing the evolution of values in terms of motives is simply a way of showing how their relationship (that of values) to behaviour changes. In other words the content of consciousness (and of life) which constitutes a value can perform the function of a motive, i.e., it forms the meaning of, directs and stimulates imagined[1] or real behaviour, but it does not of course follow therefrom that in psychology value may be reduced to motive. Unlike motive, which regardless of whether it is my, our or someone else's motive, always particularises an inividual life-world, value is that which on the contrary brings the individual into contact with a supra-individual community and integrity.[2]

Although a value as a content of consciousness does not, initially, possess any energy, as the inner development of personality proceeds it (the value) can borrow energy from motives operative in reality, so that eventually the value develops from a content of consciousness into a content of life, and itself acquires the force of a real motive. A value is not any known content capable of becoming a motive, only a content such that it can lead, upon becoming a motive, to the growth and positive development of the personality. This transformation of a value from a primary motive into a real, perceptible motivational force is accompanied by an energy metamorphosis which is hard to explain. Having once become a real motive, a value suddenly proves to possess a mighty charge of energy,[1] a potential, which cannot be accounted for by all the borrowings it may have made in the course of its evolution. One supposition that may be advanced to explain this is that when a value becomes truly part of a life it is "switched in" to the energies of the supra-individual entity to which that value links the individual.

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[1] What is known as an "acknowledged" motive is in our opinion not simply a content known to the individual which may become a real motive but which as yet is not one. An "acknowledged" motive is a motive which really stimulates and forms the meaning of the individual's imagined behaviour. Without this it would make no sense to speak of "motive" at all in this case.

[2] But does not, let us stress, disolve him away in that community; paradoxically it makes him still more individual (cf. 237).

Whatever the real reasons may be for this increase of energy, what is important for us here is that when this psychological state is reached, we then have a situation in which our original rationalistic model of the relationship between value and choice (see above) represents the true state of affairs. Choice loses its tragic tension, because all the energy of life and all the meaning of life is concentrated in the value, and in its light the true tendency of this or that intention is clearly seen, its "price" is easily fixed, and the power of the value makes it comparatively easy to reject an unsatisfactory intention. For a person "taken over" by a higher spiritual value,[2] choice ceases to be an urgent problem, for he has, as it were, made his choice once and for all, found himself and his own forward momentum, the source of meaning for existence, "the truth of life"—and by doing so has made in advance (not in detail but in principle, not in externals but in point of value and meaning) all subsequent choices. Value lights up the whole life of a human being from within, filling it with simplicity[1] and true freedom—freedom from hesitation and fear,[2] freedom to fulfil creative capabilities.

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[1] What we here refer to as energy or potential is phenomenologically expressed in states of inspiration, elevation, invigoration, in the sensation of a surge of energy, and in the accompanying feeling that life is good and has meaning.

[2] We are speaking here of the very directly experienced* state of living communion with the value. Such a state may of course not be continuous, and when it is interrupted doubt creeps in and produces wavering, tragic difficulty of choice, etc.

The first reason for choices failing to coincide with our first, rationalistic model of the value—choice relationship lay in the fact that a value does not always have sufficient status as a motive; the second reason is that a value itself can change, according to how well the individual knows it, how clearly defined it is in his consciousness.

. If we look at this process also in its genesis and development, we find that it runs almost parallel to the line previously drawn for the motivational transformation of a value, but coinciding with that line at the starting and finishing points.

The first point of coincidence comes in the period when a value manifests itself only in emotional form, and only after the behaviour chosen by a child comes into head-on collision with the social assessment made of it by adults (for instance, a child feels guilt after—*after*—he or she is caught telling a lie). At this stage the value does not truly exist, it is only starting to come into being and is first apprehended in a non-specific form, as a rule of behaviour (e.g., "I'll never tell fibs again"). But there are rules and rules. In the kind of rule we are here dealing with, we can glimpse a possible value of the future, promise of which lies in the fact that this "rule" has been independently formulated on the basis of personal—even bitter—experience* of coming into conflict with the value consciousness of people important to the child. These are the first rules to come from within, not from outside, and to be psychologically reinforced not by promises addressed to Someone Else, but by vows made to oneself.

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[1] Not, of course, the "simplicity" we have described as an attribute of our first two life-worlds, but the simplicity of inner clarity, the quality referred to in the old Russian proverb "Simplicity and purity are half of salvation".

[2] One of Lev Tolstoy's characters expresses his consciousness of such a state in these words: "...there is no more of the old tearing-apart within me and I fear nothing now. Now the light has indeed illumined me utterly, and I have become what I am" (*Diary of a Madman*).

This is a very delicate moment in the development (and in the education) of a child's personality: the development may proceed further along the road of positive building-up of values, or it may take the road of direct social conformism. One and the same rule (such as "Do not tell lies") may enshrine the spark of a future value and inculcate a love for truth, but it may also be motivated by fear of being found out and punished.

To sum up, in the first phase of its psychological development a value as such is unknown to consciousness, it is merely represented there, by two interconnected forms—that of emotion (evoked by infringement of a rule of behaviour behind which lies a value) and that of a rule (put forward on the grounds of the emotional experience* of contact with the value consciousness of an important Someone Else).

The second point where the lines of development coincide is the point at which a value attains its maximum charge of energy. As the value reaches a certain degree of power within the consciousness, at that point one gets metamorphoses akin to those already described for the motivational dimension of value evolution. Attainment of the highest phase of a value's psychological development is linked, not with a gradual growth in the clarity and definition with which the value's content and importance are presented to consciousness, but with a kind of leap, after which the value is transformed from "something seen", an object, into something by which all else is seen—into an inner light of meaning.

In between these two points values go through a long development, which proceeds with special intensity at those periods when choices and decisions are being made which are of great importance to the individual. When the internal system of values has not yet assumed firm shape and clarity, every choice made is also a vital moment in the structuring of inner values.

If at the initial point of value development in consciousness values make their appearance, as we have seen, only after actions have taken place, when they are being assessed, while at the final point of development they take precedence of choice and are its instant arbiters—then it can easily be understood that the general tendency of the changes taking place throughout that development is towards values taking a hand in proceedings at an ever earlier stage; first we find them inserting themselves between a choice already made and the executive action which has not yet started, then participating more and more fully in the actual "production" of choices.

So far, in discussing the life-activity proper to the easy-and-complex psychological world we have been speaking mainly of activity *prior to* external action. Now we must turn to activity which in the ordinary world takes place *after* action.

The conditions of the easy-and-complex life-world dictate that as soon as the individual has commenced any action it is already completed; there, already present, are its results and the immediate empirical effects it has had on other spheres of life-activity. The individual stands face to face with changes in his existence which have already occurred.

If all these changes had been allowed for in advance by the subject at the moment of choice, if they had entered into his intent, then they would present no problem. But that is the trouble: a choice is always fraught with doubts, and to some extent with risk, not only because it is impossible to work out in advance all the interconnections and interdependencies of external reality, but also because the individual's own motive/value system always remains—at least until the very highest stages of value development have been reached—not fully understood (or even totally misunderstood) by himself; it is therefore impossible for him to sense internally, in advance, the true significance for his personality of events, even pre-figured events, until they become fact, come into collision with motives, and produce changes in life relations. And in the "easy" life-world these are all irreversible events and consequences that we are discussing, for reversible changes in life relations are always linked with temporary difficulties, and these are abolished by the "ease" we have attributed to this external world. And irreversible changes cannot be put right even in the easy world, for that world may take upon itself to dispose of all the difficulties of achieving an action, however great they may be, but it is powerless in face of impossibility: the changes that have occurred must be experienced.

Value Experiencing

What types of events have to be experienced in the easy-and-complex life-world? Firstly, internal conflict. We here mean by conflict not simple contradiction between impulses, but contradiction which cannot, in the given form, be resolved. In the conflict situation it is impossible either to give up realisation of the contradictory life relations, or to choose just one of them. The second type of critical situation which is conceivable in the life-world under discussion bears a resemblance to frustration, but it would be more accurate to call it external conflict. This situation is produced by, for instance, disappearance of the object of one of the individual's life relations. Of course this frustrates the corresponding need, but frustration as such presupposes the individual's awareness of the urge involved, and activity initiated but being hindered by obstacles, and thus revealing the impossibility of its realisation—while for the individual in the easy-and-complex world the critical point, in the situation where an object disappears, will lie in the impossibility of choosing the activity connected with that object. The conflict is between consciousness, in which the "set of meaning" corresponding to the lost object is still operative (15), and existence, in which its realisation is now impossible.

A critical situation, whatever its precise nature may be, in making a choice impossible "damages" the psychological future or even destroys it. And the future is what one might call the "home" of meaning, for though meaning is in itself extra-temporal it is nevertheless "not indifferent to time" (23, p. 107), and is embodied in temporal form as "the meaningful future". Meaning in general is a borderline formation; in it consciousness and existence meet, as do the ideal and the real, life values and the possibilities for their realisation. In relation to reality, meaning is embodied in various forms of the meaningful future; but in relation to the ideal, the extra-temporal, it reflects the value integrity of the individual life.[1]

In a critical situation the psychological future, the meaning of life, and the integrity of life, all suffer injury simultaneously. There is no sequence of cause and effect between these injuries, they are different dimensions of one and the same thing—the critical situation itself. There is disturbance of the whole system of life, i.e., the "consciousness-existence" system; consciousness cannot accept existence in such a form and loses its ability to make sense of and direct it; existence, unable to realise the impulses of consciousness and failing to find, in consciousness, forms adequate for its functioning, passes out of the control of consciousness and develops spontaneous connections and dependences which erode still further the correlation of meaning between existence and consciousness. All this is expressed phenomenologically as "losing the meaning" of things. Overcoming this disharmony in life, i.e., experiencing, is in the easy-and-complex world a matter of re-structuring values and motives. This does not mean that the previous value system is itself re-structured, or not necessarily; in general what happens is a re-structuring of the relationships between the value system and the existential components of life.

There are two main sub-types of value experiencing. The first occurs when the individual has not yet attained the higher stages of value development, and it is accompanied by greater or lesser changes in the value/motive system.

One can distinguish different variations within this sub-type, characterised by the varying degrees of such changes in the value system, and by the varying extent to which motivational transformations are accompanied by re-structuring of content in the individual's values.

The first two such variations take place when an activity which may hold considerable attraction for the individual, but which makes no significant contribution to the meaning of his existence, either becomes unrealisable or comes into conflict with his dominant motives or values. Value experiencing is accomplished by means of a "vertical" (138a) movement of consciousness, affecting the "rankings" it recognises within the value/motive system: consciousness re-assesses and clarifies its own values, separating out what is genuine and fundamental from those contents and motives which have "illegally", by-passing the sanction of consciousness, come to occupy a place in the individual's life which is unjustified by their true value-ranking and potential as conveyors of meaning to life. Thereafter the process may follow two paths. When the first is taken, such contents and motives are discredited as values, are rejected by consciousness on principle. When the second is taken, consciousness finds no contradiction of principle between these motives and its fundamental drives and guiding rules, and the motives are merely demoted, losing importance; this may be expressed in conscious decision to sacrifice something of less essential import for the sake of something vital and valuable. In terms of time, this demotion takes the form of postponement for a time, or abandonment for ever, of the activity which has at the given moment become psychologically impossible.

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[1] The category of "integrity" is identical with the phenomenological category of "meaningfulness" (98).

Under the conditions of real life, of course, conscious decisions on evaluative rejection of a motive, or on the need for it to be sacrificed, require practical action before they can become operative and part of life; actual steps must be taken to overcome the force of inertia latent within the motive and to confirm the altered value-rankings. But in the hypothetical world we are discussing, the practical results of the work of consciousness are automatically guaranteed by the "ease" of that world, and so present no separate problem.

The next two variants of sub-type 1 of value experiencing involve radical re-structuring of the value/motive system, since the events being experienced render impossible the realisation of highly important life-relations, those in which the meaning of the person's life is chiefly concentrated.

If the impossibility results from purely existential changes for which the individual is not responsible, and his values as such are not affected (death of a loved one, for instance, or illness which prevents realisation of life-plans), the task of value experiencing is to select from the remaining, realisable life relations, and affirm as values, that or those which are capable, in principle, of serving as a motivational, meaning-bearing centre in life. But the main work to be performed by value experiencing is probably the effecting of particular transformations associated with the wrecked life relation itself.

These changes effected through value experiencing are radically different from what we saw to occur in realistic and hedonistic experiencing.

Pierre Janet (118) has described a case where a young girl was morbidly affected by the death of her mother: she "cared for" her mother's already dead body and later, when herself in hospital, refused to believe what she was told of the mother's death, suffered no feelings of grief, and generally behaved as though nothing had happened. This is experiencing subordinated to the pleasure principle, which preserves the subjective, the desired, and denies the objective, the real.

The exact opposite of this is seen in the experiencing of Chekhov's "Darling" (*Dushechka*) after the death of her first husband (ardently and sincerely loved by her). Her feeling for him, his image, everything connected with him is completely blotted out by a new reality, or to be more exact it all completely evaporates from the life and the memory of the story's heroine.[1]

Value experiencing is another matter. Here the life relation which has become impossible is not preserved in consciousness unchanged, as in hedonistic experiencing, nor totally ejected from consciousness as in realistic experiencing.

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[1] Three months after her first husband's death "Darling" (her real name is Olga Semyonovna) marries one Pustovalov, manager of a timber yard. and soon she starts to feel "that she had been in the timber business a long, long time, that timber was the most important and needed thing in life...". And the summer theatre, with which all her life with her first husband had been bound up, now leaves her quite cold: "We're working people, we haven't time for such nonsense. What good is there in your theatres?"

In value experiencing the reality of the death of a loved one is not ignored, nor is it accepted as a bare fact and no more; the image of the dead person is preserved, unlike in realistic experiencing, but it is preserved not as a hallucination (as in hedonistic experiencing), not eidetically, not in a natural-psychic form, but artificially and consciously (cf. 164), not by habit but by ideal imaging (118). The image of the dead person which during his or her life was permeated with my own motivations, cares, hopes, fears, etc. and in general associated with practical and essentially temporal relations, is now as it were transferred to another plane of being, is formulated in ideal terms of value, extra-temporally, in the last resort—eternally. This transfer and this formulation are brought about by an aesthetic and productive process: this work of experiencing cannot be performed through any pragmatic replacement of the dead person by someone else, not just because no one, of course, can assume the "functions" which the deceased fulfilled in my life, but because the deceased was necessary and important to me apart from those functions, as a person, in the "qualitative definition of personal uniqueness", as one having a unique value—and this last is something which even during the other person's lifetime was a product of my aesthetic activity (23, pp. 38-39). "My activity continues even after the death of the other person," writes M. M. Bakhtin, "and aesthetic elements begin to predominate within it (as against moral and practical elements): the whole of the other's life lies before me, free from all elements of temporal future, of aims and obligations. After the burial and the memorial comes *the memory.* I have the *whole* life of that other person *outside* myself, and now begins the aestheticisation of his or her personality: it is fixed and completed in an aesthetically significant image. It is the set of emotion and will towards honouring the dead, essentially, that gives rise to the aesthetic categories forming the image of the departed in his or her 'inner likeness' (and in outward likeness also), for only this set can bring value terms to bear upon the temporal, already completed whole of the dead person's inward and outward life. . . . Memory is an approach which sees a whole already complete in terms of value; memory is in a certain sense hopeless, but on the other hand it is able to evaluate, aside from goals and meanings, a life already completed and present in totality" (23, pp. 94-95).

The final variant of sub-type 1 of value experiencing resembles the one just considered in that it demands great motivational changes, re-structuring an entire life, but it differs from the above in that it calls also for radical transformations in the value-content of the individual's life, for the "making over" or even replacement of the whole value system. This variant of experiencing is necessary when the whole of a previously accepted value system discredits itself, through the results of its own application. Life finds itself in an *impasse* as regards meaning, it is devalued, loses its inner integrity, and starts to disintegrate psychologically. The object of the experiencing process here is to discover a new system of values through which internal integrity and meaning can be brought back into life, to illumine it and open up new perspectives of meaning. We shall leave it at that for now, at the stage of general statement, since in the next chapter we shall be able to make the general statement more concrete via analysis of the experiencing that Rodion Raskolnikov went through. Here we shall note only that the result of such experiencing is the creation of a psychologically new life. But unlike the case of realistic experiencing, here the transition to a new life is not a "jump" from one life-content to another, leaving the first unchanged. Here the transition means surmounting and transforming the old life in terms of value: the relation of the new life to the old is that of forgiveness to offence, of redemption to fault.

Value experiencing of sub-type 2 is only possible when the individual has attained the highest stages of development of value consciousness. If before those stages were reached a value was something belonging to the individual, a part—even if a most important and integral part—of his life, and the individual could say "this is a value of mine", now we see that relationship reversed: now the individual appears as a part of the value which has taken him over, belonging to it and finding meaning and justification for his life only in communion with that value and service to it.

The experiencing of events which disrupt such a value relationship is in some ways reminiscent of the most primitive forms of experiencing, when at the behest of the pleasure principle reality is ignored and all manner of psychological devices are employed to keep reality at bay, in order to preserve for a time at least an illusory sensation of "everything being all right". Value experiencing, too, is out of step with reality, once reality's events and circumstances, conditions and conventions, begin to make impossible the realisation of the higher values that are the whole meaning and mainspring of the existence they inform. But whereas in defensive processes a person tries to turn away from reality and hide, head in the sand, and so abolish reality, value experiencing looks reality in the eye, sees it clearly and distinctly, not admitting the slightest self-deception or underestimation of the power and unyielding resistance of reality; but at the same time this experiencing looks right through reality, as if it were asking: "Is reality so very real after all? Can this visible, audible, felt presentness be true existence, can this be truth? Can this actuality, indifferent to human values, lay down the final irresistible law of life, for us to obey without question?"

And if the content of that question expresses a certain "distrust" of reality, an answer to it can in no way be looked for from reason, or in general from knowledge, for knowledge is subordinated to reality and seeks to correspond fully with it. What, then, is the nature of that cognitive ability which can solve the question put by value experiencing, can distinguish true life from false? That is, in S. L. Rubinstein's words, the ability "to comprehend life overall and perceive in it that which is truly significant . . . it is something immeasurably surpassing any learning. . . it is that rare and priceless quality—*wisdom*" (200, p. 682).

It is wisdom which enables value experiencing to perform its principal task of helping a human being to keep faith with values in spite of the "obvious" absurdity and hopelessness of resisting reality. In what way is that achieved?

The point is that wisdom "surpasses any learning" not by pursuing further the path of learning, of reason, of knowledge. Wisdom, as a special ability to comprehend, has a directional thrust quite different from that of ordinary cognition, and quite different criteria of truth. Wisdom (Sophia) is in principle reflexive, as etymological studies have shown (237), and this is expressed firstly in its inward thrust towards self-deepening and self-knowledge,[1] and secondly in its justificatory basis being also in the self, i.e., wisdom's criteria for assessing truth are internal.

It is precisely this inward orientation, towards deepening of the self, which enables this kind of value experiencing to create a state of consciousness in which the claims of external reality to be the sole true reality are directly perceived as unfounded. And that is not all. By self-deepening, the individual in this evaluative experiencing achieves only a "weakening" of external reality, but wisdom's immanent justification-by-self simultaneously makes the individual's position on values stronger. The net result is that the unrealisability of values in the external world ceases to be a psychologically impossible situation. To the impossibility of external realisation of values the individual counterposes the still greater impossibility of giving way on those inner values (let us recall Luther's "Here I stand, I can do no other"), and it is this sense of unshakability in the stand taken on values which makes the psychological situation intelligible. As regards value/motive relationships, the work of evaluative experiencing of this type consists in bringing the entire motivational system of the individual into a state of heightened mobilisation, a state of readiness to sacrifice any relation with the external world for the sake of the value being affirmed, that is, into a state of readiness to act selflessly.

The actual means by which this kind of evaluative experiencing is accomplished can vary over a wide range, but they all involve complete abandonment of the egocentric attitude, and of the rationalistic view of the world; motivation has to be ideal in nature; the internal psychological content is *selfless action.*[1]

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[1] We need only recall sayings like "the wise man must first be wise regarding *himself*", etc., on the one hand, and on the other, the idea of *self-knowledge* ("Know thyself"), as inscribed over Apollo's temple at Delphi, and spoken of by Socrates in Plato's *Apology* (237).

Prototype

It only remains for us to indicate real-life prototypes of the existence proper to the internally complex and externally easy world. They are to be found in the sphere of moral conduct. However greatly different moral attitudes (or ethical concepts) may vary, from the standpoint of formal psychology they all meet at one point: in a moral choice there can be no excuses made on grounds of circumstance, or of realisation of moral intent being inconvenient, difficult or burdensome. The difficulty of the world, the "matter" of the act that has to be done, is something that must be disregarded, left out of account. And this disregard is what gives us one aspect of the world under discussion, as it is difined in our typological analysis—its "ease".

In other words, there is one stratum, sector or dimension of human existence—the sphere of moral conduct—in which life is reduced to consciousness and its material side—the difficulty of the world—is set aside, and the human being operates as if in an "easy" world. It is this place of being which has been brought out and discussed from the psychological point of view in this third type of our typology.

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5. Type 4. THE INTERNALLY COMPLEX AND EXTERNALLY DIFFICULT LIFE-WORLD

Description of Life-World

At first glance, the space and time of this life-world would seem to be the sum of the external aspect of space-time in Type 2 and the internal aspect of Type 3, but in fact it is rather the product of "multiplication" of those space-times by one another, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say the product of a synthesis of the two, to form an integral, not "added-together" whole.

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[1] A. N. Leontiev wrote that "the psychological mechanics of a life of selfless heroism must be looked for in the human imagination" (138a, p. 209).

The same applies to life-activity in the difficult and complex life-world. Here one cannot make do with the "organs" (activity, mind, consciousness) developed in response to difficulty and complexity of the life-world. Here the difficulty of the world opposes itself not to separate activities, as in Type 2, but to the totality of all activities, and it cannot therefore be surmounted by external efforts alone, even if these are mediated by adequate psychological reflection. And on the other hand, the complexity of the internal world cannot be resolved purely internally, for here it is fixed and embodies in external, objectual forms and relationships. So the psychological armoury which the creature of the difficult and complex world has to develop, in order to live a full life in this world, cannot be simply the sum of the psychological "devices" which are produced by life in worlds of Type 2 and Type 3.

The principal neo-formation which appears in the creature of this life-world, unlike those of the preceding ones, is will. In world Type 2, despite the difficulty of the external world, will is not necessary; the simplicity of the internal world precludes any competition between motives either before or during an activity, therefore the individual, whatever the difficulties encountered in the external world, undeviatingly pursues the activity dictated by the single operative motive, and no alternatives (continuing that activity, stopping it, doing something else) present themselves. The operative motive itself, of its own power, keeps the individual from turning aside or giving up the activity, no help from will is required, not any interference threatened. There is no will. A drug addict can display colossal activity in order to obtain his drug, overcoming considerable difficulties, but psychologically speaking this is involuntary behaviour.[1]

Will is not needed in life-world Type 3 either, where internally there is complexity but externally everything is easy. The individual has only to make a choice and take a decision, and its realisation is guaranteed by the ease of the external world.[1] Just as in life-world Type 2 the need for activity and for mind makes its appearance, and in life-world Type 3 the need for consciousness, so in the type of world now being analysed a formation must appear which will be capable, under the conditions of a difficult world, of actualising the totality of the individual's interlinked life relations. This formation is will—the psychological "organ" which can represent the individual as a whole, the individual personality, both within its mental apparatus and in life-activity in general.

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[1] This example was indicated by A. N. Leontiev.

Integrity of the personality, as represented in consciousness of self, is not something present and achieved, on the contrary it is "a unity eternally needing to be achieved; it is present to me and not present, it is being unceasingly won by me by the cutting edge of my activity" (23, p. 110). Integrity of the personality is present and not present simultaneously in the same way that a work conceived is both present and not present to an artist: integrity of the personality is as it were the conception which a person has of his or her own self and life. And the job of will is to ensure that that ideal conception is actualised.

We are speaking, then, of the personality constructing itself, of the active, conscious building up of self by a human being; not only (and this is very important) of ideal projection of self, but of the embodiment of such projections and conceptions in practical terms of the five senses, under the conditions of the difficult and complex world in short, we are speaking of life-creativity. *Creativity,* in fact, is the higher principle of this type of life-world.

More precise discussion of the question of will is directly bound up with questions of conflict of motives, and of choice. What activity a person should engage in was decided in life-world Type 2 by conflict between motives, and in life-world Type 3 by supra-situational evaluative choice, but in both these cases all was decided, finally and irrevocably, before activity commenced. But in the complex and difficult world, conflict between motives can flare up in the actual course of activity, while it is being actualised.

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[1] "Traditional psychology," wrote S. L. Rubinstein, "presented as the kernel of a voluntary act ... a 'conflict of motives', followed by a more or less painful choice between them. Internal struggle, conflict with one's own divided soul (as with Faust), and emergence from this in the form of an internal decision—that is everything, while putting that decision into effect is nothing" (200, p. 513).

Internal hesitations are especially easily induced at points where the activity being actualised meets with difficulties. If the choice of that activity was a matter of doubt and only the demands of the situation forced the individual to choose one alternative despite doubts, the old conflict of motives will reappear when difficulty and failure threaten, and the individual will vividly perceive, against the background of his present troubles, the advantages of the alternative that was rejected (cf. 58).

But even in cases where there was no indecision over the sanctioning of a given activity, the moment that activity comes up against any considerable difficulty certain definite motivational processes come to life and start to operate. On the one hand, within the given life relation itself there is a temporary lowering of what one may call the emotional intensity of its meaning, expressed in loss of enthusiasm, feelings of fatigue, satiety, sloth and so on. It can all add up to a "negative" stimulus—not just an absence of desire to pursue the given activity, but an intense aversion to doing so. On the other hand, with this process of developing "disgust" with the activity all sorts of other wishes, impulses and intentions, which we can collectively describe as distractions—become intertwined, supporting it and lending it a certain positive thrust.[1]

In life-world Type 4, then, the advance of activity towards its goal is both impeded by external obstacles and complicated by internal waverings. The difficulties evoke conflict between different motives (appearing in consciousness as "distracting" wishes, temptations etc.) competing to determine the individual's activity, and this actively proceeding internal complication "draws off" part of the energy needed for the activity first undertaken, making its realisation more difficult—the difficulty now coming not from without but from within—and a special work of the will is required if the activity is to be completed.

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[1] This is a phenomenon very well known to us all in daily life: when I meet with some difficulty in my work which cannot easily be disposed of, I am suddenly seized with a desire to have a drink of water, to ring up a friend, to look at the newspaper, etc.—anything will do, so long as it is easy to do and attractive.

Thus one of the basic functions of the will is to prevent conflict of motives, arising in the field of activity, from halting or diverting the individual's activity. In this point *will is conflict with conflict* (*of motives*).

This does not of course mean that the will, having taken up the cause of one particular activity, ceases to see the constantly changing psychological situation and brushes aside all other possibilities and intentions that may appear, but steadily continues to whip on the activity already under way—in short, it does not mean that the will is a blind force. In our view, there is altogether less force in the will than is usually thought, and more "cleverness". Immanuel Kant remarked that "strength will get you nowhere against sensuality, that is something you have to out-manoeuvre. . ." (124, pp. 43-44). The power of the will lies in its skill in using the energy and dynamism of motives for its own purposes. L. S. Vygotsky invoked studies made by Gestalt psychologists to support a thesis of his own, that in their genesis "early forms of activity of the will in children are an application by the child, towards itself, of the methods used by adults in dealing with the child" (246, p. 363). This idea can be very helpful in assisting our understanding of the human will, so long as too narrow a view is not taken of it, which sometimes happens—that is, the view is sometimes taken that the will in an adult is an internalised "command-obedience" structure: voluntary action is obedience to self-command. Certainly it is an essential feature of voluntary behaviour that the individual makes himself do something, is in command of self; but just as in social interaction one person gets another to behave in the desired way not by giving orders, or not always, not necessarily by giving orders, but by other methods such as making a request, promising a reward, making a threat, cutting off other possible lines of conduct, even having recourse to intrigue—in exactly the same way, the intrapsychic modes of action by the will on the self are extremely varied and cannot be reduced to the issuing of commands to the self.

In the situation which served to open up our present discussion (where an activity meets with obstacles which set up a conflict of motives) the operation of the will may consist in it "promising" an interfering motive that its claims will be met later, when the current activity has been completed. The competing activities are in consequence bound together into a unity of content and motive, a "merit-reward" structure for example, where the energy of meaning that pertains to the "reward" activity is borrowed to overcome the difficulties of the "merit" activity, and meaning, built up and enriched by the surmounting of those difficulties, can be returned increased an hundredfold to the "reward" activity.

Although the will does show itself principally in adopting an activity and doing everything possible to bring it to full realisation, that is not to say that the will becomes a servant to that particular activity, being totally absorbed in the latter's interests, seeing the external world and the individual's other motives only in this particular perspective, solely from the viewpoint of the possible harm or good they might do to that activity. The will is of its very nature an "organ" of the whole human being, of the personality, it serves no one particular activity but the building of a whole life, the realisation of the life intent; for this reason it defends the interests of this or that activity not because it is subordinated to them, but according to the free decision of consciousness, dictated by the life intent.

If behaviour loses this mediation through consciousness to any degree, to that extent it ceases to be voluntary, whatever obstacles it may overcome and whatever effort that may cost the individual. Even in "secondarily involuntary" activity, i.e., an activity which began with some effort of will, but having once got under way discovered within itself energy and force of its own, sufficient to enable it to surmount all difficulties and distractions with comparative ease, so that one might think there was no further need for the will—even here the will is still operative, in the form of a certain evaluative attention and of particular time/content transformations of motivation. The point here is that a temptation has to be noticed in good time, and once it is noticed it cannot be dealt with simply by waving it aside, for behind it stands a motive, a real, considerable existential force for the given individual. If his activity passes by the temptation without turning aside to it, that is the achievement not of the current activity itself but of the will, which at the very moment when it was needed effected a transformation of the motive behind the temptation, lowering its actual tension. The will, in short, keeps constant watch over the internal and external possibilities and demands that arise in any situation, assesses them, and if necessary, may itself call a halt to a current activity it has hitherto been pursuing. And it is this, not head-on, all-out effort to see an activity once commenced right through to completion, which is truly voluntary behaviour, behaviour ruled by the will—on condition, naturally, that there is good and sufficient reason for halting an activity. Clearly, an act of will of this kind cannot be based just on the immediate strength of some motive, realisation of which would be threatened if the originally willed activity were to continue. In a voluntary or willed act the direct stimulus must always be consciously recognised (200, p. 508) and accepted, and the decisive factor is not the immediate force of the stimulus but its content, the degree to which it is in harmony with the whole of the given personality, with all its factors of meaning, value, and space-time.

The will, then, must be considered not only in its formally-quantitative aspect, that of intensity ("strength of will"), indeed not so much in that aspect as from the standpoint of the content/value transformations which take place during an act of will as a whole.[1] On this level the work of the will may be understood as the correlation and connecting-up of the supra-situational and the situational aspects of life.

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[1] Compare S. L. Rubinstein's statement (200, p. 511): "The problem of will, posed not just functionally and in the last resort formally, but as regards its essence—is first of all a matter of the *content* of will. . .".

In the difficult-and-simple life-world the last word in deciding the direction, route and course of activity is with purely situational factors, this is existence entirely determined by the concrete situation, objectual and motivational; in the easy-and-complex life-world the reverse is true, supra-situational contents and values being decisive. The characteristic feature of life-world Type 4 is that here the specific problems arise from the need to adjust the demands of the supra-situational to the demands, conditions and limitations imposed by the situational facts.

What is the content of "the supra-situational"? Firstly, values, which are in principle outside space and time; secondly, all the more or less remote conceptions, goals, intentions, expectations, plans, obligations and so on, which though not forming an actual part of the given situation in space-time do nevertheless prove, under certain conditions, to have some connection with it (for instance, the possibility of achieving a distant goal may pose a threat to whatever is proceeding "here-and-now").

The overall task and responsibility of the will is to connect up, for practical purposes, all the supra-situational prospects open to the given life (those offered by ideas and values and those dependent on time and space) into a personalised unity which can be actually realised in the individual's concrete, situational, real behaviour.

It is this practical, situational aspect which distinguishes will from consciousness (as the concepts are presented in our typology). The main function of consciousness also lies in the integration of life relations to form a personal, integrated whole, but consciousness (again, we refer to the "pure culture of consciousness" delineated by the abstractions forming our Type 3 life-world) deals with life relations in their pure form as values and motives, with "laboratory-prepared" relations, freed from the "body" of their operation in the practical world of the five senses. They are integrated by consciousness in principle, "theoretically", and in the course of the process some motives or values may prove incompatible with the spirit of the assembled whole and will therefore be rejected, while, conversely, others will be affirmed as obligatory, essential, central points for the whole. But when it comes to realisation in life of what consciousness has prescribed, it suddenly appears that the relations which consciousness has integrated have an independent life of their own—a "rejected" relation energetically demands realisation, while another, that has been affirmed as holding a central position, proves to lack enough energy of its own to fuel the practical activity needed to realise it. The ideally integrated whole created by consciousness begins to come apart at the seams, under the pressure of "sensory-practical" activity.

As opposed to this "theoretical" consciousness (or more precisely as a complement to it) the individual in the difficult-and-complex world has to develop will, and as a part of it, practical consciousness, which mediates will (cf. 200). The task of practical consciousness is to bring supra-situational and situational factors together, putting the first into terms of the second (e.g., giving ideal goals a "time-table", in the shape of a planned sequence or system of real goals, transmuting supra-temporal values into temporal-spatial plans and projects), and conversely discovering in any given situation its supra-situational bearing and value and the problem it presents, which can and must be solved not in theory only, but in the practical activity that has to deal with what is presented. This is a very special task, quite unique—the psychological "coordination of times". It is accomplished by projecting into the psychological present the heterogenous "orders of content and time" represented by separate life relations and by the many prospects and horizons of the future and the past. But just as it is impossible to show in two-dimensional representation the precise correlation of the elements of a curved surface, so this internal problem, equally complex, is never completely solved, there always remains some greater or lesser degree of error, unavoidable in the context of ordinary human existence.

Let us sketch in some of the problems facing the individual when the job of "coordinating times" is to be done.

Firstly, there is the problem of unifying long-term and short-term prospects, the problem of choosing an optimal reckoning-point in the future to which the planning and organisation of concrete activity will be related. The principal aim of practical consciousness here is to make far-off things come psychologically close, in other words, to make motives or goals which themselves have no power to stimulate (though they may be highly valued by consciousness), and which are always seen as being at some remove—to make such goals part of the phenomenological "now", actually and really present, though their attainment is still at a distance.

The individual may have to perform "coordination of times" in reverse, when it is necessary to move back what is near instead of bringing closer what is distant. For example, when there is a conflict between fear and some highly valued act or behaviour, it is essential to distance from oneself the sensorily-intensive emotion of fear, because it can paralyse activity—to remove it temporally from "now".[1]

The second group of problems are those produced by the limitations which time imposes upon life-activity: the problem of "time-tabling"—getting actions performed in due time—on the one hand, and on the other, the problem of human existence being itself finite.

The last problem involves coordination not of present with future, as in the preceding cases, but coordination of present with past. It sometimes happens that in the light of value judgements now accepted as valid "something in the past is actively rejected by the individual ... present re-assessment of what used to be an established part of life leads to the person casting away the burden of his own biography" (138a, pp. 216-17). Here the work that "practical" consciousness has to do is to keep a sharp eye on the ability of the past which has been in principle rejected (i.e., rejected by theoretical, evaluative consciousness) to put out shoots reaching into the present; practical consciousness has seen when these are manifesting themselves, in everyday details of behaviour, habits, emotional reactions, etc. "But it should not be thought that revolutionary changes in attitude regarding an individual's past are brought about by consciousness; consciousness does not bring them about, it only mediates them; they are brought about by the individual's actions, sometimes even by external actions—by breaking off previous associations, by changing jobs, by entering in practice into a new set of circumstances" (*ibid.*, p. 217).

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[1] The same task—freeing the self from "the tyranny of the present"—arises when psychalgia or acute psychic pain occurs, since "when such pain is present, equilibrium is disturbed as regards perception of time-periods—of present, past and future. The mental picture of the unity of time is shattered: perception is mainly limited to the present, thus hindering the person concerned from recollecting the past, i.e., disactivating his life experience and preventing him from making use of social and adaptational skills, criteria and attitudes. This is due to the intensity of the negative experience being undergone, which switches mental activity into the emotional range" (7, p. 79). These observations by A. G. Ambrumova are of interest to us here because they indicate that "distancing" of a painful present is essential not only for perceiving a meaningful future, but also for being able to use past experience.

The above paragraphs give a schematic catalogue of the principal tasks which practical consciousness has to perform. To make more precise the distinction drawn between consciousness and will, it should be said that the will, properly speaking, differs from consciousness in respect of its practicality, while "practical" consciousness—mediating the will—differs from "theoretical" consciousness in respect of its operating within situations. Consciousness, in the easy-and-complex world, has to deal with relations in their pure form as values or motives, with relations as coordinates of life, in their supra-situational form, and strives to link them together, in that form, into an integrated whole. But the will is called upon to achieve embodiment, in concrete practical activity, of those existential intents. Just as when we use a map to guide us on a journey we have in fact to deal not with the contour-lines on the map, but with the actual material terrain we are crossing, so the will in living behavioural reality encounters not relations *per se*, but conglomerations of feelings, goals, means, obstacles, temptations, impulses and so on, in short, an actual psychological situation. In other words, there is a gap between the matters handled by theoretical consciousness and those handled by the will. This gap is exactly the space filled by the special internal activity we have denoted as "practical consciousness".

This serves as an interpreter, translating the language of supra-situational values into the language of concrete situations; it fills in the "contour map" provided by theoretical consciousness with the concrete features of the real life-space and life-time; and in the living psychological landscape it picks out the value/motive coordinates of life. Practical consciousness has to see the metaphysical in the physical, the action in the impulse; in short it is called upon to bring together, as nearly as may be, the principles of theoretical consciousness and the will, to interpenetrate the one with the other.

Creative Experiencing

The critical situation specific to the internally complex and externally difficult life-world is crisis. A crisis is a turning-point in the individual personality's life road. The life road itself, so far as it is already completed, and seen in retrospect, is the *history* of the individual's life, and so far as it is as yet uncompleted, and seen in phenomenological prospect, it is the *intent* of life, for which value provides inner unity and ideal integrity. Intent as related to value is perceived, or rather felt, as *vocation,* and as related to the temporal and spatial conditions of existence, as *the life-work.*[1] This work of life is translated into material terms as actual projects, plans, tasks and goals, achievement of which means giving embodiment to the life intent. When certain events make realisation of the life intent subjectively impossible, a crisis situation occurs.

The outcome of experiencing a crisis can take two forms. One is restoration of the life disrupted by the crisis, its re-birth; the other is its transformation into a life essentially different. But in either case we are speaking of a process something like bringing one's life to birth afresh, of building up a self, constructing a new self, i.e., we are talking of creation, for what is creation but "bringing forth" or building up?

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[1] These higher structures of life are here presented in their ideal relations to one another, omitting the problems encountered in choosing the life road, forming a life intent, seeking—often very painfully—confirmation of vocation, or suffering disillusionment with one chosen, etc.

In the first sub-type of creative experiencing, then, the result is restoration of life, but this does not mean life returning to its previous state, it means that what is preserved is only the most essential part of the life that was, its idea in terms of value, like a regiment shattered in battle living on in the standard saved from the field.

The experiencing of events, even of those which have struck very heavy, irreversible blows at the whole "body" of life, so long as they have not injured life's central, ideal values can develop along one of the following two lines. The first involves the internal conquest of existing psychological identifications between the life intent and the particular forms of realising it which have now become impossible. In this process the life intent becomes as it were "less bodily", takes on a more generalised and at the same time more essential form, more closely approaching an ideal life value. The second line of progress in experiencing, in some ways opposite to the foregoing, lies in seeking out, among the life possibilities still open, other potential embodiments of the life intent; the search is to some degree made easier by the life intent itself becoming more generalised. If the search produces forms for realisation of intent which receive positive sanction from the still-operative idea of value, a new life intent is formed. Thereafter there is a gradual coming-together of the intent with appropriate sensory-practical forms, or it might be better to say that the intent "takes" and starts to grow in the material soil of life.

All such experiencing, where the thrust is towards producing a new life intent, still does not destroy the old life intent (now impossible). Here the new does not oust the old, it continues its work; the old content of life is preserved by the power of creative experiencing, and not as a dead, inert *something past,* but as the living *history* of the personality, still continuing in the new content.

The second sub-type of creative experiencing occurs when the life intent proves to have been founded on false values, and is discredited along with those values, by what their actual realisation has produced. Here the task of creative experiencing is, firstly, to discover a new value system, able to provide a foundation for a new, meaningful life intent (in this part of its process, creative experiencing coincides with value experiencing); secondly, to absorb the new system and apply it to the individual self in such a way that it can impart meaning to the past life-history and form an ideal notion of the self within the system; and thirdly, to eradicate, in real practice in the sphere of the senses, all traces of the spiritual organism's infection by the now fading false values (and their corresponding motives, attitudes, wishes etc.), at the same time affirming, again in terms of real practice and sensory embodiment, the ideal to which the self has won through.

The third sub-type of creative experiencing is connected with the highest stages of value development of the individual. A life crisis is precipitated by the destruction, or threatened destruction, of the value entity to which the individual sees himself as belonging. The person sees this whole under attack, being destroyed, by the forces of a hostile reality. Since we are here speaking of a person who is a fully competent inhabitant of the complex-and-difficult lifeworld, he clearly does not simply see this destruction but cannot fail to see it, being incapable of hedonistically ignoring reality. But on the other hand it is equally impossible for such a creature to relinquish the value entity in question, to betray it, to abandon convictions. A rational assessment of the situation would admit it to be in principle insoluble.

So what is the "strategy" of creative experiencing here? Like value experiencing, it first of all brings up the question of whether reality is to be trusted—should reason be allowed to stand as the sole source of the genuine, sole truth about what is, should the given factual reality of the moment be accepted as the fully valid expression of the truly real? But whereas for value experiencing it was a sufficient accomplishment of its task if it could enable the individual to stand by his value system, and for that purpose it was sufficient to disallow the claims of reason and to recognise in ideal terms that value reality was the higher reality—from creative experiencing something more is required, for its task is to enable the individual *to act* on the basis of his value system, to actualise and affirm it, to act upon it under conditions which practically, materially operate against it.

Such action is psychologically possible only when a special inner state has been attained. We refer to the state of readiness to sacrifice any motive, of which we spoke already when discussing value experiencing. But whereas under the conditions of the "easy" life-world such a mobilisation of inner resources was achieved by increased introversion, here, in the situation where there is direct collision with external difficulties and dangers, we find a movement taking the reverse direction in a certain sense, a movement not *into the self* but *away from the self,* a person concentrating all his spiritual and physical forces not upon achievement of personal happiness, welfare or security, but upon service to a higher value. The highest point of this movement is a state of unconditional *readiness for self-sacrifice,* or rather a state of utter forgetfulness of self, completely freed from all egoistic fixations. This state breaks through the "impossibility" situation from within, for such a state gives meaning to "irrational" actions, which are in fact the only actions that can have meaning in such a situation; selfless action becomes a psychological possibility.

6. IDEAL TYPES AND THE EMPIRICAL PROCESS OF EXPERIENCING

Here we must complete the comparison of the different types of experiencing which has already been commenced, with the analysis we made of the first three types of life-world. The most essential differences between the various types of experiencing come out in the relationship the experiencing bears to the existential event that created the critical situation, i.e., to reality, and to the life need affected by that event.

Hedonistic experiencing ignores reality, distorts and denies it, creating an illusion of the need being actually satisfied, and more generally of the damaged content of life being still intact.

Realistic experiencing eventually accepts reality as it is, making the dynamics and the content of the individual's needs accommodate themselves to real conditions. The former life content, now impossible, is cast aside by realistic experiencing; here the individual has a past but has no history (cf. 200).

Value experiencing recognise the reality which contradicts or threatens the individual's values, but does not accept it; it rejects the claims of immediate reality to define directly and unconditionally the inner content of life, and it attempts to disarm reality by means of ideal, semantic procedures, employed to make existence valid in other terms than its own, to make it into an object for interpretation and assessment. An event that has occurred is an irreversible reality beyond human power to alter, but by value experiencing it is translated into another plane of being, transformed into a fact of consciousness, and as such transfigured in the light of the value system already evolved or in the process of being evolved. A word spoken and an act done cannot be recalled or altered, but if their wrongfulness is recognised and admission of fault and repentance follow, then they are both accepted as a reality of one's life and at the same time rejected in terms of value. As regards a life content that has become impossible, value experiencing preserves it in an aesthetically perfected form, giving it a part in the history of the individual's life.

If hedonistic experiencing rejects reality, realistic experiencing accepts it unconditionally, and value experiencing transforms it, creative experiencing builds (creates) a new life reality. An event that has taken place, say an offence committed by the individual, is only ideally transformed or transmogrified by value experiencing, but creative experiencing re-creates the individual's relationship to it in sensory-practical, material terms. It is this sensory-practical, bodily aspect which distinguishes creative from value experiencing; it is distinguished from realistic experiencing because thanks to its vital links with values it is profoundly symbolic. The now unrealisable past content of life is not only preserved aesthetically in the life's history, it lives on ethically in the intents and works of the new life reality built up by creative experiencing.

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Up to now we have been analysing different kinds of experiencing as ideal types, and we must in conclusion touch upon the problem of how the regularities we have identified operate in the real conditions of actual experiencing processes.

In this field of reality, as in all others, regularities very rarely appear empirically in their pure form: as a rule several principles play a part when a real experiencing process is taking place. Their conjunction can take various forms and have various bases. As a very simple example of such conjunction we may take a case described by Stolorow and Lachman (231), the defensive refusal by a young woman to admit the death of her father. Although the dominant principle in this process was the pleasure principle, the experiencing could only continue to be effective, i.e., to maintain the patient's faith that her father still lived, because she re-adjusted the illusion she had created to fit in with existing facts, thus following the reality principle to some extent at least.

It is important which principle is the basic one in any actual synthesis of various types of experiencing, because upon this depends the contribution which the experiencing process can make to personality growth. If the dominant factor is the pleasure principle the experiencing, even if successful, can lead to regression of the personality; the reality principle can at least preserve the personality from degradation; only the principles of value and of creation can provide the basis for potentially destructive life-events in fact becoming growth-points for the personality, contributing to spiritual growth and perfection.

But there is no simple relation of dependence between the dominant principle in experiencing and the consequences of that experiencing for personality development. When the events experienced are of minor import for personality (say physical pain) the pleasure principle may actually be the most adequate. And on the other hand, attempts to experience events evaluatively and creatively can have extremely bad results, as when the value structures injected into the situation by the experiencing are not in accord with the individual personality and its life situation. Just as even the best of medicines can do great harm if prescribed without regard to the individual peculiarities of the patient's organism and to the actual course of the disease, so the ideal modes of experiencing need to be in strict accord with the unique situation in the life-world concerned.

Creative experiencing, taken not as an ideal type but as the basis for an empirical process, as creation within experiencing, means the creation of a unique synthesis of the different types of experiencing, a synthesis in accord with the given critical situation and no other. And the first creative step is taken even before the process proper commences, and consists in determining the extent to which experiencing is required at all. The point is that in its past history the individual has, upon encountering "impossibility" situations, already developed various experiencing mechanisms, and since they are there they can be used, like any other mechanisms, as and when convenient, not only when they are vitally needed. Creativity in experiencing thus in some part means only experiencing when necessary, that is, not artificially lowering the threshold at which situations become critical.

During the course of the complex process of experiencing, creativity is often expressed, again, not so much in processes specific to one ideal type of experiencing as in allowing freedom of operation, even dominance at some stage, to any or all of the principles of pleasure, reality and value.

But, of course, experiencing of this sort, like any real creative process, cannot be creative at all points. Creative consciousness cannot control the entire course of the process without a hitch, first one and then another of our principles is going to get out of control. For this reason the whole long, involved, basically creative process of experiencing, leading to reinstatement of harmony in life, is itself far from harmonious. Each of the life principles—pleasure, reality, and value—all of which the creative principle is supposed ideally to synthesise, itself represents such a powerful and independent force, and their aims in the given situation may be so much at variance, that grave inner conflicts between principles can occur during the experiencing process. These conflicts are often resolved only inadequately and one-sidedly. Although temporary, partial restoration of harmony to consciousness and personality may be achieved, overall the solution of such conflict may have negative results as destructive to the personality as the actual events being experienced. Thus experiencing can often be a prolonged, chain-reaction type of process, at each successive stage of which one has to deal not only, or not so much, with the original critical circumstances as with the unfortunate consequences of foregoing attempts to cope with those circumstances. This fact—that the experiencing process has the nature of a chain-reaction—has frequently been noted in psychological literature, but owing to the failure to distinguish between the heterogeneous principles operating within experiencing, the chain of reaction has been conceived of as unilinear, so to speak: if the psychoanalyst speaks of "defence against defence" (191; 220), what is referred to is an attempt to experience the results of an unsuccessful defence using means that are themselves defensive. Undoubtedly such phenomena occur, but the more important point, both theoretically and practically, is to understand and explain the inner conflicts and contradictions inherent in experiencing processes in terms of struggle between heterogeneous principles. On this level "defence against defence" is not something disposing of particular situational problems and fuelled, ultimately, by the same urge towards pleasure that produced the first, unsuccessful defence which had negative results that the present process is trying to undo—here "defence against defence" is a struggle fought by higher life principles against the domination of the pleasure principle. It is a struggle against defence mechanisms as such, against their automatism, i.e., their unconscious, involuntary nature, against their distortions of reality, their self-deception; and the struggle is all the harder because it holds out no promise of immediate advantage, convenience or comfort. Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis was unable to rise, so far as the theory of experiencing is concerned, any higher than the reality principle, and that understood only as a modification of the pleasure principle. In fact, the struggle against psychological defence is carried on not for the sake of triumphing over reality, or even out of abstract love for truth. It expresses the human being's urge towards real life (142), towards that which is true, for the sake of which he is prepared to sacrifice physical, social and psychological comfort.

Thus the "life-worlds" we isolated analytically are not merely self-enclosed laboratory specimens of psychological reality, they are components in the unified psychological world of a human being. In real life there is therefore no obligatory, direct dependence of type of experiencing upon type of critical situation. A real person is for instance in no way "foredoomed" to experience frustration, the critical situation specific to the "simple-and-difficult" world, only according to the reality principle—he can take the road of hedonistic, or value, or creative experiencing. Helping a person to choose the best road for the given case is the principal task of psychological counselling.

Chapter III.

CULTURAL-HISTORICAL DETERMINATION OF EXPERIENCING

In the preceding chapter, in our investigation of the specific characteristics of different life-worlds, we were obliged to make abstractions from the multiplicity of actual forms assumed by the content of those worlds, in order to observe strictness and purity of analysis. The regularities eventually arrived at are therefore of an extra-historical, formally psychological nature. Knowledge of such regularities enables us to describe and explain the course of experiencing processes, but is quite insufficient to help us to an understanding of the precise content of the experiencing of a real person, living at a particular period in history and in a particular cultural environment. So the typological analysis of experiencing has to be complemented by a cultural-historical analysis aimed at elucidating the substantive regularities, expressed in specific historical terms, to be found in experiencing.

It should be said that an orientation of this sort in studies of experiencing is no new thing within the psychological theory of activity: forty years ago A. N. Leontiev and A. R. Luria, under the direct influence of L. S. Vygotsky (145), stated the need "to consider complex human experiences as a product of historical development".

It is after all not difficult to discover the cultural-historical mediation of any human experiencing. Why, for instance, did the prisoners in Schlüsselburg fortress (140), to whom we have adverted more than once already, find the forced-labour situation intolerable, and only reconcile themselves to it psychologically as the result of an experiencing process which transformed the inner motivation of this alien, imposed activity, so that it was turned into something psychologically quite different—free, voluntary activity? That is, why is *free* activity more acceptable psychologically in this case, why does the experiencing strive to represent any other form of activity as free (or transform it into such)? One would think that for a slave in the ancient world, for instance, such a situation would not require any experiencing, and not just because the slave was accustomed to obey, for the very fact of such "custom" demands explanation. The slave was able to reconcile himself to his life situation (even if he had been born free and only later became enslaved) because there were operating within his consciousness certain "schematisms" (165), evolved on the basis of the slave-owning social formation, themselves objective and for him directly phenomenologically obvious; according to these a slave was "an animate thing only (in Roman law a slave is referred to as *res*, a thing), or at best a domestic animal" (155, p. 34). For our purposes it is extremely important that what is spoken of here is not only the fact that the slave-owning society objectively "and essentially requires the presence of the slave, i.e. of a human being understood to be and operating as a thing" (*ibid.*, p. 53), but also the further fact that there was no "consciousness in the person concerned that he was a person and not a thing" (*ibid.*) —in the ancient world "the very experience of being a human personality" was absent (*ibid.*, p. 52).

Quite different schematisms define the consciousness, and the consciousness of self, of a human being in European society in modern times. In the experiencing gone through by the Schlüsselburg prisoners there is the schematism that is probably the central one for this period, which we may, conventionally, call "Personality". Within the field of operation of this schematism the highest value is placed upon such aspects of human life as possession of consciousness and free will, initiative, responsibility, etc. —in a word, freedom. When a person is effectively integrated psychologically with the given cultural *milieu*, the above-mentioned characteristics of activity are for him requirements, felt with active tension, of great import to his life, and his experiencing processes strive as best they can to re-construct, re-formulate or re-assess a situation so that it will correspond to those requirements. In other words, a particular contentual direction in the process of experiencing is not something which arises from any natural bent of the human mind in general. To a member of a primitive society, for instance, it would simply not occur that he might be personally responsible for the failure of a hunt. The blame is placed upon magic, the evil eye, malign influences, against which he defends himself by magical rites (149), thus experiencing the situation in ways quite other than those known to the contemporary European.

But merely to state that experiencing processes have a historical basis is hardly the end of the matter. A psychological, properly speaking, approach to the problem would be to apply to the analysis of experiencing the general schema for all socio-historical determination of human psychology which L. S. Vygotsky and his pupils have already tried to produce, using a variety of psychological materials (139; 142; 158; 246; 250 etc.); that is, to understand experiencing as a process mediated by "psychological tools" (246) which are artificial formations, social in nature (*ibid.*), taken up and internalised by the subject in the course of communication with other people.

To carry through a cultural-historical treatment of experiencing means analysing three mutually interconnected questions: what is the nature of the specifically cultural modes of experiencing? What particular features are found in the process whereby these are acquired? and lastly, what is the nature of the part played by other people in the acquisition process and in the actual experiencing of an individual?

The limits of this present work, and of the author's erudition, forbid our answering these questions fully. Their detailed investigation must be a matter for special studies. While pointing to the prospect of such studies, we see our present task as being to advance some very schematic notions, based on the general ideas of the cultural-historical approach, which may serve as first hypotheses, "rangefinders", in the study of this problem; and, further, to illustrate these notions by the data acquired from analysis of a particular instance of experiencing, in which the cultural-historical mediation of the process comes out especially strongly.

What manner of thing, then, are the specifically cultural modes of experiencing? It is logical to suppose that in them must be concentrated, in one way or another, the knowledge accumulated throughout history of how typical life situations are experienced; that each separate mode relates to only one such typical situation, and must therefore be specific in terms of content but at the same time very formalised, since it is potentially applicable to the life of any individual, i.e., is of general significance. Further, the general concepts of the cultural-historical approach would suggest that in semiotic formations which mediate actual processes, experiencing among them, the individual finds not only a "tool" or mode that quantitatively extends the possibilities open to him, but a form-producing structure also, introduction of which alters the whole process qualitatively.

All these characteristics are shown by certain well-known (poorly "known", actually, if we remember the difference that Hegel pointed out between "knowing of" something and "knowing" it in a deeper sense) special substantive schemata, anyway, familiar to most students of the humanities, and conceived of from the first beginnings of philosophy. Among modern examples of such conceptions the most popular among Western psychologists have been Carl Jung's "archetypes" (19; 120; 121; 153 et al.); Jung himself saw among the ancestors of his concept Plato's "ideas", Augustine's *ideae principiales,* Kant's "categories" and Lévy-Bruhl's "collective concepts" (120). Among Russian philosophers following the same tradition we find P. A. Florensky and his "schemata of the human spirit" (see 19), and he saw his concept as related to W. Wundt's "apperceptive mass" and Kant's "schema" (76, pp. 106, 678). Related concepts have been productively employed by Soviet authors also: in the field of literary studies there is M. M. Bakhtin with his "time/content order" (25); in that of philosophy, M. K. Mamardashvili, E. Y. Solovyov and V. S. Shvyryov have produced the concept of the "schematism of consciousness" (165); and in psychology, to conclude with, there is F. V. Bassin with "type-forms of meaning-transformations" (28).[1]

When it is attuned to one or another "schematism of consciousness" (to use the term coined by the eminent Soviet philosophers mentioned above[165]) the consciousness of an individual starts to obey that schematism's particular "form-producing regularities" (19). These schematisms are able to serve as a form through which an individual makes sense of, or re-interprets, the events and circumstances of life, and are thus a culturally-prescribed form for individual experiencing.

On the matter of how such schematisms are acquired or "taken up" by the individual, this process is sharply differentiated from intellectual acquisition of knowledge. Although a schematism is from one standpoint a system of meanings, it cannot be learned like a system of scientific knowledge, for a schematism is always heavily loaded with symbolism, and like all symbols possesses "a *depth* of meaning, a *perspective* of meaning, which it is not easy to enter into" (22, p. 826), and the "entering into" has moreover to be done not by mind alone, but involves the whole of life. One can "enter into" a schematism only when one has attained a particular state of consciousness appropriate to the internal order of the schematism concerned.[2]

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[1] We are not presenting all these concepts as identical, we merely indicate a certain resemblance between them. To analyse this whole complex of ideas would require a specialised philosophical study. For the time being at least, there are many more questions than answers here. The most important question concerns the genesis of archetypes. Jung, for instance, held them to be natural formations. A very serious argument against this interpretation has been advanced by a well-known Soviet specialist on folklore, V. Y. Propp, who has demonstrated that the Oedipus complex, itself in a way an archetype, came into being as a reflection in the social consciousness of the change that had occurred in the form of inheritance (187).

[2] This is what lends intelligibility to one view of the "spatial" relationship between a schematism and an individual's conscious-

The analysis we shall be setting out below, of a particular case of experiencing, allows us to advance the hypothesis that "entering into" a schematism can accomplish the work of experiencing. This same analysis demonstrates that "entering into" a schematism is not a "one-act" process, but goes through many stages. In this progression the "first steps of entry" are of a random and momentary nature, consciousness falling in with the schematism as it were, due to certain actions by the individual, and certain situations in which he finds himself, which objectively attune his consciousness to the schematism. But for the schematism to be fully entered into and the crisis thereby experienced and overcome, what is needed is more than an appropriate tuning-in of consciousness, a reconstruction of consciousness down to its deepest levels is required.

This complex operation upon one's own personality cannot be performed by the individual alone. "Another" is absolutely essential. Not just any other, clearly, it has to be a person who appears to the individual in the experiencing as a personification of the world-outlook proper to the schematism he is about to enter into. The role of Another can be seen with particular clarity if one views matters in a historical perspective. While a person living in the urban culture of today who has to experience, say, the death of a loved one, often seeks solitude (85; 119) and sometimes perceives collective acts of funeral and memorial ceremony as no more than a tribute paid to tradition, a custom having no bearing whatever upon his private experiencing of loss—that may be so today, but in cultures where a vital part in society's reproduction is played by the regular functioning and transaction of mythic-ritual practices, the performance of the funeral rites (102, 135) with their presumed attuning of the mourners to the symbolism those rites embody, is in fact

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ness, according to which the schematism is thought of as existing not outside but within the spiritual organism, a "something" which is actualised only when a certain state of consciousness is reached.

an act of experiencing (cf. 164, p. 135). Timportant turning-points or moments of change in human life have always tended to be perceived and experienced collectively. In view of this, students of the psychology of experiencing have a wide field before them, awaiting psychological studies of the rituals associated with birth, death, initiation, marriage etc. (48; 57; 102; 233 et al.).

It should be stressed that all these theses are of a very preliminary nature.

Passing on to our analysis of a particular case of experiencing, to wit the way in which Rodion Raskolnikov experienced his crime, we have alongside our main aim—which is to illustrate and make more concrete those same foregoing theses—some hopes of illustrating a number of other theses also, which were put forward in earlier parts of this study. But first a word needs to be said on the point that the object of our analysis is not a real person but a literary character. What force can data from such an analysis have? Can it hope to bring out true psychological regularities, relying on the realism of the literary representation? Is it possible to hope that a writer can keep within the bounds of psychological probability in depicting actions and experiences, nowhere distorting the laws of psychology, i.e., can one hope that all he describes is in principle possible, a psychological reality? In studying psychological regularities in the behaviour of characters in a book, are we reconstructing reality, or merely reconstructing the author's underlying conception, his opinion of reality? (Though "merely . . . etc." is itself quite a lot, is it not, when the writer is Dostoyevsky?) Perhaps the attempt to study the psychology of real people *via* analysis of the products of poetic invention is as senseless as trying to study marine hydrology from the canvases of painters of seascapes?

We shall leave all the questions unanswered for now, and take upon ourselves the risk of undertaking a study of Raskolnikov's experiencing as if we were dealing with a real person, a part of whose life was conscientiously chronicled by Dostoyevsky.

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Understandably enough, we have to start our study by searching out the sources of the psychological "impossibility situation" which made experiencing necessary, and the ways by which the situation came into being.

The "feeling of disengagement and disconnection from humanity" (68, p. 684) which had grown upon Raskolnikov long before the crime, that is the main internal root of his crime, and is simultaneously a life problem confronting him in general. In the first pages of *Crime and Punishment* we find the process of the hero's isolation already far advanced, all the links of communication connecting him with other people already broken: Raskolnikov "avoided all company", he had developed "a habit of monologue", "he now had a general dislike of meeting his former comrades". Although he still occasionally feels "a sort of thirst for people", this rarely results in real contact: Raskolnikov experiences "an unpleasant, irritated feeling of revulsion from any stranger who touched upon or even attempted to touch upon his private personality".

The conflict between the tendency to be "outside" people and the opposite tendency, still there though much weakened, to be "with" them, resulted in a compromise attitude of "being above other people", which corresponded nicely to the respective strengths of the conflicting wishes —being "above" others is also being "with" them to some extent, but is being "outside" them to a much greater one. The direct psychological expression of this compromise was Raskolnikov's pride, and its ideological embodiment was his "theory" of there being two orders of people. Such was the psychological soil in which the idea of his crime could "take" and grow: pride promised to ensure that the crime would be psychologically bearable, the "theory" promised that it was ethically justified, and carrying out the crime appeared to be both proof of the correctness of the theory and demonstration of the super-human (64; 93) "right" of its author, of his belonging to the higher order of men. On a quite different, more down-to-earth level, the crime appeared as a solution both of external, material difficulties and of internal problems arising from them—first and foremost his disinclination to accept Dunechka's self-sacrifice in marrying Luzhin for her brother's sake.

Leaving aside detailed analysis of the psychological transformation of "idea" into "deed" (going through the phases of: abstract "theory"; "dream"; undertaking planned in concrete terms; then "rehearsal"; and finally the actual commission of the crime), let us note only that this process was accompanied by an agonising moral struggle put up by the hero against his "accursed dream". As the dream came closer to becoming "deed" and the hero's decision to do it became more definite, it thereupon appeared to him all the more revolting and absurd—that is to say, internal resistance to the "idea", from conscience, becomes stronger and stronger, as the resistance of a spring becomes greater the more it is compressed. This inner argument was indeed never settled in principle in favour of the crime (we need only recall the state of clouded reason and failing will that Raskolnikov was in just before the murder, particularly on the way to the old moneylender's home, and we realise that the murder was not the result of conscious, voluntary decision); even the crime itself not only failed to settle the argument, but came down with the crude force of an accomplished fact on the already tight-pressed spring of moral conflict in his soul, arresting it in its most unbearable state of tension.

If before the crime Raskolnikov had had to arrange his life and communications while made "ill" by the idea of the crime, by thinking about it, its possible ethical justification and psychological tolerability, now he was weighed down by the fact of murder already committed. From it being a content of consciousness, realisation of which he might still reject, over which he could still argue, it had now grown to be a content of existence, which could no longer be argued with, nor taken out of life. But to accept it into his life was also impossible, as his first psychological reactions to the fact demonstrate. Raskolnikov's "theory", which had claimed power to ensure acceptance of such a fact and to give valid meaning to crime, proved straightaway to be psychologically unfounded. This "theory" on which the idea of the crime was based, being an abstraction from essential strata in the personality of the man who conceived and executed it, proved unequal to the test of "practice": it was torn apart by the act which gave embodiment to the idea and so brought it into sensory-practical collision with the whole complex make-up of the man's personality, a collision which unmasked (not on the level of rational consciousness, but on that of "nature", to take up the word used by the investigator Porfiry Petrovich) the claims of the theory, or more precisely those of the "Napoleonic" ideal arising from it, to operate as a principle that could internally organise and "make whole" the personality. And since wholeness of the personality is not, generally speaking, a naturally given entity, but a presented unity actively created by the person concerned, loss of an existing unifying principle opens the way to processes of disintegration and collapse of the personality and its life.

Raskolnikov felt "a terrible disorder in all his self". The temporal continuity of consciousness is broken: he realised that he could not "think about the same things as before, be interested in the same subjects as he had been before . . . such a short time ago. . . . At a great depth, down below, somewhere beneath his feet and scarcely visible, there was all the past that used to be, the tasks there used to be, the subjects there used to be, the impressions there used to be . . . and he himself, and everything, everything. . . .". Contact with himself and with the world is disrupted: "He himself had cut himself off, as with scissors, from all people and all things. . . ."[1]

It is from this moment that the hero's experiencing begins. Since there is no new value system present to serve as a base on which the personality as a whole might be reorganised, and the internal conflicts solved which are insoluble within the existing life-world, consciousness is forced to have recourse to defence mechanisms in its efforts to avert total destruction of personality. But psychological defence, while striving to achieve unity of a sort, is as we already know subordinated to the "infantile" attitude, and tries to fight complexity not by surmounting and resolving it, but by an illusory simplification and removal of it. Insensitive to the psychological situation as a whole, defence operates by inflexible means, which when applied have negative results outweighing their positive effect. In Raskolnikov's case his attempts at defensive experiencing of the basic conflict not only fail to solve it positively, they draw more and more relationships within their sphere of action and give rise to a whole network of subsidiary conflicts, eventually infecting the whole of his spiritual organism.

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[1] Here is how a contemporary author explains this chain of cause and effect: "To break the unity with conscience—conscience, the messenger of accord with other people—is to break at the same time the unity with other people, with society, with the world; it is a break with one's own essential nature. The human being then ceases in fact to be a social being. This is the road to collapse, disintegration, gradual death of the personality" (75, p. 169).

Let us briefly review the way in which this network is formed. Up to the commission of the crime the central conflict—between conscience and the idea of the crime—was continually pulsating on in his consciousness. It was an unceasing internal struggle in which all the modes of consciousness came into play—rational, unconscious (Raskolnikov's first dream), emotional. The emotional dynamic of the conflict is expressed in the hero's increasing feeling of revulsion from his "idea" and from himself as its bearer; the feeling increases as he takes decisions which come closer and closer to finality, i.e., as the "idea" comes closer to becoming a "deed", and turns to relief when the "deed" is moved away, when he foreswears his "accursed dream". When the crime had been committed, the feeling of self-disgust assumed such threatening proportions, became so unbearable, that it was urgently necessary to get rid of it or at least transform it in some way. Consciousness chooses one such way—defensive projection of the feeling against the outside world. Within this, the disgust felt towards objects in the outside world is clearly distributed anything but evenly. The explanation is that the defensive effect of the projection increases in proportion to any lowering of tension it can produce within the conflict by weakening one of its poles: since one pole, the idea of the crime, has already "hardened" into the irreversible fact of actual murder and cannot be shaken by any emotion, the target of the defence process has to be those aspects of the conflict relating to its other pole, conscience. The expression this takes is first of all Raskolnikov's finding intolerable any communication with those closest to him—his mother, his sister, Razumikhin—because all their actions and converse are addressed to that part of his soul which stands opposed to the crime, feeding it by the very act of living, human communication, and so in consequence feeding also the inner conflict and its emotional expression—revulsion from and hatred of himself. The defensive projection of these emotions, resulting in Raskolnikov starting to feel "a physical hatred" for those closest to him, thus turns their cutting edge aside, or rather not aside but against their own cause.

But there can be no question of attaining any stable equilibrium in this way, since the newly arisen feeling of hatred for those close to him may damp down one conflict but produces another, a contradiction between it and his love for those same people. Hatred blocks love and the expression of love, love stands in the way of hatred and its expression. There is only one way out for consciousness—not to feel, not to express either one emotion or the other, to keep away from the people concerned. This alienation is recognised by Raskolnikov, in a quasi-spatial form: "All this around us seems to be happening somewhere else. . .," he says to his mother, sister and Razumikhin, ". . . and you, too. . . . I feel as if I were looking at you from a thousand miles away."

Such a solution to one successive, particular contradiction proves disadvantageous in terms of the system of consciousness as a whole, inasmuch as the alienation stokes up the old, original conflict between the primal need for other people, the urge towards them, and the state of staying shut away and disconnected from other people. Thus the closing-in of Raskolnikov's psychological world is accentuated, making it more difficult to achieve that profound communion which alone is capable of breaking open the vicious circles of inner conflicts insoluble by the individual on his own. The tense moral dialogue opposing conscience to crime—this, the main driving-shaft of the hero's inner life, is now closed off to any word, look or other intervention by Another: access to one pole of the conflict, conscience, has now been blocked by the mechanism of alienation just described, and the other pole, the crime, has been closed to all communication simply because of what it was —something which in the context of society must be concealed.[1]

It is apparent that the mere fact of concealment is not without its effect on, and its danger for, the personality.

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[1] Something concealed by an individual is a canker which destroys converse from within. Valid human converse presupposes the desire to lay consciousness as fully open as possible. In such converse there is a constant striving to express oneself to the uttermost, to bring in the whole person, the entire fullness of spirit. The threads of the mental associations revealed in converse go as it were "right through" the communicator, revealing him both to listener and to self. Ideally they should take in the full temporal span of life, all orders of causes and motives for actions, plans and prospects, should outline one's attitude to life, illumine the inner world. Something concealed by one party to converse is like a hole, or rather a transparent, encapsulated alien formation within the body of converse, a point where the flow of converse, the explanation of actions, memories, plans etc., all break off. The result is that the thing concealed has "bearings" taken on it from different sides, and becomes a secret (a thing concealed differs typologically from a secret in that the first has both its content and the fact of concealment hidden, while with a secret it is known [even purposely made known] that something is being hidden, though it is not known exactly what). If converse continues to gain in fullness, it leads to a thing concealed being wholly pushed up to the surface. One could say that in the environment of converse something concealed tends to be gradually uncovered, eventually being revealed through various cultural forms of declaration—ranging from entirely private admission to public declaration—after which it becomes an organic part of the communicator's field of converse, no longer requiring special effort to keep it concealed or constantly shielded from the light of converse. The catharsis of confession and admission lies partly in this cleansing of the body of converse from alien elements, their transformation into something compatible with the whole. To keep something totally concealed, in the airless closet of an isolated individual's consciousness, is possible only at the price of abdicating from genuine, heartfelt human converse.

"Anything hidden, dark and mysterious, that might exert a decisive influence upon a personality, Dostoyevsky saw as a kind of violence done to and destroying personality" (23, p. 323). The concealment of his crime introduces into the already complex picture of Raskolnikov's inner conflicts yet another pair of opposing forces. One drives him away from close, profound converse (so as to keep the crime concealed), the other pushes him towards divulgence of it (in order to make converse possible). This contradiction, like the preceding ones, is solved by various forms of compromise: firstly, by his urge to converse with unknown or little-known persons, and secondly, by oblique divulgences of the thing he is concealing. Raskolnikov has a morbid urge to engage in conversation in which oblique, indirect discussion of his crime is possible (the most significant example of this is his conversation with Zamyotov in the public-house).

We see that any attempt to solve any of the conflicts had the ultimate result of making the overall situation worse by causing a new conflict to sprout, so that in the end there was a wide criss-crossing network of conflicts, in which any movement of consciousness only pulled the threads tighter, increasing the hero's sufferings and postponing the real escape, the true resolution of the situation. On the level of this net of conflicts there was no way out, the life problem was insoluble. To make a way forward where none existed, come through the psychological situation thus created, it was essential to unlock it on some other plane, in order to break out of the vicious circle of internal conflicts.

Among our hero's existential movements we find a particular series of actions and situations which do heal him, even if momentarily, which re-create in him his lost sense of meaning in life. These are his acts of charity. The most significant of these is the help he gives to Marmeladov's family after the latter's death. When he had given them all his money and promised to come and see them the next day, Raskolnikov went away filled with "a single, new, boundless feeling, an inrush of full, powerful life. It was a feeling maybe like that of a man condemned to death who suddenly, unexpectedly hears that he is pardoned". Why was it precisely these acts which had such a healing effect upon Raskolnikov's soul? Clearly because in their meaning and in their objective psychological consequences they stood opposed to the crime, and more generally to the whole psychological world into which the crime had plunged him. In plainer terms: over against robbery and murder stand their very opposites—charity and the giving of alms. On one side, self-seeking appropriation, on the other—selfless giving. In the first case another person is just a means to an end, in the other, a person is the end or goal. In the first case the sole unconditional value, indeed the only true reality, is I Myself: the ego is affirmed outside of any relation to Another, separates itself off from everything and everybody, in the second case the accent in terms of value is shifted to Another. The emotional register of the first action is anger, hatred, etc., that of the second is love. Such is the polarity of the internal structures which are of significance for the two actions. No less important is the polarity in their consequences. The crime, objectively barring the criminal off from other people, is also concealed by him and is therefore associated with an urge to fence himself off still more thoroughly, to shut himself away (more than once Raskolnikov expresses the desire to be left alone): the act of giving on the contrary opens a person up to Another, evoking gratitude; and love and gratitude from Another and their external expressions—the embrace, the kiss—are things which, coming from without, make whole the ego and affirm its value, lending it reality and life (cf. 23). Little Polya runs after Raskolnikov, embraces him and promises to pray for him. "Five minutes later he was standing on the bridge, on precisely the same spot from which the woman had thrown herself a little while back. 'Enough!' he said, solemnly and with decision,'—away with mirages, away with self-made fears, away with ghosts!—There is life still!' ".

Service to others thus leads to affirmation of life, to a transition from the sense of death that had dominated Raskolnikov's consciousness since the crime (his intent to commit suicide, identification of his room with a coffin, etc.) to a sense of life and of its value; in other words, we have here a transition from a situation of psychological impossibility of life to one of its possibility. This transition is made even more clearly apparent even before the scene with little Polya. After one of his acts of charity Raskolnikov suddenly remembers reading somewhere "of a man condemned to death saying or thinking, an hour before he was to die, that if he had to live somewhere on a height, on a cliff, on a space so small there was barely room to stand,—and all around were the abyss, the ocean, eternal solitude, eternal tempest—even to live like that, standing on a foot of ground for all life, for a thousand years, for all eternity, even to live in that fashion was better than to die now! Never mind how, just to live! . . .How true that is! Lord, how true!"

But this thirst for life, resurrected by acts of charity, this sense of the possibility of life, "of will and of strength", this is not the culmination of his experiencing, it is only its beginning. It is the groundwork only, without which no further movement forward is possible, but the desire to live in itself holds no answers to such questions as how to live, for what, by what to live; it has no meaningful solutions to inner problems, no means of surmounting those things which have been breaking life up from within, depriving it of integrity and meaning, making it impossible. In the feeling of re-birth experienced by Raskolnikov there is no guarantee that it will itself continue, the answers have to be created, by a contentual re-structuring of consciousness and of life, first of all by a re-assessment of those life-events and life relations which have disrupted life. This re-assessment is, to begin with, attempted by our hero under the aegis of the reality principle, in the form of efforts to accept what has happened in his life just as it is: ". . .Life exists! Was I not living just now? My life did not cease to be along with that ancient old woman! May the kingdom of heaven be hers—and that will do, ma'am, time for you to rest in peace!" Nothing is so clearly expressive of the dominance of the reality principle in his consciousness at this point as his cult of the idea of strength: " 'So, it's the reign of reason and light now, and of. . . will, and strength. . . and now we'll see, now we'll try our strength,' he added aggressively." And in a later passage: "Strength, strength is what you need: without strength you get nowhere, and here strength has to be won by strength...".

This "realistic" re-assessment of events does not continue the process of surmounting the "disengagement and disconnection from humanity" that was started by Raskolnikov's acts of charity, it even works in the reverse direction, inducing in him a surge of "pride and self-assurance", reinforcing in his consciousness the old attitude of "being above people", separating him from people and closing his psychological world in upon itself.

Besides the acts of charity, there are two other series or strains of action in Raskolnikov's behaviour which do objectively tend towards conquest of his "disengagement from humanity"—these are the oblique divulgences, already referred to, of the thing he is concealing, and his impulsive converse with strangers. These also produce in him positive emotional states, but ones which, unlike the joyful, even blissful mood following after the charitable acts, have a morbid character (after his conversation with Zamyotov in the "Crystal Palace", for instance, "he came out trembling all over from a wild, hysterical feeling, one in which there was, though, a portion of unbearably keen delight...").

The reason for this morbidity is that these acts are devoid of radical re-orientation of consciousness (that is, the shift of the centre of value-gravity towards Another) and so they cannot, though solving some of our hero's particular conflicts, lead him into the new psychological world that he enters, even if only for a passing minute, thanks to his acts of charity; they only touch upon that world and then immediately return Raskolnikov's consciousness to its old state, now burdened with a further load of spiritual complications.

But if we leave aside this distinction between the inner content and consequences of divulgence and impulsive converse on the one hand, and the acts of charity on the other, we can say that all of these actions are meaningful for the life process; were it not for them and the relief they brought, even if to a minor extent and for a short time, to the spiritual sufferings and internal contradictions of the hero, the latter might well have suffered irreversible changes in his mind and consciousness. And at the same time these actions have an indicative character, they hint, each in its own manner, at a way out of the existing life situation, a way as yet undiscovered by our hero, a road along which such actions will be present but transfigured, within a new system of values which will synthesize them into a new form. The actions themselves were like the constituents of a medicine, which separately might each have some small positive effects—though this would be cancelled out by their equally strong deleterious "side-effects"—together, though, the constituents acquire curative power.

The new form is a "time/content series" (25): fault—repentance—redemption—bliss. "Entrance into" and "passage through" this series was for Raskolnikov the means by which he could build up and affirm the healing psychological world which he had momentarily succeeded in entering, having almost by chance, in the course of his impulsive castings-about in search of a solution to his life crisis, come upon actions of a kind which provided symbolic gateways, as it were, into that world.

But it is one thing to "enter" such a world sometimes, and quite another to "take up residence" within it: for that to happen, it is essential to understand the new system of values correctly, to accept it internally, and to extend it to the whole of one's life. That system was objectively actualised in Raskolnikov's consciousness by the actions we mentioned (the acts of charity), although subjectively he did not recognise it for what it was; the same system provides the basis for the time/content series just named.

What does it mean—to accept a new system of values? First of all, it means rejecting the old one, i.e., rejecting oneself. But this cannot be done by the self, alone, just as it is impossible to lift oneself by the hair; for this process it is in principle essential to have Another, on whom one can lean. And one must lean unconditionally, in entire reliance and trust. The Other for Raskolnikov was Sonya Marmeladova.

From the very beginning her image is counterposed in Raskolnikov's consciousness to the crime and its ideology ("I chose you long ago as the one I would tell of *it,* when your father told me about you, when Lizaveta was still alive. . ."), she is the living embodiment of an understanding of and feeling for the world that are directly opposed to all the things in which he was plunged and sinking. Getting to know Sonya is the start of entry into a world new to Raskolnikov, and he is twice given emotional "forewarning" of this—first he has the feeling of being re-born after his act of charity towards Sonya's family, and later, after he has confessed to her, when Sonya "embraced him and hugged him tight in her arms", "a feeling long unfamiliar to him surged like a wave into his soul and softened it". This sensation of bliss is a part of a new structure of consciousness. In other words, although the given schematism "fault—repentance—redemption—bliss" is formally expressed as series of contents following one another in time, this does not mean that the later elements in the series appear in consciousness only after the earlier stages have been traversed. They respond to one another psychologically and all exist at once in consciousness, as a Gestalt, though it is true they are expressed with varying degree of clarity as the series is gone through. Bliss is conferred even at the beginning of the road to redemption, as a kind of advance payment of emotion and meaning, needed to keep one going if a successful end is to be reached.

In Sonya's love Raskolnikov finds a reliable fulcrum, as it were, from which to do the engineering required for restructuring the value system of his consciousness. First of all it was vital for him to re-think the meaning of his crime in terms of the new value system. Confessing to the crime was only the first, outward step towards such a re-thinking. After it comes repentance, the psychological import of this being discovery of the hidden motives behind the crime, seeking out its roots and sources. If this process is gone through alone, it may be as profound as you please but it has within itself no criteria of truth, it does not know which of the possible interpretations to choose, and is liable to go off into a horrid infinity of continual reflexive debate; only in the dialogue form of confession to another can the process be brought to a positive culmination. Raskolnikov presents for Sonya's judgment several psychologically quite coherent explanations of his crime, which she (and he himself, come to that) nonetheless rejects, until it comes to the point where our hero realises himself that "he only wanted to dare":

"It was not to help my mother that I killed—nonsense! It was not to get money and power and become a benefactor of humanity... It was not the money I needed, Sonya, when I killed... I needed to find out then, find out quickly, am I a louse like everybody else, or a man? Can I step across, or can't I! Dare I bend down and take, or not? Am I a poor trembling nonentity or have I the *right*...."

But why was it the phrase about "wanting to dare" that was recognised as the genuine, ultimate explanation, recognised in Sonya's outcry "O don't say it, don't say it... You have turned away from God, and God has struck you down and given you to the Devil!"? Because that was "the end of the line", because in that explanation lay the most terrible thing of all from the point of view of Christian consciousness—"overweening pride"—the origin and source of all sin.

The outcome of this confession is that our hero accepts (though not once and for all) Sonya's attitude to the crime, thus entering into the schematism not by way of bliss this time, but by way of fault admitted, at the same time disassociating himself from the crime, de-identifying himself with it ("...it was the devil killed the old lady, not I").

Not only the murder itself but its sources and its consequences—the urge to be "above and outside other people", the dominating sense of death, the disintegration of personality, the habit of reserve and concealment—all these are implicitly included in the religious concept of sinfulness. What is the significance in psychological terms of admission of one's sinfulness? For Raskolnikov the actual fact of the murder made no sense, there was no way leading on from it. Recognition of it as a crime offered a way forward, to admission of guilt and acceptance of society's punishment. Recognition of it as a sinful act led to its condemnation in value terms and opened up an intelligible prospect of overcoming its sources and its consequences.

Since the psychological soil that produced Raskolnikov's "theory" and his crime was the attitude of "being above people" ("overweening pride"), it was essential for rehabilitation of his personality that that attitude should be broken down. From that standpoint we can understand the vertical direction we see at the start of Raskolnikov's road to redemption, from the height of his elevation, "up above" (which had had such disastrous results), in a line "down", symbolically represented in three kisses: first when he kisses the feet of Sonya, "that most lowly of creatures", then when he kisses his mother's feet, and last when he kisses the earth, following Sonya's instructions ("Go, and stand at the cross-roads, bow down [from 'up' to 'down', as the poet M. Tsvetayeva has noted.—*F. V.*], and first kiss the earth you have defiled, and then bow yourself before the whole world, to all its four sides, and say to all, aloud, 'I have killed!'. Then God will send you life again"). This is at the same time a most extreme opening-up of psychological space—the thing that was concealed must be published "in the market-place", as only from there, from the depths of the common people, can the true return to life begin (24).

The result of all these actions is that Raskolnikov succeeds from time to time in making contact with the schematism, each time entering into it more and more deeply. Subjectively this penetration is expressed in the feeling of "the soul being softened", in the sense of radical changes to come in his own self, in a clear, illuminated state of consciousness.

But the old structure of consciousness resists these changes. There is a struggle between the two systems of consciousness, the old and the new, for the right to determine our hero's perception and sensation of the world. At some points there is a kind of diffusion between the two systems, when in one thought, one utterance or one mood of Raskolnikov's ideas and feelings of both systems are present together, one facing the other ideologically. Sometimes there are abrupt leaps from one system to the other (after feeling "a corrosive hatred" for Sonya, the next minute Raskolnikov realises it was love, and he had simply mistaken one feeling for the other). Even when he is serving his sentence of hard labour, which according to the new structure should be given the meaning of redemption of fault through suffering, the struggle between the two structures dies down only very slowly. Only at the very end of the novel, when Raskolnikov has truly come to love Sonya, is there a turning-poing in the struggle, and only then does the prologue end and the story begin "of a man's gradual renewal, his gradual re-birth, his gradual passage from one world into another. . ."

CONCLUSION

To bring this book to its close, let us try and make a reckoning of what we have succeeded in doing and what problems and questions, raised in the course of our investigation, still remain unanswered.

The principal result of the work done, as the author sees it, lies in the introduction and discussion of the category-complex "critical situation—experiencing". Introducing the category of the critical situation made it possible to bring together various dispersed psychological ideas on stress, frustration, conflict and crisis into an integrated, internally differentiated construction that distinguishes these extreme situations not as empirical "things" but as theoretical types. They are distinguished one from another principally by the internal life necessities, realisation of which is psychologically impossible under the given conditions.

Experiencing does not lead directly to realisation of these needs, it is directed towards restoring psychological possibility to the activity required for their realisation. If one likens a critical situation to a fall taken by a runner, then experiencing corresponds to the effort that must be expended in order to get up again, and so have the possibility of continuing the run. This image may seem appropriate only to external activity, but it can be applied to internal activity also. For instance, experiencing a conflict which renders impossible the internal activity of choice does not in itself make a choice, it only re-structures consciousness until choice again becomes subjectively possible.[1]

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[1] A woman patient of ours, N. L., sent to us by the medical

In real life the two activities, experiencing and taking action, can flow one into the other and even both be realised in one and the same act, but it is the business of psychological theory to take immediate reality apart, establishing the "pure" regularities that are intertwined in the single process of life-activity.

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officer of a department for treatment of neuroses, for psychological counselling, complained of inability to solve her family problems. Her husband had forbidden N. L. to see her mother. The patient nevertheless continued to meet the mother, and suffered guilt feelings towards her owing to the need for secrecy, and feelings of fear (of her husband) in case the concealment came to light. Analysis of the patient's life situation showed that N. L. was attempting to behave as if her life-world was simple: she behaved to her mother as though the husband's ban did not exist, and to her husband as though there were no secret meetings with her mother. In other words, N. L. was avoiding internal conflicts as such, was afraid of taking the responsibility of letting these two life relations confront one another in her consciousness, and was trying to substitute for a single internal, evaluative, supra-situational solution of the problem, a multitude of purely external, situational escape-routes, suppressions of truth, compromises. Objectively, she was naturally enough not succeeding in completely concealing from her two relatives what the real situation was, which led to offended feelings, quarrels, and pangs of conscience on account of the need to tell lies. The psychological counselling given was aimed primarily at getting the patient to recognise that her problem was of an internal rather than an external nature, arising from insufficiency and weakness in her position on values: she had not been able to stand up to her husband regarding the value (not just the importance) to her of her own mother, while betrayal of that value was making her feel that she was disintegrating as a personality (and was on her own admission corrupting the integrity of her children by obliging them to lie to their father). The counselling resulted in N. L. gaining a clear-cut, conscious recognition of the value involved, and an understanding of the need to defend it and embody it in real behaviour; she brought herself to the point of being prepared, for the sake of that value, to sacrifice ("if it has to be!") her secure family life, in spite of this being very important to her.

The important part of this story for us is that experiencing, in the shape of value-development of consciousness, did not in itself solve the patient's life problems, but it did transform a conflict that was causing torment owing to its insolubility into a complication of life, itself far from simple, but potentially resolvable and therefore no longer causing psychotrauma. The experiencing did not make the choice, it made choice subjectively possible.

The same task—establishing regularities in their "pure" form—this time not in order to separate activity from experiencing, but pursuing the analysis of experiencing itself—is discharged by our construction of a typology of life-worlds, which led to identification of four principles (those of pleasure, reality, value and creation) which regulate the course of experiencing.

We should like to stress the import in terms of world outlook of ours thus distinguishing the two last-named principles as independent regularities: this demonstrates the limited nature, as regards principles, philosophy and philosophical method, of psychoanalytical theories on defensive processes, in which only the principles of pleasure and of reality are recognised, thus bringing the higher, spiritual regularities of mental life down to that level.

The main result of our investigation, then, is the introduction and typological ordering of two categories, the critical situation and experiencing-as-activity. Our balance-sheet would be misleading if we mentioned only positive results and said nothing of the problems and questions raised by the investigation but not dealt with in the book. It is not possible to touch on all those questions, but thanks are due to colleagues who have taken the trouble to read the manuscript and have then formulated questions which, they feel, call for further treatment. We should however like to add some words of explanation, however brief, regarding the three most important and frequently raised of these questions.

The first of them runs thus: *can one speak of experiencing extreme but positive situations?* Put like that, it already implies that the book deals only with the experiencing of negative events. The greater part of our illustrative material certainly tends to give that impression, but strictly speaking no evaluative consideration was offered in the book of the events that create a critical situation. If one were to include such a consideration one would immediately be faced with the question of what criteria should be used in evaluating events. To start with, such criteria are clearly a subjective matter (even the death of a close relative is by no means always a negative event, as the case of Pushkin's "young dandy"[1] may remind us); they are also subject to change (an event as joyful as getting married, for instance, can alas change its sign from plus to minus in the consciousness of the married couple); and, most importantly, any criteria are ambivalent on account of the multiplicity of factors involved: that which is positive when judged in terms of one life need may cause a critical situation in relation to another need. Great success, for instance, in realising some single motive can lead to disorganisation of the established motive/value system, and the event bringing success, while positive in direct emotional terms, will then require the work of experiencing to restore damaged internal unity. In Chekhov's *A Boring Story* the Professor, Nikolai Stepanovich, meditates with sadness on what has happened to his wife and daughter: "Catastrophes of life such as fame, being promoted to be a general, passing from a life of modest comfort to living beyond one's means, rubbing shoulders with the aristocracy, and all that—they have barely touched me, I have stayed whole and unharmed, but on the weak, untried ones, on my wife and Liza, it has all come down like an avalanche, and crushed them".

So the answer to the first question runs: yes, so-called positive events also confront a person with the need for experiencing, to the extent to which they prevent realisation of some life needs although they have brought about realisation of another, i.e., to the extent to which they have created a critical situation in the strict meaning of the term.

But that still leaves untouched one valid point, perhaps the most important one in the question referred to: does the positive side of a positive event require experiencing? If one takes experiencing in its widest meaning, as an internal work needed *to take in* the facts and events of life, a work establishing correspondence of meaning between consciousness and existence, then the answer is, of course, Yes. Here is a fragment of such experiencing, described in the feeling words of I. A. Bunin. A young poet, Alexei Arseniev, unexpectedly finds his work in print, "in one of the Petersburg magazines, and there I was in the company of the best-known authors of the day and what was more I had received a postal order for it, a whole fifteen roubles". The young man decides to go up to town straightaway.

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[1] The reference is to Yevgeny Onegin, whose life as a young-man-about-town was made possible by inheritance of his uncle's money—his reflections on Uncle's passing are not deeply sorrowful.—*Trans.*

"I drove along at a really smart pace. Was I thinking, was I dreaming, of anything definite? But at such times, when something important or at least significant has happened in one's life and one needs to reach a conclusion about it, or take a decision, one thinks very little, one feels more like surrendering oneself to the secret work of the soul. I well remember how all the way to town my soul was full of a sort of brave excitement and was all the time working away on something. On what? I did not know that yet, only I felt again the desire for some change in life, for freedom from something, and there was a sense of urgently wanting to set off for somewhere. . . .".

In this description it is easy to recognise experiencing and the work it does to transform a psychological world. But we are bound by our own definitions, which here remind us that experiencing is the response to a situation of impossibility or unintelligibility. Nothing of that sort is present in the passage quoted, on the contrary, the hero's situation might be called one of "super-possibility". In it there is an excess of possibilities, an excess of meanings, that overflow the hero's soul and cannot be packed away into an actual goal or find outlet in an actual decision.

One may advance the hypothesis that the need for experiencing is created not only by a situation of impossibility, but by a situation of super-possibility also. This is not the place to launch into a detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between the two types of situation. We shall point only to one fact that on the plane of activity, both situations are characterised by an absence of outward-orientated activity to resolve them, for in both cases the task that needs performing is not an external but an internal one, to do with meaning.

It is quite probable that each type of "impossibility" situation has, corresponding to it, a particular type of "super-possibility" situation. A sportsman, for instance, whose main goal and source of meaning in life is to become a world champion, has a life crisis lying in wait for him if injury should make that goal unrealisable; but he can also be thrown into a state of crisis by the complete success that realises his life-intent to the full. The intent that has organised and given meaning to his whole life is exhausted when it has achieved its embodiment, and as an intent it is dead, leaving the person in the typical crisis state of having to seek for a new intent, a new meaning for life as a whole.

With these tentative propositions we must end our response to the question regarding "positive" experiencing, though we are fully conscious that detailed work on this theme may make necessary considerable additions to, or even changes in, the general category of "experiencing".

The second question we wished to mention was once put to the author in these words: "Is the concept of 'experiencing' which you have introduced quite independent of the traditional understanding of 'experiencing', or does it only reveal some new factors underlying that traditional concept?" In other words, the questioner is casting doubt on the categorical manner in which we counterposed our concept to the one commonly found in psychology.

On the matter of such doubts, we remain convinced of the need to draw a strict distinction between these concepts. On the level of scientific terminology, as opposed to everyday speech, the two are homonyms, no more. But if we counterpose them, as concepts which fix different aspects of reality, we are then able to compare them, and to state questions regarding the real relationships and interconnections between those aspects.

The concept of experiencing-as-activity fixes primarily the "economic" aspect of transformations in the psychological world, disregarding, at least to start with, the actual forms taken in consciousness by the transformations, the forms by which they are mediated (for the function of consciousness in relation to activity, including the activity of experiencing, is to provide *a reflection mediating that activ-*

ity, a reflection of the activity itself, its matter, conditions, means, products, etc.). The concept of experiencing-as-contemplation denotes, as we have already established, a particular régime or level of consciousness as a system, a régime which exists and operates alongside other régimes—thinking action, apperception (presentation), and the unconscious (see pp. 22-24). Experiencing-as-activity is, generally speaking, mediated by the entire multilevel system of consciousness as a whole.

These propositions enable one to advance the hypothesis that *experiencing is multilevel in structure*, in a way similar to N. A. Bernstein's representation of the different "levels" involved in movement. In each particular instance of the "experiencing" activity, the levels of consciousness detailed above come together for its realisation into a functional unity unique to each instance, in which any one level may assume the leading role. In the passage quoted earlier from Bunin's *Life of Arseniev* the experiencing activity was mainly on the *unconscious level* ("the secret work of the soul"), with some active participation by the *level of direct experiencing** ("the desire for some change in life, for freedom from something, and a sense of wanting to set off for somewhere"). When all the "somes", "somethings", and "somewheres" start to acquire definition and present themselves clearly in consciousness, that indicates that the *level of apperception* is taking a hand in the work. In creative resolution of what are known as "problem/conflict" situations, the processes of the *reflective level* of consciousness are particularly important (215).

Having touched upon the matter of how the activity of experiencing is represented in consciousness, we cannot ignore the closely related problem of how the critical situation is represented there. By no means every situation that might from the outside (e.g., from the psychotherapeutic standpoint) be described as critical is seen as such in the subject's consciousness. This inaccuracy in conscious recognition is often not just a failure of perception and understanding, but the positive product of unconscious defensive experiencing, and when it comes to psychotherapy, often requires particular effort to be put into breaking down the already established defensive illusion that the situation is really resolvable without any change being made in its external and internal conditions. In other words, one is sometimes obliged to use art and skill to bring a patient to the point of recognising that his or her hopes of a direct, immediate solution to the problem are unfounded, so as to proceed then to re-orientation of the patient's consciousness towards another activity that will prove adequate to the situation—the activity of conscious experiencing, instead of the object-orientated practical activity that has already become inadequate. In terms of our hypothesis on the multi-level structure of experiencing, we are speaking here of a therapeutically-induced switch of the leading rôle in the experiencing, of transferring it from the unconscious level to those of apperception, experience-as-contemplation, and reflective action.

To come back to our second question proper, one can say that the concept experiencing-as-activity is a separate category independent of the traditional understanding of experiencing*, but that it does at the same time reveal one particular underlying point about the latter: that experiencing-as-contemplation is one of the levels of experiencing-as-activity, and furthermore the level which in most cases has the biggest "work-load", owing to its intermediate position between the unconscious and apperception. In particular, emotional experiencing*, as being the most important species of experiencing-as-contemplation (which can be other than emotional, let us recall—see p. 23), when viewed in this way appears as one constituent of the integrated activity of experiencing—a constituent having a rôle, import and function which can only be elucidated when seen within the system of various processes—unconscious, apperceptive and reflective, proceeding in parallel and/or successively—that in concert mediate some vitally essential work of the soul. This is a line of thought which can rescue us once and for all from the old prejudice, still far from dead, in favour of viewing the emotions as epiphenomenal. Emotion is not only reaction, it is action, it is not only an "assessor" of life situations, it is a "worker", making its contribution to the psychological resolution of those situations (205; 244).

And the last of our questions (really half a question, half a reproach), which concerns the book's lack of practical recommendations. How, after all, are we to help people to cope with critical situation in their lives? This question is given no direct answer in this book for the simple reason that the author's own background in practical psychological treatment seems to him quite insufficient for him to take upon himself the risk of setting down concrete recommendations on methods of treatment. To do that, on the basis of mainly theoretical arguments, would be irresponsible to say the least. Psychological counselling, let alone psychotherapy (which is the province of doctors of medicine) is so complex and many-sided a business that it *ipso facto* cannot be dealt with inside one schematic framework, however elegant. The constructions set out in the book do help the author himself in his practical work, they are of use in that they help him to a clearer, more sharply defined understanding of patients' life situations and so help psychological counselling with regard to their experiencing. But that of course proves nothing, for psychological counselling and psychotherapy are too much of an art for us to be able to put even clear successes down to the truth of the theoretical schemata on which the therapist based his work—or for us to put failures down to their fallacy.

If the connection between theoretical ideas on experiencing and the results of psychotherapy is to become not a matter of chance but something essential and systematic, the *problem of method* has to be posed, and solved. Absence of method leaves even the most coherent and well-argued theory hanging in a speculative mid-air, for method is the one and only bridge by which mutually beneficial exchanges between theory and practice can proceed. As regards a method that can adequately serve the theory of experiencing, it is quite clear that it cannot be a strictly research-orientated method, approaching its object with cognitive aims only. It has to be *psycho-technical*. A model of such method can be found within Soviet psychology, in P. Y. Galperin's theory of the stage-by-stage formation of mental operations, where that which is under study is treated (to use the words of Marx's famous theses) not only as an object, or as contemplation, but as *human sensory activity*, *practice*, in which the researcher himself is actively involved.

Working out such a method, like the whole subject of experiencing approached either theoretically or practically, is something having many aspects and cutting across disciplines. The reader can see it is so from the example of this study, in which we have tried to keep to the line of psychology only and were therefore obliged to disregard many important aspects of the subject as a whole. In view of the inherent limitations of a purely psychological approach, we should like to bring the problem of experiencing to the attention of those working in other disciplines, particularly in the humanities, who could make an irreplaceable contribution not only to the theory of experiencing but to the *practice* of psychological assistance. The efforts of psychotherapists, psychologists and "suicide-risk" specialists are not enough. The ethnographer, the folklore expert, specialists in the history of religions, could make available to the practising psychologist a treasure-house of material on the modes, means and methods whereby human experiencing has been socially organised at different stages of social development and in cultures of different types. The sociologist and the historian could assist the practice of psychology through study of the phenomena of mass psychology at times of social crisis and at turning-points in social history. The philosopher could make a great contribution through work on theoretical representations of "schematisms of consciousness".

Psychology must not of course arrogate to itself any right to prescribe themes for other disciplines. This is only an appeal for cooperation in the work of developing the theory and the practice of psychology, so as to help people. The author can only hope that his work will prove useful to the specialists who are already helping people to surmount critical situations in their lives.

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